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ABSTRACT 
State capacity scholars contend that a state’s capabilities objectively predict its likelihood 
of civil conflict onset.  The state capacity literature argues that the likelihood of civil conflict 
increases when military strength, regime revenue, and/or political institution coherence decrease.  
However, for this theoretical causal linkage to hold, the state capacity literature must assume that 
prospective rebels possess complete regime capabilities information; whereas, prospective rebels 
will know to rebel when the regime has a sufficiently weak, low revenue, and/or an incoherent 
political institution.   
I begin my dissertation by contending that incomplete information is more indicative of 
prospective rebels’ informational abilities.  Next, I consider how incomplete information changes 
the rebellion decision calculation for prospective rebels; prospective rebels use perception of the 
regime’s capabilities, not actual capabilities, to determine whether or not to rebel.  Incorporating 
aspects from literatures and fields not typically associated with civil conflict, I hypothesize that 
two mass media dimensions, media freedom and media access, have a significant interactive 
effect on how prospective rebels perceive the regime’s capabilities which influences a state’s 
probability of civil conflict.  Using a logistic regression, I empirically examine Media Interaction 
with established civil conflict literature variables on all states from 1993 to 2004.  Over a series 
of models, predicted probabilities estimations, and a controlled experiment, I determine two 
novel findings: 1) mass media significantly impacts the likelihood of civil conflict under certain 
conditions and 2) the state capacity literature’s objective assumption misses important civil 
conflict onset variance. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
General Augusto Pinochet's neo-fascist control of Chile from 1973 to 1990 is one of the 
most reviled regimes in modern history.  After a successful military coup to overthrow the 
socialist Allende regime, the Pinochet-led junta undertook a multi-pronged plan to establish 
control over the Chilean state and people (Remmer 1980).  While the human rights abuses and 
"disappearances" are well-documented, the more passive, yet no less insidious, thought control 
strategy is less researched. 
         Immediately after seizing power in 1973, the Pinochet regime filled the airwaves and 
newspapers with propaganda (Childress 2008; 85).  Television and radio programming was 
dominated by military official ribbon-cutting events, Pinochet speeches, military parades, and 
anti-Communist rhetoric (Spooner 1991; Childress 2008; Bresnahan 2002).  Newspapers actively 
assisted the Pinochet regime (Tironi and Sunkel 2000).  A former editor at El Mercurio, a major 
Chilean broadsheet, recounts its role during the Pinochet regime as "critical collaborator" 
(Childress 2008).  Regardless, the Pinochet regime appointed a censor at every media outlet to 
prevent the publication or broadcast of information that contradicted the dictatorship to maintain 
control (Childress 2008). 
         Unexpected political and social changes began to occur in 1986.  Tironi and Sunkel 
(2000) suggest these changes began with creation of a leftist newspaper and the end of the 
Pinochet regime's mass media monopoly.  For the first time since 1973, the Chilean people could 
consume information beyond the tightly controlled pinochetista filters.  Chile's media-centered 
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political growth continued as the opposition party was granted 15 minutes of airtime a week on 
national television to discuss its platform (Childress 2008).  Both of these media outlets enjoyed 
large Chilean patronage.  Just two years later, 1990, the overwhelming "No" vote in the national 
referendum removed Pinochet from power.  
         The Pinochet-led Chile case raises an interesting research question, "what role does mass 
media play in the likelihood of political opposition"?  This example anecdotally suggests when 
Pinochet's regime maintained a tight control over mass media, media reports that questioned the 
regime's policies or offered a platform for the political opposition's politics were banned.  
Political opposition to Pinochet remained low during this time period.  However, when the 
regime lost control of the media institution and countervailing media messages were being 
released, new information entered Chilean politics information sphere.  The Chilean people were 
able to consume these new, anti-Pinochet regime messages and support for political opposition 
increased dramatically.  This Chilean people movement culminated in the “No” vote that 
removed Pinochet from the Presidency.  
         The type of information available to the Chilean people appears to be an important factor 
in the rise of political opposition to Pinochet.  The media message mix changed from solely pro-
regime to a combination of pro- and anti-regime when the regime lost control of the media.  With 
the media's introduction of anti-regime information, new perceptions of the Pinochet regime and 
political opinions were formed minds of the Chilean people.  Political scientists generally 
suggest that even a partially free press can serve as an information source on and a rallying point 
for anti-incumbent regime politics (Levitsky and Way 2000).  But, this analysis glosses over the 
fundamental actor in the political opposition process: the individual.  
         At some point, the Chilean citizen had to calculate the risks of acting against the Pinochet 
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regime, decide, and behave accordingly.  The type of information available to the Chilean citizen 
appears important; only when the regime's grip on the media loosened and new messages entered 
the information nexus did average citizens begin to consider and politically act against the 
regime.  While Pinochet's removal from power occurred at the ballot box, most authoritarian 
leaders do not enjoy a similar bloodless ouster.  Rather, many autocratic and anocratic regimes 
suffer the loss of power from a civil conflict.  However, the civil conflict literature has only 
tangentially explored the relationship between mass media and the decision of a noncombatant to 
become a rebel.   As the Pinochet-led Chile example suggests, media offers exciting institutional, 
informational, and mobilization research avenues.  This dissertation seeks to close this gap in the 
civil conflict literature by examining the role mass media plays in a prospective rebel’s decision 
to become an actual rebel.  
 
THE PROSPECTIVE REBEL AND THE DECISION TO REBEL 
The question why does an average citizen become a rebel enthralls politicians, 
bureaucrats, and political scientists alike.  Predicting the factors that propel noncombatants to 
take up arms and create or join a rebel group has significant implications.  If state leaders or 
bureaucrats can anticipate the conditions that lead to domestic strife, they can work to prevent it 
or prepare to combat it.  This has foreign policy and business implications, as well.  If domestic 
strife can be predicted, foreign leaders, bureaucrats, and multinational corporations would be 
able to take early action to protect or enhance their international interests.  The question, why do 
some individuals rebel and while others do not, has significant and practical implications beyond 
academia.  
Volumes have been written that examine where, when, and why rebellions are most 
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likely to occur.  However, at the most basic level, all rebellions require an individual to decide to 
create or join a rebel group.  Here in lies the problem: while people may be destitute, starving, 
ethnically or ideologically subjugated, or suffer political violence at the hands of the regime, it is 
dangerous to become a rebel.  Rebels are treasonous.  No government, regardless of regime type, 
takes treason lightly.  Rebels are hunted by the regime's military and state police.  If rebels are 
caught, the can expect, at a minimum, a prison sentence.  However, in many states, treasonous 
activity promises prospective rebels torture and death. 
Even if regime change is universally desired in a society, each individual would prefer to 
enjoy the fruits of a successful rebellion while allowing someone else to bear the costs and risks 
of fighting.  In short, a collective action problem exists that prevents rebellion.  And, so, 
unpopular regimes are tolerated by unsatisfied populations.  Yet, sometimes noncombatants set 
down their pitchforks and pick up guns.  Why do some individuals choose rebellion and others 
not? 
When a person makes a decision, any decision, an internal calculus occurs.  In most 
cases, this calculus is instantaneous and the process itself goes unobserved by the individual.  For 
individuals considering rebellion, here forth referred to as the prospective rebel, the calculus is 
made up of at least two considerations: the costs to fight the incumbent regime and the benefits 
to rebel.  Being shielded from state-sponsored political violence, provided food and shelter 
beyond that of remaining a noncombatant, and gaining to the ability plunder local villages are all 
benefits associated with joining a rebellion.  These as well as other reasons can be powerful 
attractions for prospective rebels.  
These benefits are weighed against the struggles of fighting and the risks therein.  The 
risks may include imprisonment, a crippling and maiming, torture, and death.  When an 
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individual considers joining a rebellion, he or she certainly gives thought to the difficulty of the 
fight.  Like a boxer deciding to accept a match, the size, strength, reach, and history of the 
opponent are all important factors for consideration.  Similar to the boxer's calculus, a regime's 
capabilities affect a prospective rebel's decision to rebel.  A regime with a strong military and/or 
an effective state police force would doubtlessly increase the risks of rebellion.  The stronger the 
regime's capabilities, the greater the cost for a prospective rebel to fight the regime.  In sum, as 
regimes' abilities to combat rebel groups vary, so too do the costs that prospective rebels face 
when considering rebellion. 
 
DETERRENCE, PERCEPTION, AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
         For a prospective rebel, a regime's capability to fight the rebel group is a deterrent.  By 
presenting significant costs to the prospective rebel, a regime with "high" capabilities will deter 
him or her from rebellion.  However, the existence of "high" capabilities does not automatically 
deter the prospective rebel from rebellion.  Rather, information is fundamental for the deterrence 
effect to function properly.  
         For a moment, imagine two countries, A and B, agree to sign a defensive alliance to deter 
a third country, C, from attacking.  Yet, country C will only be deterred if it knows the defensive 
alliance between countries A and B exists.  If A and B sign an alliance but keep it in secret, C 
will not be deterred and it will attack.  Moreover, C's knowledge is key for the deterrence effect 
to function as theorized.  
         Similar to country C, a prospective rebel must know the regime possesses "high" 
capabilities for him or her to be deterred from rebellion.  Yet, is it reasonable to assume that 
states and individuals possess equal information abilities?  Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and 
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Zorrick (1997) suggest that state leaders both know and understand their inter-state opponent's 
capabilities.  However, prospective rebels are average citizens and do not enjoy the same 
information resources as state leaders.  Does a young man residing in the periphery department 
of Morazan know the El Salvadoran junta's military and police capabilities when making his 
rebellion decision?  Along with most of the average citizens worldwide, it is probably safe to 
assume that his rebellion calculus is not made with complete information of the regime’s 
capabilities. 
         Noncombatants have incomplete information on regime capabilities.  Unlike the state 
leader, the average prospective rebel does not possess entire state apparatuses to determine and 
analyze information on his or her incumbent regime.  Yet, we can imagine that possessing 
incomplete information on regime capabilities influences the prospective rebel's rebellion 
calculus.  With limited information, a prospective rebel can make the misguided rebellion 
decision.  Limited information on the regime's capabilities allows an individual to choose 
rebellion when caution is advised or vice versa.  
         The more information a prospective rebel has on regime capabilities to calculate, the 
more correct the rebellion decision.  Three sources of information are available which can 
educate prospective rebels on regime capabilities: personal experience, interpersonal discussion, 
and mass media.  While all three sources inculcate, they each provide different levels of 
information on state capacity. 
         Defined as witnessing something first hand, personal experience provides individuals 
relative understanding of the thing or event.  However, personal experience alone is only 
completely instructive in the rarest of cases.  For example, after learning to drive a car, does a 
person know how cars run or how they are made?  No, the individual gains a small level of 
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information on one aspect on a very large and diverse concept.  Similar to the driver, the average 
prospective rebel may see local armed troops, armored transport, and state police forces, but has 
no real concept of the regime's aggregate strength or effectiveness from these personal 
experiences.  
         People often encounter new ideas and information through conversations with others.  By 
sharing their personal experiences, discussants can glean new information on a new or less-
known thing, event, or idea.  It is easy to imagine two prospective rebels conversing about a 
regime's military strength or state police capabilities.  On the surface, interpersonal discussion 
appears to be a significant source of information on regime capabilities.  Yet, like personal 
experience, the information shared is bound to the discussants’ experiences.  As personal 
experience tends to yield limited information on the regime's capabilities, so too does 
interpersonal discussion.  
         Finally, people use mass media as a resource for information.  Mass media provides a 
window for people to gain information about the world beyond their neighborhoods that they are 
unlikely to know otherwise.   Unlike personal experience and interpersonal discussion, mass 
media is a medium that can disseminate largely unknowable information to potentially vast 
sectors of society.  News stories on military strength and developments, investigative journalism 
pieces on disappearances, and editorials that level praise or criticism on the regime all inform 
prospective rebels beyond snapshot information provided the other two mediums.  In sum, mass 
media provides prospective rebels with a significant level of information with which to 
understand the costs to fight and calculate the rebellion decision. 
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CONTROLLED INFORMATION: THE PROPOSED PACIFYING EFFECT OF PRO-
REGIME INFORMATION 
 
         A prospective rebel's calculus in only as good as the information he or she possesses.  
Again, prospective rebels never actually "know" the regime's actual capabilities as they hold 
incomplete information.  Rather, the costs to fight the regime are perceptions constructed by the 
prospective rebel from information sources.  Mass media serves as a significant source of 
information on regime capabilities with prospective rebels can use to form these perceptions.  
However, the mass media institution is not necessarily a neutral, unbiased information source.  
Prospective rebels may receive biased information which complicates their rebellion calculus.  
         A regime's political interests influence the nature of the mass media institution.  The level 
of political influence, and subsequent media freedom, varies across states.  As regimes possess 
sovereign control over the mass media institution, mass media is only as free as the regime 
allows.  The opportunities to undertake investigative journalism on military developments, print 
editorials, and levy critiques on state policies and practices are not universally permitted.  The 
regime shapes what qualifies as news and the types of messages mass media is able to release.  
         A "high" level of media constraint has a trickle-down effect on the prospective rebel who 
is dependent on mass media for regime capabilities information.  The prospective rebel may be 
consuming mis-information as the availability of information on regime capabilities can be 
suppressed, biased, or both by the regime.  This can have a dramatic effect on the prospective 
rebel's rebellion calculus. 
         When regimes like Pinochet's Chile tightly control the mass media institution, all mass 
media outlets invariably report very homogenized, pro-regime content.  Military parades, 
speeches, and ribbon-cutting events illustrate the infallibility, the strength, and the 'goodness' of 
the regime.   Here in lies the prospective rebel's problem: how does he or she separate bias from 
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fact? 
         The confluence of the regime's control of media content and the dependence on media for 
regime capabilities information presents a significant dilemma for the prospective rebel.  It 
becomes exceptionally difficult to delineate facts from propaganda when people are dependent 
on an information source and are unable to determine the validity of the reports.  With no 
countervailing message as all outlets report similar content, the information-dependent 
prospective rebel is likely to accept these messages as his or her own opinion regardless if they 
are biased. 
         The Chilean population challenge to the Pinochet regime correlates with the regime's 
level of mass media control.  The lack of a challenge by the Chilean population from 1973 to 
1985 appears related to Pinochet's control of the mass media institution.  By limiting media 
freedom to pro-regime information, the messages and content available to Chilean prospective 
rebels to calculate the costs to rebel was skewed heavily in favor of the Pinochet's regime. 
         Regimes can use mass media to manufacture a more grandiose image of themselves in 
the minds of prospective rebels.  Omniscience, infallibility, omnipresence, universal support, and 
an undefeatable military are but some of the message cues that regimes employ mass media to 
print and transmit to their populations.  The bombardment of these messages affects prospective 
rebels' perceptions of the regime when these are the lone cues available to consume.  Prospective 
rebels know no different; they are ignorant to the regime's "real" capability levels as no 
countervailing information exists.  Consequently, these messages must be true.  The resigned 
acceptance of these messages manufactures a pacifying agent in the prospective rebels.  The 
perception of the cost to rebel becomes so great that the benefits to rebel cannot offset.  
         A prospective rebel's rebellion calculus with skewed information may look something 
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like the following questions.  How can a rebel group hide me when the regime's state police is 
omniscient?  When the regime is unbeatable and armed with advanced weaponry, how can the 
rebel group hope to be successful; how can I hope to survive?  How likely will I remain 
anonymous in my assistance to the rebel group when so many people love the regime; will I be 
found out?  What a prospective rebel believes, how a prospective rebel perceives the regime's 
capabilities is fundamentally important in the rebellion calculus process.  When the prospective 
rebel accepts the pro-regime information as his or her own perception, prospective rebels are 
likely to calculate that remaining a noncombatant is the preferred decision.  While remaining 
subjugated to some degree is not preferential, a prospective rebel certainly prefers it as compared 
to the belief of near-certain torture or death.  
 
MOVING FORWARD: A CALL FOR RESEARCH 
         Taking cues from the correlative relationship between media control and regime 
challenge in the Pinochet Chile example, this dissertation examines the role mass media plays in 
a prospective rebel's rebellion calculus.  Mass media offers an intriguing theoretical argument 
which has been under-explored by the existing civil conflict literature.  First, mass media allows 
civil conflict scholars to set aside the assumption that prospective rebels maintain complete 
information on the regime's capabilities and further explore the rebellion calculus from an 
information perspective.  Prospective rebel's information on the regime's military strength or the 
ability to locate and repress is neither complete nor absolute.  Rather, a noncombatant's 
understanding is limited in scope and susceptible to outside influence.  
         Mass media presents an informational bridge between the regime's capabilities and the 
prospective rebel's rebellion calculus.  To be clear, it is impossible to completely determine what 
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each civilian knows and its effect on each rebellion calculi short of a survey design approach.  
However, mass media provides researchers the ability to construct a better, more reality-tailored 
theory which can account for incomplete information and the potential for outside 
misinformation influence. 
         Second, mass media has the potential to serve as a new regime capability dimension.  
Mass media is not simply an information medium; it can shape opinions and behavior.  If the 
incumbent regime can control the information available to the population, it can coopt and 
control the message content and definition of newsworthiness.  An information sphere dominated 
by intentional bias and misinformation combined with prospective rebel limited information and 
media dependence suggests a skewed rebellion calculus.  If noncombatants believe the 
incumbent regime is infallible and omnipotent, they will calculate, decide, and behave 
accordingly.  A tightly controlled mass media institution allows the regime to dominate the 
information sphere.  Moreover, the bombardment of pro-regime information can fabricate a 
skewed calculus and consequently a pacified population.  
         The dissertation is divided into five chapters.  Chapter II examines the existing research 
on state capacity, a prospective rebel's rebellion calculus, and the role mass media serves as an 
information medium.  Chapter III hypothesizes on the effects mass media access and freedom 
have on civil conflict onset.  Chapter IV proposes a research design, method, and tests the 
hypotheses.  Chapter V discusses the findings and concludes the dissertation by offering 
directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the literature necessary to lay the foundation for this research’s 
theory and methodology.  Several literatures must be reviewed in order to properly address the 
gaps in the literature and research puzzle.  First, I review the civil conflict literature with specific 
attention to the state capacity thesis.  Next, I highlight a particular gap in the state capacity 
theoretical argument: the information assumption.  Finally, I explore nontraditional literatures 
such as psychology, political psychology, and political communication for clues to the 
prospective rebel information dilemma. 
 
CIVIL CONFLICT, STATE CAPACITY, AND THE PROSPECTIVE REBEL 
The research question of when and why a prospective rebel decides to join a rebel group 
continues to be a prominent research topic in the conflict literature.  In general, the civil conflict 
onset literature can be categorized by Most and Starr’s (1989) two distinct dimensions, 
opportunity and willingness.  However, the literature has focused more on the willingness than 
that of the opportunity dimension (Sobek 2010).  The greed and grievance literary debate typifies 
the civil conflict literature’s commitment to the willingness research agenda.  However, a recent 
research trend suggests that a transition from the willingness to the opportunity dimension is 
underway.  Recent analysis has focused on the structural dynamics that can encourage and 
discourage prospective rebels to undertake civil violence.  Scholars in this research vein have 
identified state capacity as an important structural dynamic for further examination. 
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In the broadest sense, state capacity dictates the opportunity for a prospective rebel to 
undertake civil violence strategies against the regime.  First generation scholars identified 
relationships between certain state characteristics and the likelihood of civil conflict.  The 
foundations of the state capacity thesis are seen in research by Gurr (1970) and Huntington 
(1968).  Gurr (1970) assesses what dynamics increase the likelihood of civil conflict in a state.  
Gurr contends that civil conflict is more likely to occur in states where order is maintained 
through coercive force than the provision of ‘value-satisfying’ policies or actions (Gurr 1970: 
317).  Cooptation is an important factor on the likelihood of civil conflict.  In short, Gurr finds 
that civil conflict onset is more likely when a state does not respond to or mollify its population's 
demands.  Similar to Gurr, Huntington (1968) theorizes that civil conflict stems from a regime’s 
inability to govern.  Categorized by capability to govern, Huntington identifies two state types: 
civic and praetorian.  On one hand, civic states have a low likelihood of civil conflict as the state 
responsibly governs with an open and participatory government with significant 
institutionalization.  On the other hand, praetorian states are more likely to experience civil 
conflict as these regimes offer little opportunity for societal civic participation.  Huntington 
concludes that the demand for greater institutional participation and transparency fuels rebellion. 
Drawing conclusions from Gurr and Huntington, the more politically inclusive a regime, 
the lower the incentive for prospective rebels join a rebel group.  However, as Hegre et al (2001) 
concludes, the most repressive regimes experience very few civil conflicts as well.  State 
capacity dynamics beyond civic transparency and institutionalization affect the likelihood of 
civil conflict.  Exploring this puzzle, second generation opportunity scholars have found that the 
likelihood of civil conflict is determined by three conceptual dimensions of state capacity which 
are: 1) the level of political institution inclusiveness (Hegre et al 2001; De Nardo 1985; Muller 
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and Weede 1990), 2) military strength operationalized by funding (Henderson and Singer 2000) 
or the number of personnel (Walter 2006; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Balch-Lindsay, 
Enterline, and Joyce 2008), and 3) bureaucratic/administrative capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Hendrix 2010; Hendrix and Young 2014).  An examination of these 
three conceptual dimensions demonstrates the development of the state capacity thesis. 
Hegre et al (2001), Muller and Weede (1990), and DeNardo (1985) find that an inverted-
U relationship between political institution and civil conflict onset.  Imagining absolute 
inclusiveness and repression as polar opposites on the political spectrum, highly democratic and 
autocratic regimes both enjoy low likelihoods of civil conflict.  On one hand, political 
institutions that offer transparency and inclusiveness provide opportunities for citizens to 
peacefully air their grievances.  The political institution incorporates mechanisms for prospective 
rebels to change the status quo and violent strategies become less attractive and unnecessary.  On 
the other hand, highly repressive states use coercive force to control their populations which 
makes it difficult for rebellion to transpire (e.g. Zanger 2000).  Hegre et al (2001) aptly phrases 
the autocratic peace as “the peace of a zoo”.  However, the middle polities do not offer the levels 
of inclusion to co-opt or the levels of repression to deter prospective rebels.  Hence, the middle 
polities, termed anocracies, are shown to experience the highest likelihood of civil conflict 
(Hegre et al 2001).   
The idea of challenging a state military that is well funded with advanced weaponry 
(Henderson and Singer 2000) or has a large number of personnel (e.g. Walter 2006; Balch-
Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008) would be daunting for a 
prospective rebel.  Here, the greater the regime’s military strength, the lower the likelihood a 
rebellion occurs.  As Lichbach (1995) suggests, the rational prospective rebel would not join a 
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rebellion when an extremely high costs exists.  When the regime possesses significant military 
strength, prospective rebels are deterred from creating or joining a rebel group as the costs to win 
are extremely high. 
Military strength is not the only capability that can deter rebellion.  Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) show that rebellion can also be deterred by a highly 
professionalized state bureaucracy.  The state capacity literature broadly defines bureaucratic 
capacity as the ability to collect and manage information (Hendrix 2010).   Here, the more 
professionalized a state’s bureaucracy, the better it is able to monitor the population and identify 
both who the rebels are and where they reside (Hendrix 2010).   An effective bureaucracy makes 
the formation of a rebel group extremely difficult to accomplish (Hendrix and Young 2014).  For 
example, the holding of secret meetings and the recruiting of new supporters becomes 
demonstrably more difficult as the breadth and depth of a repressive state police force grows.  
Bureaucratic capacity affords a nuanced and powerful tool to efficiently and effectively engage 
rebels.  Like military strength, prospective rebels are deterred from joining or creating a rebel 
group when a regime has an effective bureaucracy as the cost of rebellion is significant. 
The decision to rebel is not solely determined by the willingness of an individual to 
engage in political violence.  Rather, a regime's level of political inclusiveness, strength, and 
effectiveness plays an influential role as well.  Regimes that possess effective bureaucracies, 
strong militaries, and highly inclusive or exclusive political institutions present a significant 
hurdle for the prospective rebel.  Given these costs, the prospective rebel would be deterred from 
rebellion.  
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PROSECTIVE REBEL AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION  
A fundamental problem in the state capacity theoretical argument is the assumed link 
between the regime's level of state capacity and the prospective rebel's knowledge of this level.  
For much of the state capacity literature, the prospective rebel is assumed to possess two 
informational abilities.  The prospective rebel is assumed to both “know” and be able to delineate 
“strong” versus “weak” state capacity levels.  The importance of this information assumption 
cannot be understated as it acts as the glue in the state capacity thesis' theoretical argument.  By 
assuming complete information, the prospective rebel has knowledge of the state capacity levels 
and any/all behavioral effects can be directly linked to these structural factors.  If the prospective 
rebel does not have knowledge of the regime's capacity level or is unable to delineate "strong" 
versus "weak" regimes, the state capacity thesis' deterrence causality fails.  The prospective 
rebels must know and be able to separate "strong" versus "weak" regimes for the state capacity 
thesis to function.   
Of course, the complete information assumption seems to fit with Bueno de Mesquita, 
Morrow, and Zorick's (1997) suggestion that state military capabilities are common knowledge.  
While these assumptions may be true for state leaders, how portable are they for the average 
noncombatant?  The information abilities differ starkly between state leaders and average 
citizens.  The average prospective rebel does not have access to similar state apparatuses to 
collect and assess information on possible opponents.  On the contrary, information on regime's 
capacity(s) is limited for prospective rebels.   
Recent research on state capacity has acknowledged the disconnect between the complete 
information assumption and the prospective rebel's actual informational ability.  By introducing 
the perception of rebellion success into the prospective rebel calculus, several scholars attempt to 
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better mirror reality (e.g. Young 2009; Regan and Norton 2005).  The prospective rebel's 
rebellion calculus is not undertaken with complete information on the regime's capacity, rather, it 
is drawn from incomplete information.  Here, the perception of rebellion success factor accounts 
for the prospective rebel's limited information on state capacity.    
A prospective rebel’s perception of the state’s capacity level impacts his or her calculus, 
decision, and ultimate revolutionary behavior.  Regardless if the state actually possesses strong 
or weak capabilities, if a prospective rebel believes that the state is “strong” or “weak”, this 
perception has a fundamental effect on the ultimate decision.  However, the theoretical 
arguments explaining where and how prospective rebel form state capacity perceptions remain 
under-developed.  The next section teases out questions on the prospective rebel perceptual 
process.  Looking to nontraditional literatures, I explore the psychology discipline and political 
psychology sub-field for clues on how prospective rebel perceptions are formed. 
 
PERCEPTION: BEYOND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Perception plays a significant role, explicitly or implicitly, in conflict research.  
Noncombatant perceptions underscore much of the civil conflict literature’s explanations on 
individual participation in rebel groups.  For example, an individual’s perception on the likely 
success of a revolt is explicitly factored into the decision whether to rebel or not (De Nardo 
1985).  Tangential to the perception of rebellion success, individual perceptions on the state’s 
military strength is evident in the civil conflict literature as well.  Heath et al (2000) theorizes on 
an individual’s decision to join a rebel group.  Here, a prospective rebel’s perception on the 
ability of the rebel group to shield participants from state repression affects the decision to join a 
rebel group.  Said in a different way, the prospective rebel’s perception of the power asymmetry 
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between the rebel group and regime shapes the decision to rebel. 
The civil conflict literature has aptly incorporated individual perceptions into the decision 
to join a rebel group.  However, the discussion on how and where prospective rebels form state 
capacity perceptions is under-examined.  If the civil conflict literature acknowledges that 
perceptions are important dynamics in the participation calculus, ex ante questions on perception 
formation clearly are necessary.  Looking to the psychology discipline and the political 
psychology and political communication sub-fields, I find important clues as to how perceptions 
form as well as the resulting impacts on the decision-making process and behavioral outcomes. 
Perception is defined as the interpretation of sensory information that attempts to make 
sense of some person, object, idea, or event (Gregory 1997; 1998)  While many theories on 
perception formation exist in the cognitive psychology literature, Bruner and Goodman’s (1947) 
and Bruner and Postman’s (1946) perceptual process findings are foundational in this sub-field.  
For international relations scholars, this theory will be familiar as Jervis’ (1968; 1976; 1988) 
work on perception and misperception in war and Tetlock’s (1983) “cognitive miser image” of 
the individual research each liberally borrow from these cognitive psychology conclusions.   
According to Bruner and Goodman’s and Bruner and Postman’s research, perceptions are 
formed through a three-step process.  The perceptual process begins when an individual is 
introduced to a new idea, actor, or object.  This "thing" strikes the person’s interest and he or she 
wishes to learn more about it.  Second, the individual seeks more information to make sense of 
the new discovery.  At some point in this information-seeking step, the individual recognizes 
similar or already understood dynamics and categorizes the new discovery.  Finally, these 
categorizations crystalize and the image of the idea, actor, or object takes shape in the 
individual’s mind.  A perception of the "thing" has formed for the individual.  Applying this 
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process to the prospective rebel, perceptions of the benefits of rebellion, the cost to fight the 
regime, and the likelihood of success all serve as information for the rebellion calculus.  But, 
how and where do prospective rebels gather information to form these perceptions? 
 
INFORMATION SOURCES, THE PROSPECTIVE REBEL, AND REGIME CAPACITY 
PERCEPTION 
 
For Bruner and Goodman’s and Bruner and Postman’s model, the investigation into the 
new discovery is the key mechanism into perception formulation.   Individuals gather at least 
some level of information on the state's capacity to form a perception.  A major gap in the state 
capacity literature, even the research that includes a perception factor in the calculus, is the 
question of where prospective rebel information.  If we assume that civilians maintain limited 
information, the obvious question becomes, "where do prospective rebels get their information"?  
Thinking critically, a civilian can gain state capacity information from at least three sources: 
personal experience, interpersonal discussion, and mass media.   
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 
The most obvious source of information is an individual's personal experience.  An 
individual can form some rudimentary perception of the regime’s military strength by witnessing 
it firsthand.  Best case scenario, an individual served in the military or worked in the regime's 
bureaucracy.  This type of prior experience makes him or her a special knowledge individual.  A 
special knowledge individual is one that has advanced knowledge of the regime or military 
beyond that of the average individual.  Excluding states that maintain mandatory conscription, 
this percentage of the population is assuredly rather small.  Beyond former employment, we can 
imagine that an individual who resides near a military installation or who has witnessed military 
parades/ceremonies would have a more crystallized image of military capabilities.  These 
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individuals could witness regiments of soldiers marching in lock-step formation, troops transport 
capabilities, tanks and mechanized armaments, and any number of other weapons.  Through 
personal experiences, an individual can have some understanding on the type of weapons the 
regime’s military has available to it and begin to gauge its level of professionalization and/or its 
possession of advanced weaponry.   
On the other hand, it is easy to believe that the average individual, for instance an 
individual in a rural area, has little to no experience with the regime’s military.  The extent of 
state military strength understanding may be as simple as “the state has men with guns”, but how 
does the prospective rebel make a power comparison when an existing rebel group also has “men 
with guns”?  When relying on personal experience for militarized actor comparisons, 
juxtapositions on professionalization, size, and type/advancement of weaponry are exceptionally 
difficult to make unless they are special knowledge individuals.  For the vast majority of 
individuals relying on personal experience, the strength of the state’s military is largely 
uncrystallized and indeterminate pictures in their minds. 
This of course says nothing of personal experience with bureaucratic capacity.  
Bureaucratic capacity to deter rebellion often comes in the form of state-sponsored repression 
(Hendrix and Young 2014).  Personal or familial experience with state-sponsored repression 
would raise an individual’s estimation on the effectiveness of the regime’s bureaucracy at 
finding potential enemies of the state.  However, a regime directly represses an entire population 
in only the rarest of circumstances.  In sum, personal experience with the state military and 
bureaucratic capacity can only be a minorly instructive information source for the population at 
large.  In most cases, the average individual does not have enough interaction with a regime’s 
military or a state police to characterize the state as “strong” or “weak” in his or her mind.   
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INTERPERSONAL DISCUSSION 
Noncombatants can gain new information on state capacity through interpersonal 
discussion.  By sharing personal experiences, discussants can get new information which further 
crystallizes their perceptions on the state's capacity by sharing personal experiences.  However, 
unless one of the discussants is a special knowledge individual, only minimal knowledge will be 
gained from the shared experiences.  Like the personal experience medium, a discussion on state 
capacity is bound to an individual's experiences knowledge and would be little more educational 
than one's own personal experiences. 
MASS MEDIA 
 Mass media presents a significant piece to the prospective rebel state capacity perception 
puzzle.  Mass media is a primary source for people to consume information about events beyond 
their daily lives.  Lippmann (1922) argues that mass media provides a window for people “see” 
beyond their daily lives and gain knowledge about the world that they could not know otherwise.   
Mass media fills a prospective rebel's knowledge void on state capacity that could not be 
satisfied otherwise.   
 Mass media provides information on the incumbent regime's military strength and 
bureaucratic effectiveness that the average citizen could otherwise not know.  Newspaper articles 
and editorials, radio broadcasts, and television reports can all provide information from all 
corners of the state to all corners of the state.  From trials of captured accused to military 
parades, media provides a mechanism for civilians to form a nuanced, crystallized perception of 
state capacity.  Mass media can help shape a prospective rebel's image of the military as “strong” 
or “weak” and the bureaucracy as “effective” or “incapable” by providing and describing likely 
unavailable information.  In sum, the ability to broadcast or present this information to large 
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sectors of society demonstrates the massive effect media can have on an entire population’s 
perception of the state. 
Stark differences can be observed on the ability to crystallize perceptions when 
comparing mass media and the other two information mediums.  Generally speaking, the 
personal experience and interpersonal discussion sources are low information mediums with 
limited dissemination.  This is especially true for personal experience.  The witnessing of 
relevant events and the holding of conversations on state capacity are operationally small 
compared to the broadcast of mass media messages.  Mass media, on the other hand, is a medium 
that can disseminate largely unknowable information to potentially large sectors of society.   
Unlike personal experience and interpersonal discussion, mass media offers information beyond 
the average individual’s perceptual process; information-consumers gain perceptions on a state’s 
capacity beyond their sensory bubble.   
 
MEDIA EFFECT AND THE PROSPECTIVE REBEL 
 Media often serves as the central intermediary between the government and the citizenry 
(Curran 2000).  Consequently, people are largely dependent on mass media for political 
information (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur 1976).  Mass media creates a lens for people to perceive 
their unseen environment and form opinions.  Ultimately, behavior is patterned from perceptions 
derived from media.  Moreover, media serves as a information guide; mass media affects an 
individual's social reality understanding and perception formation. 
 Until this point, mass media has been considered solely an information source.  On the 
contrary, Nelson et al (1997), Druckman (2001), Zaller (1992; 1996) amongst other political 
communication scholars show that mass media influences political perceptions and opinions.  By 
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filtering what is newsworthy and highlighting certain messages cues, mass media serves as a 
news mediator between the political world and the information-dependent individual.  This 
mediating role allows media to interpret a political event or dynamic for the media consumer 
(Zaller 1992; 1996).  Mass media acts as a news gatekeeper and content mediator; the reception 
of certain cues, or information that highlights specific messages, can influence political opinions 
(Cook 2005). 
 A prominent media effect process is Zaller's (1992) Receive Accept Sample (RAS) 
Model.  Zaller contends that opinion change occurs through a two-step process.  First, the 
individual receives the media message.  Second, the individual considers accepting or rejecting 
this message as his or her new or updated political opinion.  The information in the new media 
message is weighed against the individual's existing political knowledge and perceptions.  For 
Zaller's RAS Model, a new message must fit the with the individual's existing political opinions 
for it to be accepted.  However, if the topic is uncrystallized, media cues can change political 
opinions easier as the existing political opinions are in flux (Bartels 1993). 
 The RAS Model finds that public opinion will diverge along partisan lines when 
contrasting political messages are received.  However, an underlying assumption in the RAS 
Model is that the contrasting media messages possess equal visibility and accessibility.  It is easy 
to imagine that one media message is likely to be "louder", or the level of intensity is greater, 
than other media messages in non-democratic regimes.  Zaller (1996) accounts for asymmetrical 
message intensity in his crossover effect model.  Here, the author contends that the level of 
media message intensity impacts an individual's message reception and the likelihood of 
acceptance.  Individuals are both more likely to receive and accept the "louder" media message 
cue than one of the "softer" rival messages.  The crossover effect model concludes that 
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individuals are more prone to accept the new, "louder" media message as their own political 
opinion despite their political predispositions.   
 Mass media can affect an individual's political perceptions and opinions.  However, 
media does not operate in a bubble; structural interests influence the nature of mass media in a 
state.  The next section explores the relationship between the state and media. 
 
MASS MEDIA AND THE REGIME 
Mass media differs from the other sources of information in a distinct way.  Personal 
experience and interpersonal discussion spread information through individual understanding 
and conversations.  Cook (2005) argues that mass media is much larger in socio-political scope 
than individual or organizational spread of information.   Mass media has a defined social pattern 
of behavior with procedural and routine assumptions that preside universal over the societal 
sector which fits with Huntington and Dominguez’s (1975) definition of ‘institution’ (Cook 
2005; 84).  Mass media is not simply a coalescence of independent news decisions.  On the 
contrary, the prescribed newsworthiness method, news content consensus, and the official-public 
dependency for dissemination-reception of information suggests that mass media is a political 
institution (Cook 2005). 
Mass media is not an isolated institution; rather, it is shaped by the sovereign power of 
the regime.  Cook (2005) finds the regime impacts media in two particular ways: the definition 
of newsworthiness and the type of media content.  Often times, most particularly in western 
democracies, mass media is thought of as the watchdog or the sentinel that guards against 
national government corruption, abuses of power, or the encroachment on societies’ civil 
liberties (e.g. Dahl 1971; Coppedge and Reinicke 1999; Gurevitch and Blumler 1990; Curran 
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2000).  This is largely the Liberal Theory view of media (e.g. Moravcsik 1997) and can be traced 
as early as de Tocqueville’s “Liberty of the Press in the United States” (1984 [1835]).  However, 
mass media’s role is not always that of the watchdog; whereas the state defines the mass media 
institution's nature. 
Cook (2005) argues that mass media is a political institution in all states, regardless of 
regime type.  The definition of newsworthiness and the type of content permitted varies as the 
level of regime involvement in the mass media institution changes.  In some regimes, media is 
used to assert the state’s military strength, the omniscience of the bureaucracy, and infallibility of 
the leaders.  For example, recall the El Mercurio editor's comments on the relationship between 
the newspaper and the Pinochet regime in Chapter I.  The Chilean media largely collaborated 
with the Pinochet regime and was used as a propaganda device.  On the other hand, some states 
are expressly laissez faire with mass media.  These states afford the mass media institution 
freedom to define what is newsworthy and the content of the messages.  As noted above, western 
democracies demonstrate this type of state-mass media institutional relationship. 
 The effect that regimes have on mass media institutions is not uniform.  On the contrary, 
the way regimes shape mass media institutions varies globally.  However, regime influence is not 
the only difference between mass media institutions.  It is important to delineate and categorize 
mass media institutions as they can have divergent effects on their information-dependent 
populations.  The next section examines the media system literature for global mass media 
institution categorization.   
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MEDIA SYSTEM: GLOBALLY DEFINING MASS MEDIA 
 Media system is generally defined as a state's political communication culture (Esser and 
Pfetsch 2004).  The effect media has on people varies as it functions in different ways across 
states.  Often times, media systems are defined by the Liberal Theory good governance 
standards; does state afford media independence or not.  This is evident from Dahl's polyarchy 
description to Vultee's (2009) discussion on the relationship between media freedom and 
democratic peace.  Clearly, the level of constraint on the mass media institution by the state is an 
important factor when defining media system.  However, several dimensions, one of which is 
level of media freedom, make up and define a media system.  This section discusses two 
prominent media system definitions in the comparative political communication literature. 
 Hallin and Mancini (2004) propose four dimensions define a mass media institution and 
provide a means to categorize them into one of the three media system types.  The mass media 
institution dimensions are: 1) the development of a mass circulation press, 2) the degree and 
nature of the links between media and political parties, 3) the development of journalistic 
professionalism, and 4) the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system (Hallin 
and Mancini 2004; 21). Based on the varying levels of these four dimensions, mass media 
institutions are categorized into three media system types which are: the Liberal Model, the 
Democratic Corporatist Model, and the Polarized Pluralist Model.   
 While Hallin and Mancini's media system model is one of the most cited, it presents 
several theoretical and replication problems.  First, Hallin and Mancini's media system model 
requires extensive historical analysis of each mass media institution's development (2004; 14).  
While the qualitative results from such a research program would be subtle and nuanced, it poses 
a serious problem for large-n media system analyses.  Second, Hallin and Mancini admit that 
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states often display characteristics of more than one model.  Media system analysis becomes 
unduly complicated and produces blurred results when the Model categories are not definitive.  
Third, the authors offer a media system categorization based only on Western Europe and North 
America mass media institutions.  However, Hallin and Mancini's media system categories are 
based on the historical research of people and states with highly similar socio-cultural and 
political histories.  Mass media institutions outside of Western Europe and North America that 
developed with different histories may not fit nicely into the existing types.  Consequently, 
Hallin and Mancini's media systems types cannot be considered a global media system model, 
rather, a supra-regional one. 
 Norris' (2004) media system model begins with the Liberal Theory's assumption that a 
free press is necessary for social and political development (e.g. Dahl 1989).  However, she 
argues that the governance concept does not adequately categorize the differences between 
media systems.  For example, while the mass media institutions are largely independent from 
state interference in both the Philippines and the United States, they are clearly different along 
other conceptual divides.   
The level of media freedom represents the types of messages available to consumers, 
however, it misses a crucial dimension when taken alone: the ability to consume media 
messages.  Norris finds that any media system theory that does not contemplate a level of access 
dimension is an incomplete mass media institution categorization.  When categorizing mass  
media institutions solely by level of media freedom, media messages are assumed to be equally 
consumed.  Juxtaposing Mongolia and the United Kingdom illustrates the inaccuracy of this 
assumption.  For example, it is easy to imagine that Mongolian and British peoples have 
substantially different level of media access despite both being free mass media institutions.    
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The level of media access, the number of radios, televisions, and newspapers in a state, 
importantly represents the population's ability to receive the media messages.  In short, Norris 
contends that the greater availability of media resources, the more likely a media message will 
have an effect on the population at large. 
Norris hypotheses that mass media institutions should be categorized by two dimensions: 
the level of media freedom and the level of media access.  Mass media institutions are 
categorized into one of the four media system types based on "high" or "low" levels of the two 
dimensions.  Figure 2.1 illustrates Norris’ media system typology in a 2 x 2 matrix which are: the 
Widespread Access and Free Press Model, the Limited Access and Free Press Model, the 
Widespread Access and Nonfree Press Model, and the Limited Access and Nonfree Press Model.   
The author concludes that each Model yields a different level of media effect on the 
population.  First, the Widespread Access and Free Press includes mass media institutions that 
are independent from state intervention.  Here, mass media can freely report on social problems, 
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public concerns, and present calls for governmental accountability.  And, these media messages 
are able to be consumed by large sectors of society given the widespread level of media access.  
Mass media in the Widespread Access and Free Press model is demonstrative of the Liberal 
Theory arch-type; it is an information source and government watchdog for both elites and the 
general public.  The level of media effect is not society-wide due to the heterogeneous message 
mix.  However, a pocketed, self-selection oriented media effect does exist (e.g. Newton 1999). 
Second, it is easy to imagine that the media effect is different when limitations on press 
freedom and access are instituted.  In the Limited Access and Free Press Model, the mass media 
institution is free from state constraint and has a measured effect on government accountability.  
However, given the limited level of access, the media effect will probably limited to society's 
elites.  The lack of society-wide media access limits the media effect trickle-down to the general 
population.  Moreover, mass media institutions in the Limited Access and Free Press Model 
minimally affect the general population's political opinions and perceptions.   
Third, the objective is not the enhancement of government accountability for mass media 
institutions demonstrative of the Widespread Access and Nonfree Press Model.  Here, the 
incumbent regime tightly defines what is newsworthy for and constrains the messages of mass 
media.  Mass media serves as a regime functionary; it is a tool for pro-regime propaganda 
content.  Given the level of state intervention, the message mix is highly homogenous.  Also, as 
the level of media access is high, large sectors of society are bombarded with these pro-regime 
media messages.  Media effect for mass media institutions in this Model should be significant in 
both society-wide breadth and individual perception formation depth (see also Chong and 
Druckman 2007).  
Finally, fourth, mass media institutions in the Limited Access and Nonfree Press Model 
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are restricted in scope by the state.  Like the Widespread Access and Nonfree Press Model, mass 
media does not serve the good governance watchdog role.  However, unlike the Widespread 
Access and Nonfree Press Model, it is not employed as a propaganda tool.  Mass media does not 
serve as a significant information source for the population due to the low level of media access.  
As such, mass media is not an effective mechanism for the regime to shape the population’s 
opinions.   Moreover, given the combination of the general population’s low media access and 
the restricted media, media effect for institutions in the Limited Access and Nonfree Press Model 
is pro-regime but minimally so. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Chapter II discusses the existing literature necessary to address why prospective rebels 
decide to join rebellions.  Focusing on the state capacity literature, I argue that two information 
problems exist.  First, a significant portion of the state capacity literature assumes that 
prospective rebels maintain complete information on regime capabilities.  This assumption 
serves as a crucial link in the theoretical causal mechanism; the deterrence effect will not 
function as theorized if prospective rebels do not know or cannot delineate "strong" versus 
"weak" state capacity levels.  Unfortunately, this is an unrealistic assumption.  Prospective rebels 
do not possess complete information; rather, their state capacity information is quite limited.   
 Second, in an attempt to address this information problem, a growing contingent of state 
capacity scholars has introduced perception into the prospective rebel calculus.  While I applaud 
this decision as it better represents the prospective rebel's informational abilities, it only 
supplants one theoretical gap for another.  If prospective rebel informational ability is limited 
and the rebellion calculus is based on perception, where and how do these individuals form their 
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perceptions?  To date, the literature has under-examined the perception formation process of 
prospective rebels. 
 Chapter II questions, "where do prospective rebel perceptions come from"?  To answer 
this question, I explore literatures traditionally unassociated with the civil conflict literature.  
First, the cognitive psychology literature is reviewed to determine the process of perception 
formation.  Then, I consider where individuals gather information that forms their perceptions, 
specifically on state capacity.  Mass media is determined to be a significant source of 
information.  However, mass media does not neutrally crystallize perceptions and opinions, it 
can also shape perceptions.  Finally, mass media is not a standalone institution.  The media 
system literature finds that the level of regime involvement and the level of media access both 
influence the breadth and depth of media effect on a population.   
 The next chapter unifies many of these concepts.  Here, I present a solution to the state 
capacity information assumption and under-developed perception theoretical argument problems.  
Mass media is not just an information source for prospective rebels; it is a formidable dimension 
of state capacity. 
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CHAPTER III: THEORY 
 
Why do prospective rebels decide to rebel?   The state capacity literature contends that 
prospective rebels base their opportunity-cost rebellion calculus on the regime's "real" or actual 
capability level (e.g. Hendrix 2010).  I argue that state capacity is not simply military and state 
police capabilities; rather, it is also the regime's ability to control information through mass 
media.  As discussed in Chapter II, the civil conflict literature has attempted to include mass 
media theoretical explanations into analyses on the likelihood of civil conflict onset.  However, 
under-theorizing, under-examination, and case study portability issues have plagued existing 
literature.  In order to move the literature forward, this dissertation offers a well-developed mass 
media argument that addresses these issues.   
First, media cannot be treated as possessing absolute persuasion capabilities; mass media 
does not demonstrate a hypodermic needle effect (Lazarfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944).  A 
more theoretically informed civil conflict and mass media hypothesis needs to include a media 
effect mechanism that is grounded in the political communication literature.  Second, the mass 
media institution is not the same in every country.   The mass media institution is free to choose 
and report information in some states and is constrained by the regime in others.  A well-
theorized argument accounts for a mass media institution’s level of media freedom as it 
structurally affects the definition of newsworthiness and the content of the messages able to be 
reported.  Third, in many instances, the existing literature makes the assumption that, because 
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mass media reports information, prospective rebels’ opinions are affected.  While media must 
first exist for any media effect to occur, it is misguided to assume that because media exists it 
has a media effect.  The variance in the ability to receive media messages is a fundamental, 
structural factor for media effect.  It is essential to consider both a country’s and an individual 
prospective rebel’s ability to consume media messages when hypothesizing media's effect on 
likely regime capabilities perception and rebellion behavior. 
 The theoretical arguments presented in Chapter III seek to advance the civil conflict and 
mass media literature significantly forward by accounting for media effect, media freedom, and 
media access.  By acknowledging a prospective rebel’s information on regime capabilities is 
incomplete, I argue that the information available to prospective rebels likely influences what 
perception he or she crystallizes and his or her subsequently calculated rebellion behavior.  
Given that mass media is a potentially unrivaled source of information on the regime’s aggregate 
capabilities, I propose it has a particular influence on a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities 
perception.  Chapter III argues that, together, media freedom and media access structurally 
influence a prospective rebel’s level of and accuracy of information on the regime’s capability to 
combat a rebellion.  By employing Zaller’s RAS model and crossover effect, I contend that 
certain prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perceptions are likely shaped as media freedom 
and media access covary.  I conclude Chapter III by hypothesizing on mass media’s effect on the 
likelihood of civil conflict onset. 
  
THE PROSPECTIVE REBEL 
This chapter focuses on the prospective rebel’s rebellion decision calculus.  As one might 
imagine, the decision to transition from a noncombatant to a traitorous rebel is a significant life-
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choice.  Just as in any decision, an individual looks to make an informed choice (Satz and 
Ferejohn 1994; Hausman 1995). Information is perhaps even more valuable to a prospective 
rebel given the starvation, capture, torture, maiming, and death risks associated with rebellion.  
Consequently, prospective rebels likely seek as much information about the regime’s capabilities 
as possible in order to guide their decision. 
 As discussed in Chapter II, prospective rebels do not possess complete or perfect 
information on the regime’s capabilities.  Rather, prospective rebels likely base their rebellion 
decision calculus on the information gathered about the regime’s capabilities.  It is logical to 
conclude that the information available to the prospective rebel probably plays a significant role 
in shaping how he or she perceives the regime’s capacity to combat a rebellion.  The next section 
examines the three information sources from which prospective rebels can gather regime 
capabilities information and their different levels of informational utility. 
 
REGIME CAPABILITIES INFORMATION SOURCES  
 The prospective rebel likely gathers information about the regime’s capabilities through 
three sources which are personal experience, interpersonal discussion, and mass media.  While 
all three sources provide regime capabilities information, the level of information differs 
between them.  In short, personal experience and interpersonal discussion are less informative of 
the regime’s aggregate capabilities than mass media. 
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 
 Personal experience generally can be defined as the information an individual witnesses 
through direct sensory acquisition.  As an individual spends much of his or her life at home or at 
work, personal experience is largely bound to what occurs in an individual’s home community.  , 
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The likelihood an individual directly experiences some phenomenon logically decreases the 
farther away he or she moves from the home community.  Personal experience is informative but 
most likely only on phenomenon in an individuals’ home community. 
 Applying this concept to prospective rebels, personal experience likely provides 
information on the regime’s strength and effectiveness in their home communities.  Ranging 
from no interaction to daily interaction with the regime’s military and bureaucracy, a prospective 
rebel can glean valuable information about the regime’s capacity in that locale.  However, 
personal experience is less likely to provide information on the regime’s capabilities the farther 
away the military and bureaucracy are from the home community.  So, while personal experience 
provides regime capabilities information, it is limited in scope as it is largely bound to the 
prospective rebel’s home community.  Moreover, personal experience provides significant local 
regime capabilities information but little aggregate regime capabilities information to prospective 
rebels.   
INTERPERSONAL DISCUSSION 
  Interpersonal discussion is defined as a conversation between at least two people and 
where information is shared.  As an individual is most likely to converse with his or her social 
group than with a stranger, interpersonal discussion primarily occurs between family members, 
friends, and with people in a common social organization.  That said, a stranger can purposefully 
seek out a conversation with a specific individual if he or she has an incentive. 
 During interpersonal discussion, participants exchange information known about a certain 
phenomenon.  Interpersonal discussion relegates information in two ways.  First, interpersonal 
discussion allows individuals to pass along personal experience information.  No new 
information is passed when this type of information transfer occurs between individuals that 
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possess the same level of information.  On the surface, interpersonal discussion in this context 
seems irrelevant.  However, it offers an informational reaffirmation for the discussants; what 
they independently experience is mutually held between discussants.  Second, interpersonal 
discussion allows a discussant to relay information he or she received through mass media to 
another discussant that did not receive the media message.  This type of interpersonal discussion 
information transfer allows for discussants to receive information they did not possess 
previously.   
Interpersonal discussion is potentially informative source of information on the regime’s 
local and aggregate capabilities for a prospective rebel.  Here, the level of information the 
interpersonal discussion medium possesses depends on the discussants’ levels of information.  If 
the discussants possess only personal experience information, interpersonal discussion is largely 
confirming the local personal experiences already held by the discussants.  If one of the 
discussants possess mass media information and the other(s) does not, the relay of this 
information proves very informative.  The under-informed discussant would then possess both 
local and aggregate regime capabilities information.  Interpersonal discussion can be either 
ineffectual or very informative depending on the discussants’ levels of information. 
MASS MEDIA 
  Lippmann (1922) suggests that mass media is a window for people “see” beyond their 
daily lives and gain knowledge about the world that they could not know otherwise.  In practice, 
mass media is typically defined as the modes such as television, newspaper, radio, news 
magazines, and technology devices used to convey messages.  In short, mass media is a tool for a 
relatively large audience to glean information about the world beyond their home communities.   
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 Mass media is a significant source of regime capabilities information for a prospective 
rebel.  Mass media provides information on the regime’s capabilities beyond what a prospective 
rebel can locally acquire in his or her home community.  For example, mass media can provide 
through news reports information on troop movements, troop professionalization, possession of 
armored mechanization, air and sea capabilities, and the use of special tactical units.  In addition 
to direct military information, mass media exposes can include military and state police funding, 
budgetary changes, and victories or defeats in intra- or inter-state conflicts.  Moreover, when 
compared to personal experience and interpersonal discussion, mass media can provide 
potentially unparalleled information on the regime’s military capabilities to the a prospective 
rebel.  
 From a bureaucratic effectiveness standpoint, mass media reports provide prospective 
rebels with information on the regime’s capacity to find dissidents as well as it’s willingness to 
use violence.  These media reports could show and/or discuss a regime’s omnipresent police 
force, court trials of captured dissidents, public displays of repression, and outright torture. Mass 
media can be used to broadcast parades and civilian protests to either champion or demonize the 
regime and its policies.  This type of mass media message might convey the level of civilian 
support for the regime on a state-wide level to the prospective rebel.  In sum, mass media likely 
serves as a significant information resource on the regime’s aggregate capabilities for 
prospective rebels.   
 Overall, each of the three information sources provide prospective rebels with 
information on the regime’s capabilities.  The difference between the information sources is the 
level of information that each respectively offers to prospective rebels.  Personal experience is 
likely to only offer local information on the regime’s capabilities.  As most conversations occur 
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between people of the same social group, interpersonal discussion offers little additional 
information on the regime’s capabilities than what the discussant prospective rebel already 
maintains from his or her personal experiences.  That said, conversations with individuals that 
have received mass media messages are informative for the discussant prospective rebel that has 
not received similar media messages.  These conversations are particularly rewarding as mass 
media is likely the most informative information source on the regime’s aggregate capabilities.  
Prospective rebels that receive mass media messages, either directly or through conversations, 
likely glean information on the regime’s aggregate military strength and bureaucratic 
effectiveness.  Without mass media information, the prospective rebel probably only possesses 
local, limited information on the regime’s capabilities.  Consequently, I contend prospective 
rebels are largely dependent on mass media for aggregate regime capabilities information.   
 While prospective rebels gather regime capabilities information from one or some 
combination of these sources, the sources’ different levels of information likely influence the 
perceptions formed.  The next section discusses a prominent information-to-perception 
crystallization process which is Bruner and Goodman’s (1946) and Bruner and Postman’s (1947) 
three-stage cognitive perceptual process model.  After discussing the model, I consider how 
information from mass media versus personal experience and interpersonal discussion likely 
affect a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception. 
 
INFORMATION AND PROSPECTIVE REBEL PERCEPTION FORMATION  
What is perception?  A working definition is as simple as an individual’s incomplete 
understanding of some phenomenon.  But, how do individuals come to form perceptions on a 
new phenomenon; they gather information on it.  Consider this, every phenomenon has some 
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defined universe of information on it that, to one degree or another, is available to individuals to 
consume.  I term this universe the information sphere.   
For example, imagine an elementary or primary school student is assigned to write a 
report on some concept that is entirely new to him or her.  What does the student probably do?  
Depending on the question and source availability, the student likely searches one or all of the 
following information sources to gain a better understanding of the assigned concept: 
newspapers, magazines, books, television programs, discusses with friends and/or family 
members, and searches the internet.  In short, an individual can form some perception of a 
phenomenon by accessing the phenomenon information sphere and gathering information on it.   
PERCEPTUAL PROCESS MODEL 
Bruner and Goodman (1946) and Bruner and Postman (1947) theorize on the mechanics 
of perception formation and present a three-stage cognitive perceptual process model which 
codifies this activity.  In the first stage, when an individual is introduced to a new concept, actor, 
or object, often times the new phenomenon strikes his or her interest and wants to know more 
about it.  In the second stage, the desire to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon 
compels the individual to seek more information on it.  After gathering more information on the 
phenomenon, a perception of the phenomenon crystallizes in the individual’s mind.   
 The three-stage perceptual process occurs during any new perception formation.  For 
example, the process is the same for a sports fans considering a team’s new player as it is for 
prospective rebels considering rebellion; each individual undergoes a perception formation 
process through information gathering.  Applying the perceptual process to the prospective rebel, 
the first stage’s introduction of a new phenomenon is analogous to the noncombatant considering 
the regime’s capacity to combat a rebellion.  As discussed earlier in the chapter, the rebellion 
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decision is a significant life choice for a prospective rebel given the potential costs associated 
with rebel group participation.  Similar to the second stage, the search for more information on 
the regime’s capabilities is part of the prospective rebel’s decision.  In order to understand the 
regime’s capabilities, a prospective rebel will gather as much information from all three sources.  
Finally, like the third stage, a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception crystallizes 
based on the information search.  Here, the totality of the information gathered by the 
prospective rebel coalesces into a perception of the regime’s capacity to combat a rebellion. 
THREE CONCERNS 
Given the three-stage perceptual process model’s conclusions, the more information a 
prospective rebel consumes, the more accurate his or her regime capabilities perception is to the 
regime’s actual capabilities.  While a reasonable conclusion, I find three problems exist with this 
conclusion.  First, is it fair to assume that mass media is equally accessible for all prospective 
rebels, across all states, over time?  Just because mass media is potentially the most informative 
of the information sources on regime capabilities, media effect on perception only occurs if 
prospective rebels actually receive the media messages.  The level of media accessibility in a 
state must be accounted for when considering the effect of mass media on prospective rebels’ 
perceptions.   
Second, mass media message content is not uniform; media messages can have different 
cues.  Every mass media institution is subject to the sovereign laws of the state with which it is 
located.  Therefore, the level of state control over the mass media institution likely influences the 
nature of media messages available to prospective rebels.  By shaping the messages available, 
regimes can likely structurally affect the regime capabilities perceptions crystallized by 
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prospective rebels.  As a result, the level of media freedom in a state must be accounted for when 
considering the effect of mass media on a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception.   
Third, Bruner and Goodman’s and Bruner and Postman’s three-stage perceptual process 
model offers an simplistic media effect construct. Assuming media messages are received, 
theories on media effect differ from the three-stage perceptual process model’s conclusions.  In 
short, mass media does not have the hypodermic needle effect on perceptions and opinions as 
assumed in the three-stage perceptual process model.  Consequently, it is important to account 
for media effect theory when examining how mass media likely shapes a prospective rebel’s 
regime capabilities perception.   
 The effect the level of media freedom has on civil conflict onset has generally, albeit in 
an under-theorized way, been addressed in the existing civil conflict literature.  However, the 
relationship between the level of media freedom and the level of media access and a prospective 
rebel’s rebellion decision calculus has gone largely unexamined.  Similarly, media effect theory 
has been considered in a wide range of situations, yet, its potential role in shaping the way in 
which an individual perceives the regime’s capabilities remains unexplored.  The following 
sections discuss how the level of media freedom, the level of media access, and mass media 
effect each influence a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception.  
 
 
THE LEVEL OF MEDIA FREEDOM: HOMOGENOUS AND HETEROGENEOUS 
ENVIRONMENTS  
 
 Unfortunately for prospective rebels, personal experience and interpersonal discussion 
are unlikely to furnish aggregate regime capabilities information.  This forms an information 
dependence on mass media whereas in most cases this is the only information source which 
provides information on the regime’s aggregate capabilities.  When considering mass media 
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solely in its theoretical form, this dependence is not necessarily problematic as it reports 
information like the other two information sources.  In the previous section’s mass media 
discussion, I assumed mass media messages provide accurate information on the regime’s 
aggregate capabilities.  In essence, what a prospective rebel reads in a newspaper, sees on 
television, or hears on a radio broadcast is indicative of the regime’s actual capacity to combat a 
rebellion.  However, because mass media interacts with and functions within other actors, it 
often operates differently than the neutral, unbiased theoretical form.  This can have an effect on 
mass media’s message accuracy.   
At the state level, the mass media institution is subject to the regime’s sovereign laws.    
Given the confluence of the prospective rebel’s likely inability to garner aggregate regime 
capabilities information from the non-mass media sources and the regime’s ability to sovereignly 
govern its own state, regimes are incentivized to influence the mass media institution.  As such, a 
regime can see mass media as a way to control what the population knows about its military 
strength and bureaucratic effectiveness.  By requiring mass media to report that the regime has 
“strong” capabilities, it can potentially dissuade challenges to its power.  I explore this concept 
further in the following pages.   
LEVEL OF MEDIA FREEDOM AND MESSAGE MIX 
 The level of media freedom that a regime allocates to the mass media institution 
structures the nature of the information available to the population.  The mass media institution’s 
level of media freedom is demonstrated on two dimensions which are the definition of 
newsworthiness and the determination of media content.  In practice, the mass media 
institution’s ability to define what is newsworthy and what content to report demonstrates its 
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level of media freedom.  The effects of an increased or decreased level of media freedom is 
borne on the media environment, or, the mix of pro-regime and non-regime media messages.   
The regime likely forces a definition of what constitutes news and censoring the reported 
content when it affords only a low level of media freedom to the mass media institution.  In this 
media environment, mass media does not perform investigative journalism or release exposes on 
the regime’s capabilities.  Because the regime tightly governs the mass media institution and has 
an incentive to dissuade potential challenges, the regime has an interest in allowing media to 
release reports that champions its capabilities.  As such, mass media is akin to a regime 
propaganda tool where it is only allowed to report pro-regime biased messages that the military 
is strong and the bureaucracy is effective at finding dissenters.  Consequently, when the mass 
media institution has a low level of media freedom, the media environment’s message mix is 
likely homogenous with a significant pro-regime weight.   
Conversely, when the regime does not constrain the mass media institution, mass media 
is able to independently define what constitutes news and determine content coverage.  As a 
result, mass media likely takes on the watchdog role as it is relatively free from regime oversight.  
Acting as the population’s sentinel against regime corruption and malfeasance, mass media 
investigates the regime and reports on its activities and policies to the public.  From a message 
mix standpoint, while the regime can release its pro-regime message, it is only one of the many 
media messages present in the media environment.  When the mass media institution has a high 
level of media freedom, the media environment’s message mix is likely heterogeneous with a 
non-regime message weight. 
The Chilean media example represents a real world instance of a mass media institution 
gaining more media freedom from the regime.  The practical implication was that the media 
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environment changed from a perfectly pro-regime homogenous message mix to a heterogeneous 
one in 1985.  In sum, the Pinochet regime only allowed mass media to report pro-regime 
message pre-1985, however, the pro-regime and a non-regime message made up the media 
environment from 1985 onward.  If we accept the three stage perceptual process, the Chilean 
people’s Pinochet regime perceptions perhaps changed from that of absolute strength to potential 
weakness assuming they received the non-regime media messages. 
 The Pinochet example demonstrates the transition from a perfectly homogenous media 
environment to largely homogenous media environment.  That said, most mass media institutions 
do not possess such low levels of media freedom.  In practical terms, media environment 
message mixes range from pro-regime message exclusivity (perfect homogeneity) to an infinite 
number of messages on regime’s capabilities (perfect heterogeneity), worldwide.  Figure 3.1 
illustrates how the media environment’s message mix changes as the level of media freedom 
changes. 
 Figure 3.1 represents an increase in the level of media freedom and an equal increase in 
media environment’s message mix when moving left to right along the diagonal line.  The nexus 
of the dotted vertical line and the diagonal line illustrates the point in which the pro-regime and 
anti-regime messages achieve symmetry in the media environment.  Functionally, this is the 
point at which the pro-regime message no longer has message prevalence over the anti-regime 
message in the media environment.  At the aggregate level, the vertical dotted line represents the 
break between two holistic media environments: media-as-propaganda and the watchdog media. 
 Starting at the far left of Figure 3.1, mass media likely takes on the propaganda role.  
Given the low level of media freedom, the media environment is dominated by pro-regime 
messages.  By moving right, while still outnumbered, a growing few mass media report non- 
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regime messages to the public.  This media environment message mix is termed minorly-
heterogeneous.  Upon passing the dotted line, the pro-regime message declines to the point that it 
no longer dominates the media environment.  As mass media increasingly enjoys the freedom 
from regime oversight, the media environment is increasingly filled with investigative journalism 
reports on the regime’s policies and capabilities. 
When considering media message consumption, admittedly, it is nearly impossible to 
know the type of and how many mass media messages each individual prospective rebel 
consumes.  However, as the level of media freedom structures the media environment’s message 
mix, that same message mix offers clues on what information a prospective rebel is likely to 
receive on the regime’s aggregate capabilities.  So, on one hand, a prospective rebel is likely to 
receive largely accurate information about the regime’s aggregate capabilities when he or she 
resides in a mass media institution with a high level of media freedom.  On the other hand, a 
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prospective rebel is likely to receive pro-regime biased information about the regime’s aggregate 
capabilities when he or she resides in a mass media institution with a low level of media 
freedom.  I argue that, based on the level of media freedom, I can predict what messages 
prospective rebels likely receive and, as to be discussed later in the chapter, what perceptions 
they are likely to crystallize on the regime’s capabilities..   
To summarize, due to the mass media institution’s level of media freedom, mass media 
does not always report on regime capabilities in the same fashion.  While mass media likely 
informs prospective rebels on the regime’s aggregate capabilities, the content of the message 
may not always accurately depict the regime’s actual aggregate capabilities.  The next section 
explores how media messages influence a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception.   
 
MEDIA EFFECT AND PERCEPTION 
 For a prospective rebel, mass media offers a potentially unparalleled source of 
information on the regime’s aggregate capabilities.  However, prospective rebels receiving media 
message in a heterogeneous versus a homogenous media environment are likely to be presented 
with very different regime capabilities information.  On the surface, the likely effect of media 
message variance has on a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception seems reasonable.  
Bruner and Goodman’s (1946) and Bruner and Postman’s (1947) perceptual process model 
suggests that all gathered information will shape what perception crystallizes for an individual on 
a phenomenon.  But, this assumption runs dangerously close to one of the existing literature’s 
theoretical problems, the hypodermic needle media effect.  The hypodermic needle media effect 
argues that an individual’s perceptions and opinions are continuously updated after receiving 
each and every media message.  For example, an individual’s opinions would swing wildly on 
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the phenomenon receiving contradictory media messages.  Refuted by Lazarfeld, Berelson, and 
Gaudet (1944), perceptions and opinions are more stable and do not form or change through a 
shot-styled media effect.   
So, while the perceptual process model's first two stages (interest and information 
gathering) appear logical, media message reception does not automatically translate to perception 
formation.  Rather, a more nuanced media effect process occurs in the third stage of the 
perceptual process.  This section discards the hypodermic needle media effect assumed in the 
perceptual process model and considers two political communication media effect models which 
are Zaller’s (1992) Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model and Zaller’s (1996) crossover media 
effect model.  By specifically accounting for media effect in the perception crystallization 
process, I offer a stronger, more theoretically informed model on the manner in which 
prospective rebels form regime capabilities perceptions. 
THE RAS MODEL, MEDIA EFFECT, AND THE PROSPECTIVE REBEL 
To this point in the dissertation, I have argued that information available to a prospective 
rebel likely affects a prospective rebel’s regime capability perception.  However, the three-stage 
perceptual process offers a too-simplistic explanation of media's effect on perception.  This 
section sets aside the hypodermic needle media effect and looks to the political communication 
sub-field for theoretical mechanisms on the way in which mass media messages influence 
opinions.  Of course, several media effect theories exist yet two prominent media effect models 
map particularly well with the three-stage perceptual process model.  These two media effect 
models are Zaller's (1992) RAS model and Zaller's (1996) crossover media effect. 
Like Bruner and Goodman’s and Bruner and Postman’s three-stage perceptual process 
model, Zaller’s (1992) influential Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model incorporates the 
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fundamentals of phenomenon interest, information consumption, and potential perception 
change.  While Zaller originally developed the RAS model to describe how American political 
perceptions form, I contend that the principles of the RAS model can be applied to the process 
with which prospective rebels crystallize their regime capabilities perceptions.  By focusing on 
media message reception and its effect on perception, the RAS model allows scholars to examine 
the nuanced details that exist in and between the three stage perceptual process model's second 
and third stages.   
The RAS model consists of three stages.  In the first stage, Reception, a prospective rebel 
actively seeks and is passively bombarded by regime capabilities media messages.  Zaller 
contends that the amount of information an individual receives is based upon his or her level of 
cognitive engagement which is defined as an individual's level of interest in a particular 
phenomenon.  Here, the cognitive engagement factor suggests that as individual’s level of 
interest increases, the more likely he or she will receive media messages on the phenomenon.  I 
argue it is fair to assume that prospective rebels have a relatively high level of cognitive 
engagement on the regime's capabilities level because the rebellion decision presents a 
significant life choice.  In short, the prospective rebel has an incentive to make the strategically 
correct rebellion decision and the gathering of information, specifically mass media information, 
on the regime’s capabilities is a rational approach to do so.  
In the second stage, Acceptance, the RAS model finds that individuals tend to resist 
media messages counter to their pre-existing positions on an issue.  Zaller finds that an 
individual’s ability to resist the media message’s cue depends on his or her ability to identify the 
relationship between their predisposition and the media message.  The resistance factor is a 
significant hurdle in Zaller's RAS model as most Americans have some political predisposition.  
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The theoretical need to account for political predisposition is clearly important.  However, I 
contend the prospective rebel presents a somewhat special case for the Acceptance stage as he or 
she inherently possesses a neutral pre-existing regime capabilities perception.   
On one hand, the prospective rebel is not pro-regime as he or she is considering rebellion.  
Naturally, this is not a pro-regime disposition.  On the other hand, the prospective rebel is not 
wholly anti-regime as he or she has not yet joined a rebel group.  By employing personal 
experience and limited information derived from interpersonal discussion, a prospective rebel is 
likely to understand that the regime has soldiers, weapons, and can locate rebels to some degree.  
However, when employing this localized information, the regime’s aggregate capabilities 
probably remain unknown to the prospective rebel.  As a result, the prospective rebel likely has a 
low resistance factor to media messages due to the combination of neutral political 
predispositions and probably limited information on the regime’s aggregate capabilities.  
Moreover, a prospective rebel is likely to accept media message cues because he or she has a 
neutral predisposition and limited capabilities information to qualify them against. 
In the final stage, Sampling, the RAS model concludes that the media effect on an 
individual’s opinion is demonstrated through “top-of-head” information recall.  Zaller finds that 
asking the individual pre-message and post-message questions, a change in what the individual 
recalls about the phenomenon illustrates the media effect on his or her opinion.  For the 
prospective rebel, I suggest that the individual is at the cusp of a decision when considering 
rebellion.  The media effect on a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception is thus 
demonstrated through the rebellion decision calculus and subsequent rebellion or noncombatant 
behavior.   
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In sum, a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception is influenced by mass media 
messages.  Due to a prospective rebel’s incentive to make a rational, strategic rebellion decision 
and the likely dependence on mass media for aggregate regime capabilities information, media 
messages should have a significant effect on his or her regime capabilities perception.  Given 
that perception serves as the basis for a prospective rebel’s rebellion decision calculus, the 
determined rebel or noncombatant behavior is, at least partially, the culmination of the media 
effect.   
THE CROSSOVER EFFECT AND ASYMMETRICALLY-WEIGHTED MEDIA 
ENVIRONMENTS 
 
 When considering cross-national media system analysis, media environments from 
heterogeneous to homogeneous message mixes are present throughout the world.  Message 
“loudness”, defined as the message’s prevalence in the media environment, is a problematic 
factor for the RAS model as it assumes that two messages exist with symmetrical media 
environment prevalence.  Said a different way, Zaller assumes that individuals have an equal 
probability of receiving each media message.  Zaller fashions the competing message RAS 
model in this way as his research examines how an individual’s level of cognitive engagement 
and predisposition resistance factors mediate media effect in the United States’s media 
environment.  By assuming equal media message “loudness”, Zaller is able to analyze the effect 
these factors have upon opinion change.  Unfortunately, due to this assumption, the RAS model 
is unable to gauge how media influences perceptions in a media environment with an 
asymmetrical message mix. 
 Zaller (1996) acknowledges that the RAS model is not a silver bullet media effect model 
and argues that opinions are affected differently when varying message loudness.  Here, Zaller 
finds that media message mix is likely to have a structural effect on opinion crystallization.  
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Termed the crossover effect, Zaller contends that media message loudness influences opinions 
because an individual has a higher probability of receiving a message when it is asymmetrically 
prevalent in the media environment.  Even those individuals with pre-existing positions counter 
to the media message's cue can experience some level of opinion change due to the loudness of 
the messages.  In sum, an asymmetrically loud media message complicates both the resistance 
factor and the "top-of-head" recall process by repetitively bombarding the individual and 
effectively drowning out the lesser prevalent message's cue.  An example may help illustrate this 
crossover effect on perception.   
 First, imagine some phenomenon has occurred, mass media has decided it is newsworthy, 
and media coverage ensues.  For ease of explanation purposes, next imagine a population of 
media messages on the phenomenon is ten.  Within this media message population, two 
messages exist: Message A and Message B.  Also, assume that an individual possesses a high 
level of cognitive engagement on the phenomenon and thereby receives all ten media messages.  
Finally, imagine the media environment's message mix is asymmetrically weighted; Message A 
is significantly “louder” than Message B.  Message A’s cue is represented in nine of the ten 
media messages and Message B’s cue is only in the remaining on media message.   
 Using the “top-of-head” sampling media effect method, a significantly higher probability 
exists that the individual will recall cues from Message A than Message B on the phenomenon.  
Even if the individual possesses predispositions more akin to Message B’s cue, he or she 
becomes less likely to identify the links between these predispositions and the phenomenon in 
the face of the Message A’s asymmetrical prevalence and reception.  The increase in Message 
A’s recall probability illustrates the crossover effect’s opinion or perception influence.  
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Moreover, media message “loudness” demonstrates a media effect on opinion by shaping what 
an individual recalls about the phenomenon.   
THE CROSSOVER EFFECT’S LIKELY IMPACT ON THE PROSPECTIVE REBEL’S 
REGIME CAPABILITIES PERCEPTION  
 
 Applying the crossover effect to the prospective rebel, an asymmetrically loud media 
message likely influences the way media shapes his or her regime capabilities perception.  
Inserting a prospective rebel into the hypothetical media message example, the prospective rebel 
will only experience a symmetrical-mixed media environment once (when Message A and 
Message B are each reported in five media outlets) out of a possible ten media environments.  As 
a result, the RAS model does not accurately depict media environments prospective rebels likely 
receive media messages in.  More likely, prospective rebels experience some type of 
asymmetrically-weighted media environment where either Message A or Message B has a 
"louder" presence than the other message. 
 Refer back to Figure 3.1.  It illustrates all the possible media environments on regime 
capabilities by showing the change in the level of media freedom and the impact on message 
mix.  Here, the vertical dotted line represents the only media environment with message mix 
symmetry between the pro-regime (left side) and non-regime (right side) poles.  Collectively, the 
areas to the left and right of the vertical dotted line are media environments where one of the 
messages possesses message mix prevalence.  By moving closer to the poles, the asymmetrical-
weight of the one message increases.   
 When introducing the message loudness media effect into Figure 3.1, a prospective rebel 
who resides in the watchdog versus the media-as-propaganda media environment is likely to 
receive messages demonstrative of the message mix.  Given their high level of cognitive 
engagement, dependence on mass media for aggregate capabilities information, and low political 
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predispositions, a prospective rebel likely will receive both types of media messages.  However, 
because the prospective rebel likely receives more of one message than the other, he or she has a 
higher probability of accepting and recalling the louder message cues.  According to crossover 
effect conclusions, the prospective rebel likely adopts these cues as his or her regime capabilities 
perception.   
When considering the concepts of media freedom level and the crossover effect together, 
a prospective rebel is likely to receive, accept, and recall media message cues from whichever 
asymmetrically-loud media environment he or she resides.  On one hand, if a prospective rebel 
resides in a watchdog media environment, he or she is likely to receive more non-regime than 
pro-regime media messages.  Due to high cognitive engagement and low predisposition 
resistance factors, the prospective rebel will receive both non-regime and pro-regime messages.  
However, the pro-regime message will likely be drowned out given the asymmetrical prevalence 
of the non-regime message in the watchdog media environment.  The prospective rebel is likely 
to recall the non-regime message cues which include accurate regime capabilities information.  
As a result, the prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception is influenced by the non-
regime message cue; the perception will likely accurately depict the regime’s actual aggregate 
capabilities.   
On the other hand, if a prospective rebel resides in a media-as-propaganda media 
environment, he or she is likely to receive more pro-regime than non-regime media messages.  
Again, the prospective rebel is likely to receive both pro-regime and non-regime messages due to 
a high cognitive engagement level and a low predisposition resistance factor.   However, the 
non-regime cue will likely be drowned out given the pro-regime message’s loudness in the 
media-as-propaganda media environment.  Here, the prospective rebel has a higher probability to 
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recall the pro-regime message cues which likely aggrandize the regime’s actual aggregate 
capabilities.  In sum, the prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception is affected by the pro-
regime message cue and will likely reflect the biased, pro-regime accounting of the regime’s 
aggregate capabilities.   
 To review, this section examines how mass media messages shape perceptions.  Moving 
beyond the perceptual processes’ tacitly assumed hypodermic needle media effect, I look to the 
political communication literature for theory on the specific ways in which mass media is able to 
influence perceptions.  Using Zaller’s RAS model and the crossover effect, I present how media 
affects opinions in an asymmetrical media environment.  According to Zaller, the louder media 
message drowns out the less prevalent one in an asymmetrical media environment which results 
in individuals being more likely to recall information from the louder cue.  This louder cue recall 
represents the media message’s impact on perception of the phenomenon of interest.  When 
applying this media effect process to the prospective rebel, the asymmetrical media environment 
affects the regime capabilities perception.  As pro-regime messages are asymmetrically loud in 
the media-as-propaganda media environment and non-regime messages are asymmetrically loud 
in the watchdog media environment, the level of media freedom structurally shapes how a 
prospective rebel perceives the regime’s capabilities. 
 To this point, I have analyzed how media message content affects a prospective rebel's 
regime capabilities perception.  However, a prospective rebel's regime capabilities perception 
can only be influenced by mass media messages if he or she actually receives the message.  The 
next section discusses how a prospective rebel's regime capabilities perception likely varies as 
the level of media access changes.   
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THE LEVEL OF MEDIA ACCESS: MEDIA MESSAGE RECEPTION AND LIMITED 
INFORMATION PERCEPTIONS  
 
 While the mass media institution's media freedom level likely influences the type of 
media messages available to a prospective rebel, a different structural dynamic impacts a 
prospective rebel’s search for regime capabilities information.  I argue that a country’s level of 
media access likely affects a prospective rebel's perceptions as it varies the probability that he or 
she will receive media messages.  Prospective rebels likely desire the most information possible 
on the regime’s capabilities in order to determine the "correct" rebellion decision.  However, 
desire and ability are not necessarily the same. 
 An underlying assumption in media freedom's explanation of the likelihood of civil 
conflict is that prospective rebels receive media messages when they are reported.  I contend it is 
inappropriate to assume that every prospective can receive media messages, let alone all media 
messages, just because they are being written or broadcast.  Rather, the level of media access 
must be accounted for as it has a fundamental effect on the ability of prospective rebels to 
receive mass media information.  This section explores how media access likely shapes a 
prospective rebel's regime capabilities perception.   
DOMESTIC CLASS AND THE DIFFERENCE IN MEDIA ACCESS 
The media access thesis argues that the level of media access in a state determines a 
prospective rebel’s ability to, either passively or actively, receive media messages.  As mass 
media messages provide information on a regime’s aggregate capabilities, the level of mass 
media access can influence a prospective rebel’s perception.  While all prospective rebels seek 
regime capabilities information, they are not equally able to acquire it from mass media.  
Prospective rebels come from all segments of society (Grossman 1995; Popkin 1979; Skocpol 
1979; Fearon 2004a; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Huntington 1996) and their abilities to 
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consume mass media vary substantially.  Personal wealth and income affect an individual’s 
ability to access media and thereby receive media messages.   
 It is easy to imagine that an American has significantly greater access to mass media than 
a Namibian or a Javan when considering the level of mass media access cross-nationally.  I take 
this conclusion one step further to the domestic level.  I argue an aggregate decrease in the media 
access level likely does not uniformly affect the entire population's ability to receive media 
messages.  More likely, an individual's income influences his or her ability to access media.  
Norris (2004) makes a similar argument by suggesting that income level likely affects whether or 
not an individual has the capital expenditure necessary to purchase luxury goods such as 
television set, cable or satellite feed, a radio set, and even a newspaper.  The lower the income, 
the less likely the individual is to make these luxury goods purchases.  So, even as media access 
aggregately declines, this decrease should not uniformly affect the entire population’s ability to 
receive media messages.  If income affects media accessibility, then certain segments of a 
domestic population should maintain media access despite a reduction in the country’s aggregate 
level of media access.  I contend that the ability to receive media messages is not only different 
between states but also domestically by income level.  In short, I account for the domestic 
variance in media access by considering a population in terms of class, specifically Elite and 
Non-Elite. 
ELITE AND NON-ELITE PROSPECTIVE REBELS 
 First and foremost, it is important to define these actors, their particular preferences, and 
their particular rebellion calculus.  Beginning with a definition, the Elite and Non-Elite actors are 
defined by their level of income and personal wealth.  Here, wealthy and prosperous individuals 
are considered Elite prospective rebels and all other non-wealthy individuals are deemed Non-
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Elite.  While level of income differentiates the Elite prospective rebel from the Non-Elite 
prospective rebel, I assume that the two groups share the same preference which is to maximize 
personal welfare.  This assumption is rather simplistic; it is similar to the rational actor 
assumptions made in the opportunity literature (e.g. Grossman 1995).  Using the welfare 
maximization preference, I assume that the Elite and Non-Elite will both choose to rebel when 
they perceive the regime is weak.  Rebellion is attractive for a few different reasons.  For the 
Elite prospective rebel, it offers the opportunity supplant the incumbent regime and establish a 
new institution that maximizes his or her welfare.  For the Non-Elite, rebellion is attractive 
because often time it offers a better life than remaining a noncombatant.  Like the Elite 
prospective rebel, a Non-Elite prospective rebel will likely maximize his or her welfare by being 
part of a successful rebellion; as the maxim suggests, to the winner goes the spoils.  However, it 
is important to remember that rebellion is likely a dangerous decision.  The strength of the 
regime’s capabilities matters; while a weak regime may be defeated, a strong regime will likely 
defeat a rebel group.  But, as the prospective rebels do not possess perfect or complete 
information on the regime’s capacity to combat a rebellion, the amount and accuracy of an Elite 
and a Non-Elite prospective rebel’s regime capabilities information underscores their rebellion 
decision.  In short, rebellion may offer a way for prospective rebels to maximize welfare and it 
may offer the exact opposite, depending on the regime’s actual aggregate capabilities to fight a 
rebellion.   
Considering these Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebel distinctions, how might income 
affect the likelihood of civil conflict?  A state’s socio-economic elite have the income and 
personal wealth necessary to afford luxury purchases like televisions, radios, and newspapers.  
So, even when a state’s overall level of media access declines, the Elite class is still likely able to 
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receive and consume media messages.  On the other hand, the Non-Elite class is unlikely to 
possess the level of income and wealth necessary to purchase luxury goods like media receptors.  
As a result, the Non-Elite class is more likely to experience the decline in media access as the 
state's level of media access declines.  Consequently, Non-Elite prospective rebels are less likely 
to receive informative media messages on the regime's capabilities which should affect the 
accuracy of their regime capabilities perceptions. 
The level of media access likely has a significant implication on a prospective rebel's 
regime capabilities perception.  The higher the level of media access, the more likely a 
prospective rebel utilizes mass media to gather information on the regime's capabilities.  As mass 
media messages probably include aggregate capabilities information, a prospective rebel that 
receives mass media messages is likely to form more accurate regime capabilities perceptions 
than those that do not.  As the level of media access declines, a prospective rebel is less likely to 
use mass media to gather regime capabilities information and thus more likely to crystallize a 
regime capabilities perception from personal experience and interpersonal discussion which offer 
largely local, limited information.  A prospective rebel in this circumstance is less likely to form 
an accurate regime capabilities perception.    
 Bringing these various concepts together, Figure 3.2 illustrates the relationship between 
the level of media access, the level of regime capabilities information, and domestic population 
class.  First, similar to Norris (2004), media access is categorized into two levels which are 
“Widespread” Access and “Limited” Access.  In a “widespread” access state, mass media can be 
received by all segments of society and serves as an important population-wide information 
source.  In a “limited” access state, only the Elite class has access to mass media what the level  
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of media access is aggregately low.  Second, the level of information is divided into two 
categories which are “Local” and “Aggregate”.  “Local” represents the information likely 
gathered through the personal experience and interpersonal discussion and “Aggregate” 
demonstrates the information likely received through mass media. Third, the domestic 
population is separated into two classes, the Elite and Non-Elite.  The Elite class possesses 
significant income and personal wealth.  The Non-Elite class represents the remainder of the 
society.  
 Information on a regime's local capabilities is available to all prospective rebels, 
regardless of class. Information gathering through personal experience is a natural, near-
involuntary process for all individuals.  Additionally, a prospective rebel is likely to inquire with 
his or her peer group about the regime’s capabilities given the high interest in the subject.  While 
both of these information sources are widely available, they are unlikely to yield information 
about the regime’s capabilities beyond the prospective rebel’s local area.  In a “widespread” 
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access state, both the Elite and Non-Elite have a high level of media access, likely possess 
aggregate regime capabilities information, and crystallize accurate regime capabilities 
perceptions.  However, I contend a difference in information probably exists between the Elite 
and Non-Elite classes in a “limited” access state.  Regardless of a decrease in aggregate media 
access, the Elite class likely retains the ability to receive media messages and thus remains 
informed on the regime’s aggregate capabilities.  Unlike the Elite class, the Non-Elite class 
experiences the decline in mass media access.  Consequently, the Non-Elite prospective rebel is 
likely to form inaccurate regime capabilities perceptions by relying on local, limited information 
as mass media becomes less accessible.   
LIMITED INFORMATION PERCEPTIONS AND SUB-OPTIMAL REBELLION DECISIONS 
 Recall that a prospective rebel's regime capabilities perception likely influences his or her 
rebellion decision calculus.  A prospective rebel likely crystallizes a regime capabilities 
perception from local information when media is inaccessible.  However, this local information-
oriented perception can have negative consequences for the prospective rebel.  A prospective 
rebel is more likely to calculate a sub-optimal rebellion strategy when his or her regime 
capabilities perception is formed from local versus aggregate capabilities information.  Fearon 
(1995) and Huth (1988; 1997) argue that incomplete or limited information can lead to sub-
optimal decisions and ultimately behavior for rational actors.  Considering a rational actor’s 
decision calculus on combat, Fearon and Huth each conclude that at least two limited 
information-induced sub-optimal decisions exist which are “yielding too little” and “yielding too 
much”.  While these findings center on inter-state conflict, I find that the limited information 
problem is equally applicable for a prospective rebel’s rebellion decision calculus.   
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 First, when a prospective rebel maintains only limited information, it is highly likely that 
he or she is unable to distinguish between regimes that are both locally and aggregately weak in 
capabilities from regimes that are locally weak but maintain strong aggregate capabilities.  The 
"yield too little" sub-optimal decision scenario begins when a prospective rebel possesses only 
local information and the regime has a weak capacity in that area.  Using this local information, 
the prospective rebel likely crystallizes that the regime is weak and calculates to rebel.  However, 
while the regime is weak in the prospective rebel's area, the regime's actual aggregate capabilities 
are strong.  As a result, the prospective rebel makes a rebellion decision against his or her 
preference of fighting a weak regime.  Moreover, from an information standpoint, had the 
prospective rebel possessed more informative aggregate regime capabilities information, he or 
she would have likely determined to remain a noncombatant and not rebel. 
 Second, opposite from above, when a prospective rebel has only limited information, it is 
highly likely that he or she is unable to distinguish between regimes that are both locally and 
aggregately strong in capabilities from regimes that are locally strong but have weak aggregate 
capabilities.  The "yield too much" scenario begins when a prospective rebel possesses only local 
information and he or she hears and sees that the regime is strong in their area.  Crystallizing a 
perception from this local information, the prospective rebel likely calculates to remain a 
noncombatant.  Yet, despite the regime's strong capabilities near and around the prospective 
rebel, the regime's actual aggregate capabilities are weak.  As a result, by calculating to remain a 
noncombatant, the prospective rebel behaves counter to his or her preference of rebelling against 
a weak regime.  From an information standpoint, the prospective rebel would have likely 
calculated to rebel had he or she possessed more informative aggregate capabilities information.   
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 Recall that the Non-Elite prospective rebel is more likely to experience any decline in the 
state's level of media access than an Elite prospective rebel.  The practical implication is that the 
Non-Elite prospective rebel is less likely to receive the informative aggregate capabilities 
information that is likely included in mass media messages.  Consequently, as the Elites likely 
receive these media messages, a domestic divergence in the accuracy of the regime capabilities 
perceptions exists between the Non-Elite and Elite prospective rebels.  Applying this to the 
likelihood of calculating sub-optimal rebellion decisions, I contend that the Non-Elite 
prospective rebel is more likely to commit miscalculate their preferred rebellion strategy than the 
Elite prospective rebel because the Non-Elite prospective rebel has an elevated probability of 
crystallizing a less-than-accurate regime capabilities perception.  In sum, because a Non-Elite 
prospective rebel is more prone to experience any decrease in media access, he or she has an 
increased probability of forming inaccurate opinions and thus calculating rebellion behaviors 
counter to preferred strategies.   
 To review, the level of media access in a state matters for media message influence; 
whereas the media message must first be received by a prospective rebel for it to shape his or her 
regime capabilities perception.  The level of media access likely varies both across countries and 
within domestic populations.  Countries with a significant level of media access are likely to 
have an informed population regardless of class.  However, when the level of media accesses 
decreases, the Elite and Non-Elite domestic classes likely possess different levels of media 
access.  I argue the Elite probably retain a high level of media access regardless of an aggregate 
decrease.  It is the Non-Elite class that has a higher chance of experiencing the media access 
decline.  When this occurs, the Non-Elite class’s regime capabilities perceptions likely crystallize 
from local, limited information.  As a result, this class’s rebellion decisions are more susceptible 
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to sub-optimal calculations.  Moreover, the level of media access effects a prospective rebel’s 
regime capabilities perception and ultimately the rebellion decision calculation. 
 
SUMMARY 
 The prospective rebel’s rebellion decision calculus is not based on perfect or complete 
information about the regime’s capabilities as assumed by the state capacity literature.  On the 
contrary, the prospective rebel possesses only limited information and the rebellion decision 
calculus is based on his or her perception of the regime’s capacity to combat a rebel group.  
Chapter III has examined several factors which shape a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities 
perception.  Before transitioning to my theoretical addition to the civil conflict literature, this 
section offers a review of the several theories and mechanisms presented to this point. 
 Beginning with the level of media freedom, while mass media is arguably the most 
informative source of information on the regime’s aggregate capabilities, media messages can be 
biased.  Given the prospective rebel’s dependence on mass media for aggregate capabilities 
information and the regime’s ability to sovereignly govern the mass media institution, regimes 
often constrain mass media in order to maintain power.  However, not all mass media institutions 
are heavily constrained by the incumbent regime.  In short, a cross-national variance exists in the 
level of freedom regimes afford to their respective mass media institution.  
 I argue that the variance in media freedom impacts the type of media messages that are 
most likely available for prospective rebels to receive.  So, when the level of media freedom is 
low, the mass media environment is dominated by pro-regime media messages which likely 
aggrandize the regime’s capabilities to deter potential challengers.  The opposite is true in mass 
media environments with a high level of media freedom.  Here, a watchdog media exists and 
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non-regime investigative media on the regime’s actual aggregate capabilities are the most 
prevalent in the media environment.  As a result, the same prospective rebel would likely 
conclude a different regime capability perception based on the media messages structurally 
determined by the level of media freedom. 
However, an individual’s perceptions do not swing wildly back and forth on a 
phenomenon each time he or she receives an opposing media message.  So, while the level of 
media freedom is a fundamental factor determining the media messages likely available for a 
prospective rebel to consume, a more nuanced process surrounds how mass media affects 
perception.  Using Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model, I consider how mass media 
messages shape a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception.  Because a prospective 
rebel likely has a high cognitive engagement level on the regime’s capacity and a low rebellion 
predisposition, he or she will consume and consider both pro-regime and non-regime media 
messages.  However, the type of media environments prospective rebels likely reside and 
consume media in is not accurately depicted by Zaller’s symmetrical media message assumption. 
 The probability that a prospective rebel resides in a media environment with 
symmetrically-weighted pro-regime and non-regime media messages is quite low.  I contend that 
the asymmetrical media messages assumptions held in Zaller’s (1996) crossover effect better 
encapsulates the media effect process for prospective rebels.  In terms of media effect, Zaller 
shows that the louder message likely drowns out the weaker one which makes the message 
consuming individual more likely to recall cues from the louder message.  Applying the level of 
media freedom impact on message mix and the crossover effect conclusions on media effect to 
the prospective rebel, he or she is likely to form a pro-regime-oriented regime capabilities 
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perception when in a media-as-propaganda media environment and a non-regime-oriented one 
when in a watchdog media environment.   
While the level of media freedom structurally effects a prospective rebel’s regime 
capabilities perception, he or she must actually receive the pro-regime or non-regime media 
messages for any media effect to occur.  The level of media access affects the accuracy of the 
prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perceptions.  I hypothesize the level of media access 
varies across two different levels of analysis.  Generally, states can be cross-nationally compared 
by level of media access.  When media access is high, a state is likely to have an informed 
population.  However, when media access aggregately declines, I argue that a domestic class 
analysis offers rewarding conclusions on perception formation and the likelihood of rebellion.   
The Elite and Non-Elite classes possess different abilities to access media.  The Elite 
prospective rebel, due to high income, are likely always able to access mass media regardless of 
any aggregate decline.  However, when media access aggregately declines in a state, it is the 
Non-Elite class which likely experiences this decrease.  I argue that a decrease in media access 
has an informational effect on a Non-Elite prospective rebel.  When mass media is scarce or 
inaccessible, a Non-Elite prospective rebel likely calculates a regime capabilities perception from 
the local and limited in scope personal experience and interpersonal discussion information 
sources.   Consequently, a Non-Elite prospective rebel’s rebellion decision is likely more prone 
to sub-optimal calculations because his or her regime capabilities perception is formed from 
limited information.  In sum, the level of media access effects a prospective rebel’s regime 
capabilities perception and ultimately the rebellion decision calculation. 
 Moreover, the level of media freedom and the level of media access influence the type of 
information and its availability for the prospective rebel.  I argue this has a significant effect on a 
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prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception and ultimately his or her rebellion behavior.  
However, while the level of media freedom and the level of media access have been examined 
for their effects on the likelihood of civil conflict, these analyses have always considered these 
two concepts independently.  Furthermore, the existing literature’s causal mechanisms are often 
under-theorized; the manner in which mass media effects perception either goes undiscussed or a 
hypodermic needle-esque process is assumed.  The remainder of Chapter III is dedicated to my 
theoretical addition to the civil conflict literature which offers a solution to these literature gaps.  
Here, I combine and vary the level of media freedom and level of media access factors, consider 
the implications each media circumstance has on a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities 
perception, and theorize on the likelihood of civil conflict. 
 
MEDIA INTERACTION TERM: MEDIA SYSTEM TYPE AND THE PROSPECTIVE 
REBEL  
 
 The level of media freedom and the level of media access influences the type of 
information likely available to a prospective rebel and a prospective rebel’s likely ability to 
receive mass media messages.  By determining the media environment’s message mix and the 
likelihood of reception, both of these factors shape a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities 
perception.  However, to date, the civil conflict literature has separated these factors and 
considered their respective effects on the likelihood of civil conflict independent of each other.  
This is puzzling decision as these factors are neither theoretically mutually exclusive nor does a 
real world circumstance exist where these dimensions are not omnipresent and relevant.  In short, 
no theoretical reason exists to consider these factors independently when they are always 
intimately related in the real world.   
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Norris (2004) comes to a similar conclusion.  She finds that the effect media freedom has 
on perceptions differs depending on the level of media access.  This conclusion makes intuitive 
sense; if mass media is inaccessible, media freedom will have very little influence on perception 
regardless of message type.  Only when considering both the media environment’s message mix 
and the prospective rebel’s likely ability to receive media messages can the effect media has on a 
prospective rebel’s perception be determined.   
As noted in Chapter II, Norris offers a media system theory which categorizes media 
systems across the media freedom and media access dimensions.  Using variants of “high” and 
“low” on each dimension, the media system theory produces four media system types.  Norris 
finds that each media system type likely has a different impact upon an individual’s perceptions.  
As such, this media system theory serves as the foundation for my theoretical arguments as it 
presents an extremely useful framework to structurally consider how mass media likely 
influences perceptions when the levels of media freedom and media access vary.  By employing 
Norris’s media system typology, I argue that each of the four different media freedom and media 
access combinations affect a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception.  Ultimately, this 
variance in perception formation likely influences the probability of civil conflict onset. 
I break from Norris’s media system theory in one fundamental way which is the 
assumption that media is consumed equally by a state's domestic actors.  As I argue earlier in the 
chapter, media access is not uniform across an entire population.  When considering a state's 
population in terms of class, the Elite and Non-Elite classes maintain different capacities to 
consume media messages.  By incorporating domestic media access variance into Norris's 
original matrix, Figure 3.3 presents the new model.   
 
68 
 
 
 
The remainder of Chapter III presents a detailed theoretical explanation of Figure 3.3 and 
the implications for relationship between mass media and the likelihood of civil conflict onset.   I 
specifically address how the four different media system types likely affect regime capabilities 
perceptions of the two domestic classes and the probable resulting rebellion decision 
calculations.  Because probabilistic theorizing on the covariance of two continuous variables has 
a complicated explanation, I simplify it by considering media freedom on two levels, “High” and 
“Low” and separately theorize on each as the level of media access decreases from 
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“Widespread” to “Limited”.   
In order to compare the likelihood of civil conflict within the media freedom-media 
access covariance, I create a 2 x 2 matrix that is consistent with my theoretical explanations for 
each media system type.  Here, each matrix is tailored to the level and accuracy of the regime 
capabilities information available to the Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels.  As the levels of 
media freedom and media access as well as the regime’s capabilities change, each matrix 
suggests the likely rebellion behavior (“Rebel” or “Noncombatant”) for the Elite and Non-Elite 
prospective rebels, respectively. 
For explanation and presentation simplicity purposes, I make five important assumptions 
that are consistent with my theoretical explanations in the 2 x 2 matrices.  First, a regime’s 
capabilities are divided into Local and Aggregate capabilities.  I make this distinction as some 
prospective rebels are unable to gather aggregate capabilities information but can gather local 
capabilities information.  As such, I assume that prospective rebels acquire Regime’s Aggregate 
Capabilities level information primarily through mass media and Regime’s Local Capabilities 
level information through personal experience and interpersonal discussion.  Second, both 
Regime’s Aggregate Capabilities and Regime’s Local Capabilities are divided into two levels 
which are “strong” and “weak”.  A “strong” capabilities level suggests the regime has a 
significant military presence and an effective bureaucratic capacity in that area, be it the overall 
state or that particular locale.  A “weak” capabilities level suggests the opposite.  However, given 
the regime’s control over the mass media institution, Regime’s Aggregate Capabilities “weak” 
category is replaced with “manufactured strong” when the level of media freedom is “low”.  
Here, a “manufactured strong” demonstrates the situation when Regime’s Aggregate Capabilities 
are actually “weak” but mass media is required to report them as “strong”.  Third, mass media 
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information (Regime’s Aggregate Capabilities level) trumps personal experience and 
interpersonal discussion information (Regime’s Local Capabilities level) as it offers more 
informative information on the regime’s overall capacity to combat a rebellion.  Fourth, when the 
level of media access in a state is “widespread”, I assume Regime’s Aggregate Capabilities level 
information is available to the Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels and will likely shape their 
perceptions and rebellion calculi.  However, when the level of media access in a state is 
“limited”, only the Elite prospective rebels can receive Regime’s Aggregate Capabilities 
information.  Fifth, the Elite prospective rebels can share their mass media-derived Regime’s 
Aggregate Capabilities level information with the Non-Elite prospective rebels.  As an incentive 
may compel the Elites to remain silent, I do not assume they are required to share this 
information.  But, if shared, this information will influence the Non-Elite prospective rebels’ 
likely regime capabilities perceptions and rebellion calculi.  Sixth, As previously discussed, the 
two limited information sources are less likely provide informative and accurate information on 
the regime's actual aggregate capabilities than mass media.  As a result, I argue that Non-Elite 
prospective rebels are more likely to form misperceptions of the regime's capabilities when they 
on limited information sources for regime capabilities information.  A regime’s capabilities can 
look strong or look weak to a Non-Elite prospective rebel in this situation when the regime may 
or may not actually possess that aggregate capabilities level.  I use Local Capabilities Level to 
proxy what a Non-Elite prospective rebel may locally see and hear and thus perceive.  While the 
actual Local Capabilities Level is not directly observable for each and every prospective rebel, 
the "Strong" and "Weak" Local Capabilities Levels are the two (mis)perceptions that a limited 
information-reliant Non-Elite prospective rebel could form on the regime's capabilities. 
By covarying the information, class, and capabilities, each matrix illustrates a certain 
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number of scenario(s) where at least one prospective rebel class calculates to “Rebel”.  This 
number ranges from 0 (where all prospective rebels in every scenario are likely to calculate to 
remain “Noncombatant”) to 4 (where at least one prospective rebel class in each scenario are 
likely to calculate to “Rebel”).  In short, the higher the number of rebellion scenarios in a matrix, 
the higher the risk that the media system type is likely to experience a civil conflict.  By 
summing the number of scenarios where “Rebel” is determined for each matrix, I determine the 
expected rebellion risk for each corresponding media system type.  I conclude Chapter III by 
comparing the media system types’ expected rebellion risks and offer three corresponding 
hypotheses on the relationship between mass media and the likelihood of civil conflict onset. 
 
“HIGH” MEDIA FREEDOM MEDIA ENVIRONMENT 
 The media environment’s message mix is heterogeneous when the mass media institution 
enjoys a “high” level of media freedom.  For the prospective rebels able to receive media 
messages, they are likely to consume non-regime messages due to their media environment 
dominance.  Here, mass media takes on a watchdog role as the regime either has a laissez-faire 
approach to governing the mass media institution or is simply unable to constrain the mass media 
institution.  In the watchdog role, mass media serves as the public’s sentinel, investigating and 
reporting on the regime’s policies, conduct, and potential malfeasance.  Mass media not only 
verifies the regime’s official reports, it also undertakes investigative journalism that uncovers 
information the regime may not wish released to the public.  In short, the watchdog media 
provides both informative and accurate information on the regime’s actual aggregate capabilities 
for the message-consuming population.  However, when varying the level of media access in a 
“high” media freedom media environment, the effect on prospective rebels’ regime capabilities 
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perceptions is significant.   
“HIGH” MEDIA FREEDOM AND “WIDESPREAD” MEDIA ACCESS 
 In states with a “high” level of media freedom and “widespread” media access, the 
watchdog media reports are available to the vast majority of the population and likely serve as an 
important, society-wide information source.  Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels alike are able 
to utilize mass media to gather information about the regime.  Given that the watchdog media 
provides accurate information, both the Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels likely form 
regime capabilities perceptions which accurately match the regime’s actual aggregate 
capabilities.  However, this does not mean that states with a “high” level of media freedom and 
“widespread” media access have the highest likelihood of civil conflict onset.  On the contrary, I 
argue that the likelihood of civil conflict onset is low in this media system type.   
 The regime’s either inability to control or decision not to control the mass media 
institution is a key factor in a state’s likelihood of civil conflict.  When the regime does not 
constrain the mass media institution, mass media is free to take on the watchdog role, investigate 
the regime, and report about the malfeasance and capabilities findings.  If the regime governs 
unjustly and has limited capabilities, the watchdog media is likely to report on it.  As mass media 
is an important source of information on the regime for prospective rebels in both classes, they 
are likely to receive these non-regime media messages.  Given the asymmetrical-weight of the 
non-regime message in this media environment, the Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels will 
both likely form the perception of the regime that it is corrupt and unable to effectively combat a 
rebellion.  As a result, the Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels would likely calculate to rebel.  
Figure 3.4 illustrates the likely rebellion decisions for each class in this media system type. 
Having said that, I argue that the likelihood of civil conflict onset is low for “high” media 
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freedom and “widespread” media access media system states.  The reason rests with a regime’s 
office-maintaining interests.  Regimes are aware of the mass media-induced audience cost risk to 
their power.  The combination of the inability to or decision not to control the mass media 
institution and the latent threat of a population that is accurately informed about the regime’s 
activities and capabilities presents a daunting risk to the regime’s office-maintaining interests.  
Consequently, the regime is likely compelled to undertake two strategies.   
 First, the regime will likely establish laws to police its corruption.  This reduces potential 
socio-economic grievances with the regime by both Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels.  
Second, the regime will move towards a more transparent, inclusive system of government 
where socio-economic issues can be aired and solved, intra-institutionally.  By offering inclusive 
political institutions, rebellion becomes a sub-optimal behavior for prospective rebels as the cost 
to induce political change is comparatively much lower through the regime than through 
rebellion.  Thereby, rebellion is unlikely to occur in this media system type 
I acknowledge that my institutional explanation is similar to the state capacity literature’s 
political institution thesis; democracies have a low likelihood of civil conflict onset.  An 
important difference exists between my media system type explanation and the existing state 
capacity contention on the likelihood of civil conflict onset, however.  While, like the existing 
scholarship, the media system type explanation describes how open political institutions decrease 
the likelihood of rebellion.  Unlike the existing scholarship, the media system type explanation 
highlights why regimes are incentivized to become and remain an open political institution. 
Moreover, the mass media-induced audience cost mechanism is a foundational point in 
the classical (de Tocqueville 1984 [1835]) and updated (Dahl 1971; Moravcsik 1997) Liberal 
theory.  A free mass media that is accessible to large sector of society presents a significant  
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threat to weak and corrupt regimes.  In order to minimize the risk of losing power to an 
accurately informed rebellion, the regime is likely to self-police and adopt an open government 
which, in effect, alters the prospective rebel’s cost calculus.  In sum, states with a “high” level of 
media freedom and “widespread” media access likely experience a low probability of civil 
conflict onset. 
“HIGH” MEDIA FREEDOM AND “LIMITED” MEDIA ACCESS  
 Media access is not always “widespread” in states with a “high” level of media freedom.  
This section discusses how the decrease in mass media access negatively affects the accuracy of 
regime capabilities perceptions for Non-Elite prospective rebels and ultimately the likelihood of 
75 
 
civil conflict onset.  When the mass media institution has a “high” level of media freedom, I 
argue that the likelihood of civil conflict increases as the level of media access decreases in a 
state. 
If a regime is unresponsive to the population and possesses sufficiently weak capabilities, 
it likely faces a rebellion threat by a widespread, accurately informed population when the level 
of media freedom is “high” and media access is “widespread”.  As discussed above, regimes 
with this media system type reduce government corruption and institute a more transparent, 
inclusive form of government to minimize the rebellion threat and maximize office-maintaining 
interests.  However, the regime’s incentive to self-police and maintain a politically-inclusive 
institution exists only when both mass media dimensions are “high”.  While the society-wide 
threat of revolt deters the regime from abusing its power, this threat is only credible if society on 
the whole receives watchdog media messages.  The impetus to revolt vanishes when the 
population does not know that the regime has weak capabilities and is abusing its power.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the regime becomes less deterred from committing 
abuses of power and malfeasance increases to some degree as the level of media access 
decreases. 
 A population’s information about the regime is not uniformly affected when media access 
decreases in a state.  I argue that media access bifurcates along class lines.  Regardless of an 
aggregate media access decrease, the Elite class is likely to retain significant media access.  
However, the Non-Elite class is likely to experience the population’s decrease in media access.  
From an informational standpoint, the watchdog, non-regime media messages are still accessible 
for the Elite class.  So, when gathering information about the regime’s capabilities, Elite 
prospective rebels are likely to use mass media as it is available to them, consume the accurate 
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and informative information on the regime’s aggregate capabilities, and thereby form perceptions 
which correctly mirror the regime’s actual aggregate capabilities.  In sum, no informational and 
perceptual change is likely to exist for the Elite prospective rebel in “widespread” or “limited” 
media access states. 
 When the regime is perceived to be “weak”, the Elite prospective rebel is likely to 
calculate to rebel.  As a high probability exists that the Elite prospective rebel maintains accurate 
aggregate capabilities information, their rebellion calculation is unlikely a suboptimal strategy.  
However, most prospective rebels do not come from the Elite class, rather, they primarily are 
Non-Elites.  And, unlike the Elite class, it is probable that the Non-Elite class will receive less 
watchdog non-regime media messages as media access decreases.   
 Recall that Non-Elite prospective rebels rely more on personal experience and 
interpersonal discussion for their regime capabilities information as media access decreases.  
While these two information sources provide information on the regime’s capabilities, this 
information is likely only to provide a Non-Elite prospective rebel with localized and limited 
information on the regime’s capabilities.  Consequently, a Non-Elite prospective rebel’s regime 
capabilities perception has a lower probability of accurately mirroring the regime’s actual 
aggregate capabilities.   
 A less accurate regime capabilities perception negatively affects the Non-Elite 
prospective rebel’s rebellion decision calculus which is analogous Fearon’s (1995) and Huth’s 
(1988; 1997) conclusions on the rational actor and incomplete information.  A rational actor has 
a higher probability of determining sub-optimal decisions with limited information.  Because a 
Non-Elite prospective rebel is likely to possess only localized regime capabilities when media 
access is “limited”, he or she is more prone to calculating one of the two sub-optimal rebellion 
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decisions.  Figure 3.5 illustrates how localized information can produce sub-optimal rebellion 
behavior for the Non-Elite prospective rebel in a “high” media freedom and “limited” media 
access media system type. 
The Non-Elite prospective rebel forms the accurate regime capabilities perception and 
likely calculates the optimal rebellion behavior when local information matches the aggregate 
capabilities.  However, the Non-Elite prospective rebel’s “correct” rebellion behavior is not 
based on a strategic calculation; this calculus amounts to blind luck as the regime’s local 
capabilities simply happen to mirror its aggregate capabilities.  That said, the Non-Elite’s 
“correct” decisions mirror the situational rebellion decisions from the “high” media freedom and 
“widespread” media access media system type.  The Non-Elite prospective rebel’s two sub-
optimal decisions are of greater interest as they present a difference in rebellion behavior 
between the “high” media freedom and “widespread” media access and “high” media freedom 
and “limited” media access media system types.   
First, in the yield too little scenario, Elite prospective rebels likely receive informative, 
accurate information on the regime’s aggregate capabilities from mass media, form accurate 
perceptions, and calculate to remain noncombatants.  Conversely, Non-Elite prospective rebels 
likely only receive local, limited information on the regime’s capabilities which suggests that the 
regime’s capabilities are weak.  The Non-Elite prospective rebels form perceptions based on this 
limited information and determine the sub-optimal decision to rebel.  I argue that a Non-Elite 
rebellion is likely to occur in this scenario for two reasons.  First, while the Elite class likely has 
the accurate capabilities information, it has no incentive to restrain the Non-Elite prospective 
rebels.  If a Non-Elite rebellion is able to weaken or unexpectedly defeat the incumbent regime, 
the Elite class could free ride on the regime change costs and win in the future.  Second, the Elite  
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class may simply not have the ability to reach and inform the Non-Elite prospective rebels that 
rebellion is an undesirable decision.  I assume that most people have social circles which reflect 
themselves and therefore Elite and Non-Elites are unlikely to socially overlap.  Combining the 
two reasons, Elites have little interest in updating the Non-Elites on the regime’s capabilities and 
thus are unlikely to stretch their social circle to do so.  In effect, the Non-Elite prospective rebels 
are free and able to behave against their rebellion interest and as a result a Non-Elite rebellion is 
likely to occur.   
 The Non-Elite’s second limited information miscalculation is to yield too much to the 
regime.  Here, by virtue of receiving mass media messages, the Elite prospective rebels form 
accurate perceptions that the regime possesses weak capabilities and thus calculate to rebel.  
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However, because the Non-Elite prospective rebels only receive local, limited information which 
suggests that the regime’s capabilities are strong, they form regime capabilities perceptions that 
match this information.  For example, a regime may have a military installation or a regime may 
conduct capture raids in this particular locale and Non-Elite prospective rebels form the 
perception that the regime is strong.  As a result, the Non-Elite prospective rebels likely calculate 
to remain noncombatants when they should join the Elite prospective rebels in rebellion.   
 In this situation, the Non-Elite prospective rebels’ initial calculi are to remain 
noncombatants.  However, due to the Elite prospective rebels’ interests and, interestingly, 
interpersonal discussion, I argue that rebellion is likely to occur in this scenario.  First, it is 
plausible that the Elite prospective rebels rebel without the Non-Elites.  However, this outcome 
seems unlikely given the probably few Elite prospective rebels versus the incumbent regime’s 
capabilities regardless of how weak it is.  Consequently, unlike the Elite’s incentive to free ride 
in the yield too much scenario, the Elite prospective rebels are likely incentivized to expand their 
social circles and reach out to Non-Elite prospective rebels: they need foot soldiers.   
 While the Non-Elite prospective rebels have likely calculated to remain noncombatants, 
their reliance on interpersonal discussion for regime capabilities increases the susceptibility to 
persuasion.  As Elite prospective rebels have a vested interest in mobilizing rebellion 
participation and possess more accurate information on the regime’s actual aggregate 
capabilities, I expect they expand their social circles and attempt to convince the Non-Elite 
prospective rebels to rebel.  According to Lichbach (1995), a prospective rebel’s regime 
capabilities perception is a battleground between the rebel group and the incumbent regime.  In 
the yield too much scenario, the Elite prospective rebels behave like Berejikian’s (1992) and 
Lichbach’s (1995) ‘rebel leader’ and attempt to solve the Non-Elite prospective rebel’s dilemmas 
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by reducing their perceived costs of rebellion.  By sharing the watchdog media information, the 
Elite prospective rebels likely provide more accurate and informative information on the 
regime’s aggregate capabilities than the Non-Elite prospective rebels currently possess.  The 
Non-Elite prospective rebels, due to this new information, likely crystallize a weak perception of 
the regime’s capabilities to combat a rebellion and subsequently calculate to rebel.  Ultimately, 
due to Elite information, incentives, and persuasion, I anticipate rebellion to occur with at least 
some Non-Elite prospective rebel participation despite the expected yield too much sub-optimal 
calculation.   
THE LIKELIHOOD OF CIVIL CONFLICT ONSET IN A “HIGH” MEDIA FREEDOM 
MEDIA ENVIRONMENT 
 
 Taking stock of these informational dynamics, I argue that an additive risk analysis 
demonstrates the likelihood of civil conflict onset between the “widespread” and “limited” media 
access states in a media freedom media environment.  Said in a different way, I find that the 
likelihood of civil conflict onset can be determined by comparing the number of scenarios with 
which rebellion is a likely outcome.  In probabilistic terms, the greater the number of rebellion 
outcome scenarios for each media system type, the greater the likelihood that the media system 
type experiences a civil conflict.   
In the “high” media freedom and “widespread” media access media system type, both the 
Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels likely receive mass media messages, form accurate regime 
capabilities perceptions, and “correctly” determine when to rebel.  As shown in Figure 3.4, the 
prospective rebels from each class calculate to rebel when the incumbent regime possesses 
“weak” aggregate capabilities.  The expected outcome is that two of the four scenarios produce 
rebellion; when the regime is “weak”, prospective rebels from both classes calculate rebellion.  
However, the regime has an office-seeking incentive to self-enforce its malfeasance and offer a 
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transparent, inclusive political institution which reduces the costs of socio-economic change for 
prospective rebels as compared to rebellion.  So, I expect the likely risk of civil conflict onset is 
even less than the theoretical number of rebellion scenarios (two) in the “high” media freedom 
and “widespread” media access media system type.   
 In the “high” media freedom and “limited” media access media system type, only the 
Elite prospective rebels are likely to receive mass media messages, form accurate regime 
capabilities perceptions, and “correctly” determine when to rebel.  The Non-Elite prospective 
rebels are unlikely to receive mass media messages.  As a result, this class has a higher 
propensity to error in regime capabilities perception formation and thereby calculates a sub-
optimal rebellion behavior.  Illustrated in Figure 3.5, only in one scenario do both classes 
correctly calculate when to rebel.  While rebellion is the outcome in the other two scenarios, the 
Non-Elite prospective rebels’ limited information plays a central role in their rebellion decision 
calculi.  In sum, the expected outcome is that three of the four scenarios produce rebellion.   
 Moreover, I argue that the risk of civil conflict differs as the level of media access 
changes in a “high” media freedom media environment.  Due to the difference in regime 
capabilities information, rebellion is the likely outcome of two scenarios in a “widespread” 
media access state and three scenarios in a “limited” media access state.  I conclude that the 
likelihood of civil conflict onset increases as a state’s level of media access decreases in a “high” 
media freedom media environment.   
 
“LOW” MEDIA FREEDOM MEDIA ENVIRONMENT 
 When the mass media institution has a “low” level of media freedom, the media 
environment’s message mix is homogenous.  For those prospective rebels able to receive mass 
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media messages, they are likely to consume pro-regime messages due to their media 
environment dominance.  Here, mass media takes on a propaganda role as the regime controls 
the mass media institution.  Mass media-as-propaganda does not investigate or verify the 
regime’s reports; rather, it is used as a functionary by the regime to communicate specific 
messages that depict the regime’s policies, conduct, and capabilities in some favorable light.  In 
short, media-as-propaganda provides informative but likely inaccurate information on the 
regime’s actual aggregate capabilities for the message-consuming population.  
This section discusses how pro-regime messages likely influence how prospective rebels 
perceive the regime’s capabilities and their subsequent rebellion decision calculi.  I argue that 
pro-regime messages manufacture strong regime perceptions and have a pacifying effect on 
rebellion behavior.  However, this pacifying effect only occurs in the prospective rebels that 
receive the pro-regime message.   
“LOW” MEDIA FREEDOM AND “WIDESPREAD” MEDIA ACCESS 
 In states with a “low” level of media freedom and a “widespread” level of media access, 
mass media is available to a large segment of society and pro-regime messages dominate the 
media environment.  Given the dependence on mass media for aggregate capabilities 
information, it is likely an important information source for both the Elite and Non-Elite 
prospective rebels as they gather regime capabilities information.  However, while mass media 
messages are informative, they are not necessarily accurate in this media system type.  Due to 
office-maintaining interests, I argue that the regime will use its influence over the mass media 
institution to shape the definition of newsworthiness and the content of media messages in hopes 
to deter potential challenges when it possesses “weak” capabilities.  By requiring media 
messages to include only those cues which espouse the regime’s “strong” and “effective” 
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capabilities, the regime attempts to manufacture the perception of capabilities strength.   
 Prospective rebels that receive these messages are likely to disregard the less “loud” non-
regime messages received as the pro-regime messages are asymmetrically-weighted in the media 
environment.  I anticipate prospective rebels to crystallize regime capabilities perceptions in line 
with the pro-regime cues: the regime is militarily “strong” and “effective” at finding its enemies.  
Consequently, even when the optimal, preferred strategy is to rebel, I expect both the Elite and 
Non-Elite prospective rebels are likely to perceive that the cost to rebel is too great and calculate 
to remain noncombatants due to pro-regime biased information. 
 Figure 3.6 illustrates how a “low” media freedom and “widespread” media access media 
system type influences Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels’ rebellion decision calculi.  First 
and foremost, the rebel outcome is noticeably absent when examining Figure 3.6.  However, I set 
this conclusion aside for the moment.  When the regime has “strong” aggregate capabilities, both 
the Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels likely receive this information through mass media 
and thereby have a high probability of crystallizing a regime capabilities perception which 
mirrors reality.  Given this perception, the prospective rebels are likely to calculate to remain 
noncombatants and Figure 3.6 illustrates this rebellion decision.  Furthermore, similar to the 
“high” media freedom and “widespread” media access media system type, the Non-Elite 
prospective rebels disregard the limited information sources and calculate to remain 
noncombatants even when the Regime’s Local Capabilities are “weak”. 
Unlike the “high” media freedom and “widespread media access media system type, 
mass media messages likely do not include accurate information on the regime’s capabilities 
when a regime possesses “weak” aggregate capabilities in a “low” media freedom and 
“widespread” media access media system type.  In this scenario, prospective rebels like receive  
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biased, pro-regime messages which aggrandize the regime’s capabilities.  In Figure 3.6, when the 
Regime’s Aggregate Capabilities is “manufactured strong”, both the Elite and Non-Elite 
prospective rebels will likely receive and form regime capabilities perceptions akin to the 
“strong” and “effective” cues espoused in the pro-regime media messages.  So, due to their 
dependence on mass media for aggregate capabilities information and the pro-regime bias in 
these messages, prospective rebels are likely to calculate to remain noncombatants even when 
the regime’s actual aggregate capabilities are “weak”.  Moreover, I anticipate the likelihood of 
civil conflict onset to be low when a state’s media freedom level is “low” and the level of media 
access is “widespread”. 
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“LOW” MEDIA FREEDOM AND “LIMITED” MEDIA ACCESS 
 Media access is not always “widespread” in states with a “low” level of media freedom.  
So, while mass media is likely available to the Elite class, the Non-Elite class experiences the 
state’s decrease in media access. Given this access decline, it is important to examine the impact 
that the confluence of a media-as-propaganda media environment with a “limited” media access 
level has on a prospective rebel’s rebellion decision calculus.  I contend that the likelihood of 
civil conflict increases as the level of media access decreases when the mass media institution 
has a “low” level of media freedom.   
 A regime has two strategies to retain power when it possesses “weak” capabilities, 
cooptation and deterrence.  As discussed in the “high” media freedom media system sections, a 
regime can attempt to co-opt its population by offering a more transparent, open form of 
government.  However, I argue a regime is more likely to undertake the deterrence strategy if it 
affords the mass media institution a “low” level of media freedom.  A regime attempts to 
manufacture idealized perceptions with its population by allowing mass media to only report its 
capabilities as being “strong” and “effective”.  As discussed in the previous section, the 
deterrence strategy can pacify a population and thereby reduce the likelihood of civil conflict.  
But, the effectiveness of the deterrence strategy rests on one fundamental factor: the population 
must receive the pro-regime media messages in order to form the preferred perception and be 
deterred from rebellion.   
 A “limited” media access level affects a population, differently.  Again, I argue that 
media access divides along class lines where the Elite class is likely to retain media access and 
the Non-Elite class is likely to not as media access decreases in a state.  As a result, the Elite 
prospective rebels are likely to use mass media as it is an available information source when 
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gathering regime capabilities information.  Given that the media environment is asymmetrically-
weighted with the pro-regime message, Elite prospective rebels are likely to crystallize a 
“strong” regime capabilities perception regardless of the regime’s actual aggregate capabilities.  
Consequently, due to their continued ability to access media, Elite prospective rebels have a high 
propensity to calculate to remain noncombatants.  In short, I do not anticipate an information or 
perceptual change for Elite prospective rebels in “widespread” or “limited” media access states 
when the level of media freedom is “low”. 
 For the Non-Elite prospective rebel, the rely more on personal experience and 
interpersonal discussion which likely provide only limited and localized regime capabilities 
information as media access decreases in a state.  Non-Elite prospective rebels’ reliance on 
limited information affects the probability that their regime capabilities perceptions accurately 
match the regime’s actual aggregate capabilities.  Ultimately, the probability Non-Elite 
prospective rebels’ rebellion decision calculi generate the optimal rebellion strategy decreases as 
the probability his or her regime capabilities perception is accurate decreases.  Said in a different 
way, a Non-Elite prospective rebel is more prone to calculating sub-optimal rebellion behavior 
due to the increased likelihood he or she possesses limited regime capabilities information.  
Figure 3.7 illustrates the likely Elite and Non-Elite rebellion behaviors in a “low” media freedom 
and a “limited” media access media system type.   
For the Elite prospective rebel, due to significant access to mass media, a high probability 
exists that they calculate to remain noncombatants like the “low” media freedom and 
“widespread” media access media system type.  For the Non-Elite prospective rebels, they likely  
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crystallize accurate regime capabilities perceptions and calculate the optimal rebellion decision 
when the regime’s local and aggregate capabilities match as shown in Figure 3.7.  However, 
these optimal rebellion decisions and behaviors are not based on strategic calculation, rather, the 
Non-Elite prospective rebels’ “optimal” strategies amount to blind luck as the local and 
aggregate capabilities simply happened to align.   
 Like in the “high” media freedom and “limited” media access media system type, the 
Non-Elite prospective rebels likely determine sub-optimal rebellion strategies in the other two 
scenarios.  These sub-optimal decisions are yielding too little and yielding too much to the 
incumbent regime.  In the yield too little scenario, Non-Elite prospective rebels likely only 
receive local and thereby limited information on the regime’s capabilities.  This information 
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suggests the regime possesses “weak” capabilities when it actually has “strong” aggregate 
capabilities.  Non-Elite prospective rebels probably form inaccurate regime capabilities 
perceptions and determine the sub-optimal decision to rebel because they did not receive mass 
media messages that would have informed them the opposite is true.  Despite the fact that the 
Elite prospective rebels likely calculate the optimal rebellion strategy, to remain a noncombatant, 
they are unlikely to expand their social circles and inform the Non-Elites of their likely 
miscalculation.  This inaction stems from the Elite prospective rebels’ incentive to free ride on a 
rebellion which challenges the regime.  In short, despite the fact that Elite prospective rebels 
could inform Non-Elite prospective rebels that the regime’s aggregate capabilities are “strong”, I 
anticipate Non-Elite prospective rebels to calculate a sub-optimal rebellion behavior and 
rebellion to occur in this scenario.   
 In the yield too much scenario, the Non-Elite prospective rebels likely only receive local, 
limited information on the regime’s capabilities.   This information suggests the regime 
possesses “strong” capabilities when it actually has “weak” aggregate capabilities.  Non-Elite 
prospective rebels are likely to form inaccurate regime capabilities perceptions and determine the 
sub-optimal decision to remain a noncombatant as they did not receive mass media messages that 
would have informed them the opposite is true.  While Non-Elite prospective rebels’ likely 
noncombatant rebellion behavior is the consistent across the “limited” media access media 
system types, I contend the probable rebellion outcome for this scenario differs due to the Elite’s 
rebellion strategy.   
 Recall in the “high” media freedom and “limited” media access media system type, I 
contend that the Elite prospective rebels are able to crystallize accurate regime capabilities 
perceptions and calculate the optimal rebellion strategy (to rebel) by virtue of receiving 
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watchdog mass media messages when the regime is aggregately “weak”.  Due to the needs for 
foot soldiers to combat the regime, I argue the Elite are likely incentivized to inform the Non-
Elite prospective rebels that the regime’s actual aggregate capabilities are “weak” and persuade 
them to join a rebellion.  Due to Elite persuasion in this media system type, I argue some level of 
rebellion behavior occurs by the Non-Elite prospective rebels despite their initial noncombatant 
theoretical expectation.   
I use this expectation as a comparison to the probable rebellion outcome for the same 
scenario in the “low” media freedom and “limited” media access media system type.  Here, I 
anticipate the Elite prospective rebels receive pro-regime media messages, likely crystallize a 
“strong” regime capabilities perception, and thus calculate to remain noncombatants.  Without 
the Elite’s accurate capabilities perception, their incentive to persuade Non-Elite prospective 
rebels to rebel, vanishes.  Unlike the “high” media freedom and “limited” media access probable 
rebellion outcome, the likelihood Elite prospective rebels attempt to mobilize the Non-Elite 
prospective rebels is low as they, themselves probably calculate to remain noncombatants.  
Moreover, due to a collective problem, I argue that the probable rebellion outcome for this 
scenario in a “low” media freedom and “limited” media access media system type is consistent 
with the initial theoretical expectation: peace.   
THE LIKELIHOOD OF CIVIL CONFLICT ONSET IN A “LOW” MEDIA FREEDOM 
MEDIA ENVIRONMENT  
 
 Once again, I use an additive risk measure to demonstrate the likelihood of civil conflict 
onset for the “low” media freedom media environment as media access varies.  I argue that the 
relative risk of civil conflict onset within the “low” media freedom media environment can be 
determined by respectively totaling the number of scenarios when rebellion is the probable 
outcome for “widespread” and “limited” media access states and comparing them.  Overall, I 
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contend that the greater the number of probable rebellion outcome scenarios in a media system 
type, the greater the likelihood that the media system type experiences civil conflict.   
 In the “low” media freedom and “widespread” media access media system type, both the 
Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels likely receive mass media messages which are informative 
on the regime’s aggregate capabilities.  When the regime’s aggregate capabilities are “strong”, 
both classes likely calculate to remain noncombatants regardless of the local capabilities 
information.  However, when the regime’s aggregate capabilities are “weak”, the regime only 
allows pro-regime media messages on its capabilities to be reported.  Given the “widespread” 
access to mass media, both the Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels likely receive these pro-
regime cues, crystallize a “strong” regime capabilities perception, and calculate to remain 
noncombatants.  The expected rebellion outcome for a “low” media freedom and “widespread” 
media access media system type is zero. 
 In the “low” media freedom and “limited” media access media system type, only the Elite 
prospective rebels are likely to receive mass media messages.  As a result, the Elite prospective 
rebels’ rebellion decisions likely match those in the “low” media freedom and “widespread” 
media access media system type.  Conversely, the Non-Elite prospective rebels are unlikely to 
receive mass media messages and, given their limited information, they have higher probability 
to determine sub-optimal rebellion strategies.  While the Non-Elite prospective rebels calculate 
to rebel two out of the four scenarios, limited information appears to be the derivative of these 
decisions: blind luck and the yield too little miscalculation.  In sum, the “low” media freedom 
and “limited” media access media system type probable rebellion outcome is two.   
 In conclusion, I contend that the risk of civil conflict varies as the level of media access 
changes in a “low” media freedom media environment.  The additive risk measurement suggests 
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the number of scenarios in which rebellion is the probable outcome differs between a 
“widespread” media access state and a “limited” media access state.  The analysis proposes that 
the risk of rebellion is zero in a “widespread” media access state and two in a “limited” media 
access state.  As a result, I conclude that the likelihood of civil conflict onset increases as a 
state’s level of media access decreases in a “low” media freedom media environment.  
 
MASS MEDIA AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF CIVIL CONFLICT ONSET  
 To recap, I have articulated how information influences regime capabilities perceptions 
of prospective rebels.  By identifying mass media as a potentially highly informative source of 
information, I argue the structural factors which affect the message (media freedom) and the 
reception (media access) shape how a prospective rebel perceives the regime’s capacity to 
combat rebellion.  However, a well-developed civil conflict-mass media explanation must 
include both dynamics as these two structural factors are neither mutually exclusive nor isolated 
in reality.  As such, I theorize how prospective rebels’ perceptions are likely affected in each of 
the four possible media system types as media freedom and media access covary.   
 In order to hypothesize on the likelihood of civil conflict onset within media freedom-
media access covariance, I created a 2 x 2 matrix for each of the four media system types that are 
consistent with my theoretical explanations.  Here, I tailored each matrix to the level and 
accuracy of the regime capabilities information available to the Elite and Non-Elite prospective 
rebels, respectively.  As the structural media factors and the regime’s strength change, each 
matrix suggests the likely rebellion behavior, “Rebel” or “Noncombatant”, for each domestic 
class prospective rebel.  Resultantly, each matrix illustrates the number of scenarios with which 
at least one domestic class prospective rebel calculates to rebel.  In short, the higher the number 
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of rebellion scenarios in a matrix, the higher the risk that the media system type is likely to 
experience a civil conflict.  By summing the number of rebellion scenarios for each matrix, I 
conclude the expected rebellion risk for each corresponding media system type.    
 Having determined the likely risk of rebellion for each media freedom type as media 
access varies, I argue that a comparison of these expectations illuminates how mass media likely 
affects the probability of civil conflict.  Figure 3.8 plots the expected rebellion risk for each 
media freedom type by media access level and probabilistically illustrates the likelihood of civil 
conflict onset.  Here, two important dynamics can be drawn from Figure 3.8 on the relationship 
between media freedom and media access and the likelihood of civil conflict. 
 First, states with "limited" media access are likely to demonstrate at least the same if not 
a higher probability of civil conflict onset than those with "widespread" media access.  Looking 
to the "limited" media access column, these points are plotted at 3 and 2 on the probability of 
civil conflict onset y-axis.  Conversely, the "widespread" column has a uniformly lower point 
plotting of 2 and 0.  As such, Figure 3.8 shows the likelihood of civil conflict increases as a 
state's media access level decreases. 
Second, Figure 3.8 also shows that the level of media freedom has a structural effect on 
the probability of civil conflict onset as it illustrates a variation between "high" and "low" media 
freedom media environments.  Notice that all four media system type points are distinctly 
plotted.  Had the solid and open points in either or both of the media access columns overlapped, 
the practical implication would be that no variance exists between the "high" and "low" media 
freedom media environments.  However, as four distinct points exist, Figure 3.8 shows that 
media freedom likely has some structural effect on the probability of civil conflict.  Furthermore, 
the orchestration of the points indicates the likely nature of media freedom's structural effect.   
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Figure 3.8 shows that both the “high” media freedom solid points are plotted higher on 
the probability of civil conflict onset y-axis than the "low" media freedom open points.  
Interestingly, this implies a media freedom-civil conflict relationship exists that is counter to the 
established literature's findings.  In short, Figure 3.8 demonstrates that "high" media freedom 
media environments are more likely to experience civil conflict than "low" media freedom ones.  
By combining these two preliminary media freedom results, the likelihood of civil conflict onset 
increases as the level of media freedom increases. 
Overall, Figure 3.8 shows that media access has a general directional effect consistent 
across both media freedom types as the lines slope in the same direction.  In brief, “limited” 
media access states are more likely to experience civil conflict than “widespread” ones.  Figure 
3.8 also shows that the level of media freedom bears a structural effect on the likelihood of civil 
conflict.  Here, the four media system points are distinctly plotted and the “high” media freedom 
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media environment is uniformly more likely to experience a civil conflict.  Therefore, consistent 
with my theoretical contentions and explanations, I argue that media freedom and media access 
have an interactive effect on the likelihood of civil conflict.  This interactive effect is 
demonstrated in the totality of the following three hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 demonstrate the interactive effect of media freedom and 
media access on the likelihood of civil conflict onset.  As evidenced in Figure 3.8, the likelihood 
of civil conflict onset increases as media access decreases regardless of the level of media 
freedom.  Hypothesis 3’s inclusion accomplishes two important features.  First, it demonstrates 
that media freedom has a structural influence on the likelihood of civil conflict.  Without 
Hypothesis 3, the combination of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 would suggest that media 
access is independently responsible for any change in the likelihood of civil conflict which 
would be neither indicative of my theoretical contentions nor Figure 3.8.   
Second, Hypothesis 3 provides a nuanced positioning of the solid points (“high” media 
freedom) as compared to the open points (“low” media freedom).  While the slopes of the lines 
can be determined in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, it is impossible to rank or value them on 
the y-axis without an anchoring, “compared to what” hypothesis.  In short, by comparing the 
media environments, Hypothesis 3 demonstrates media freedom’s structural effect on the 
likelihood of civil conflict. 
Hypothesis 1: When the level of media freedom is “high”, the likelihood of civil conflict 
decreases as a state’s level of media access increases. 
 
Hypothesis 2: When the level of media freedom is “low”, the likelihood of civil conflict 
decreases as a state’s level of media access increases. 
 
Hypothesis 3: By comparison, “high” media freedom media environments are more likely to 
experience civil conflict than “low” media freedom media environments.   
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CONCLUSION 
I conclude Chapter III with the same question I opened with: why do prospective rebels 
decide to rebel?  There are many reasons why an individual prospective rebel chooses to rebel 
and the existing civil conflict onset literature has examined a host of them.  However, I find that 
a fundamental dynamic has gone under-explored in the civil conflict onset literature: the roles 
incomplete information and mass media play in affecting the likelihood of civil conflict.   
As discussed in Chapter II, the state capacity thesis has become a primary predictor of 
civil conflict onset in recent years.  The state capacity thesis suggests civil conflicts occur when 
the regime is sufficiently “weak”.  But, when considering this assertion at the individual 
prospective rebel level, short of suggesting that they maintain complete information, the state 
capacity literature offers few clues as to a prospective rebel’s informational wherewithal to make 
this assumed “weak” versus “strong” regime capabilities delineation.  As a result, the existing 
literature leaves scholars to wonder, “if not completely informed, where do prospective rebels 
get their regime capabilities information in order to make this rebellion decision calculus?” 
My dissertation embraces the notions that 1) a prospective rebel likely possesses 
incomplete information, 2) a prospective rebel likely makes his or her rebellion decision calculus 
based on a contrived perception of the regime’s capabilities, and 3) this regime capabilities 
perception is crystallized from the information acquired by the prospective rebel.  Combining 
these dynamics, I contend that the information available to prospective rebels likely influences 
what perception crystallizes and the subsequently calculated rebellion behavior.  Given that mass 
media is a potentially unrivaled source of information on the regime’s aggregate capabilities, I 
propose it has a particular influence on a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception.  As 
mass media can be manipulated by regimes and not equitably accessible to all prospective rebels, 
96 
 
I suggest it incorporates a natural variance across countries as well as within domestic 
populations.  Overall, I argue two mass media factors, media freedom and media access, 
structurally affect a prospective rebel’s level of and accuracy of information on the regime’s 
capabilities to combat a rebellion.  Using Zaller’s RAS model and crossover effect, I theorize 
how certain prospective rebels’ regime capabilities perceptions are likely shaped as these two 
structural factors covary in scope.  I conclude Chapter III with three hypotheses which articulate 
my contention that mass media has a particular effect on the likelihood of civil conflict. 
Moreover, Chapter III represents an important theoretical advancement in the civil 
conflict onset literature.  By acknowledging prospective rebel incomplete information and 
theorizing on mass media’s varying effect on regime capabilities perception, the media freedom 
and media access interaction theoretical explanation fills a significant informational gap in the 
literature.  In the next chapter, I quantify my media freedom and media access contention and 
empirically examine its relationship with the likelihood of civil conflict onset.  Focusing on the 
1993 to 2004 time frame, I test whether the media freedom-media access interaction term is a 
significant predictor of civil conflict onset when controlling for a host of noteworthy variables 
from the existing conflict literature.  I conclude Chapter IV with a robustness check and a 
discussion of the results.   
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CHAPTER VI: ANALYSIS 
 
Chapter VI empirically examines my proposed relationship between mass media and the 
likelihood of civil conflict onset.  First, I describe the data employed to test my hypotheses.  
Next, I discuss the research design and articulate how it appropriately analyzes the different 
effects that the mass media conceptual dimensions have on the likelihood of civil conflict onset. 
Then, I detail the dependent variable, the three mass media-specific predictor variables, and the 
civil conflict onset literature control variables.  After presenting the research method, data, and 
timeframe of analysis, I conduct the primary and supporting empirical tests.  Chapter VI 
concludes with a “most similar” controlled experiment and a discussion of the results.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Chapter VI empirically tests Chapter III’s hypothesized relationships between mass 
media and the likelihood of civil conflict onset.  I employ Uppsala/PRIO’s Armed Conflict 
dataset to analyze this relationship (Gleditsch et al 2002).  The Armed Conflict dataset is a 
country-level time series which identifies civil conflict episodes.  I use Uppsala/PRIO’s 
definition of civil conflict: 1) a militarized event that occurs between a state actor and internal 
opposition group which 2) experiences at least twenty-five conflict-related deaths in a calendar 
year.  The dataset has 235 civil conflict onset events.  The dataset includes only those states with 
populations greater than one million in 1993.  The timeframe of analysis is 1993 to 2004, 
however, this decision requires further explanation.  
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TIMEFRAME OF ANALYSIS   
Mass media is a dynamic entity.  When considering mass media’s effect on another 
phenomenon, it is paramount to first ask “at what point in time” as mass media has constantly 
evolved over time.  For example, consider mass media’s evolution in Western Civilization.  In 
the 13th century, books and official decrees by the Catholic Church and/or a feudal lord made up 
mass media.  Post-Gutenberg press and the subsequent explosion of vernacular literacy and the 
printed word, newspapers and pamphlets were new forms of mass media in European countries 
and their colonies.  In the Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first centuries, technological 
advancements in mass media occurred in much quicker succession.  The invention and 
commercial usage of radio (1895), television (1928), satellite television (1972), and finally 
internet (1989) each present informational watershed moments in the advancement of mass 
media.  I argue it is important to be cognizant of mass media history when determining a 
timeframe of analysis as each new mass media technological advancement represents a new way 
for people to receive information.  By not accounting for all forms of mass media, selecting a 
timeframe of analysis that overlaps a new mass media technological advancement can skew 
empirical results (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur 1976).  Moreover, while scholars examine on many 
different timeframes, I argue it is important to select a timeframe of analysis which not only 
accounts for global political affairs but also mass media dynamics.  
I determine the timeframe of analysis is 1993 to 2004 due to three factors which are mass 
media data availability, the Cold War, and the internet’s global proliferation.  First, Freedom 
House’s press freedom rating data is a primary dataset for press freedom analyses (e.g. Norris 
2004; Vultee 2009).  While Freedom House provides a press freedom rating by country by year 
from 1971 to present, the coding scale underwent a substantive change in 1992 to 1993. Pre-
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1993, Freedom House coded a state's level of press freedom on a 1 (high), 2 (medium), 3 (low) 
scale.  1993 to present, Freedom House expanded the scale to 0 to 100 to demonstrate nuanced 
press freedom differences between states.  In order to use the more comprehensive press freedom 
coding, the beginning of the timeframe of analysis must be 1993 or after. 
Second, 1993 presents a global political affairs breakpoint as well. The Cold War is 
shown to have some effect on civil war onset (Zakaria 2003; Lacina 2004) and a timeframe that 
begins in 1993 can control for this effect.  Third, 2004 is the chosen as the final year of analysis 
due to the internet’s global proliferation.  When considering consumption, nature, and political 
opinion effect, the internet is unlike the other mass media types (e.g. Xenos and Moy 2007).  
Consequently, because internet is such a distinct form of mass media, I exclude it from my mass 
media definition.  However, the decision to exclude internet from my mass media definition has 
a delimiting effect on the timeframe of analysis.  As discussed above, if internet is an important 
form of mass media in the years examined but internet is not contemplated in the mass media 
definition, the tests risk skewed results.  While no definitive breakpoint year exists, 2004 makes 
theoretical sense due to two factors.  In 2004, internet became an important, mainstream source 
of political information in developed countries (Rainie, Cornfield, and Horrigan, 2005).  Also in 
2004, the developing world began a near-exponential increase in personal internet usage 
(International Telecommunications Union Statistics 2013).  Given the internet’s rise in global 
usage and importance, I make 2004 the final year in the timeframe of analysis in order to exclude 
it from the mass media definition.  Moreover, due to mass media data availability, the Cold War, 
and the internet’s global proliferation, I determine a 1993 to 2004 timeframe of analysis.  
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RESEARCH METHOD  
I test my hypotheses on the likelihood of civil conflict onset by means of logistic 
regression and the statistical package Clarify.  First, given the research question, logistic 
regression is both an appropriate model to estimate the probability of a civil conflict event 
occurrence and is a commonly used approach in the civil conflict onset literature (e.g. Fearon 
and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006).  Second, as Civil 
Conflict Onset is a binary coded dependent variable, the civil conflict observations likely 
demonstrate some level of temporal dependence over time where the probability of civil conflict 
recurring is increased soon after the previous conflict (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).  Using 
Carter and Signorino’s (2010) cubic polynomial method, I address time dependence by including 
the Time, Time2, and Time3 variables.  Third, when using country-level time-series data, often 
times correlations exist between a country’s observation years.  This intra-class correlation can 
bias the standard errors of the estimates and diminish the results.  To avoid intra-class 
correlation, I cluster the data by country code to obtain corrected, robust standard errors (UCLA 
Statistical Consulting Group 2014).  Fourth, I employ Clarify to gain a more nuanced 
understanding how mass media specifically influences the likelihood of civil conflict onset.  
Clarify illustrates the predicted probability of civil conflict in point-to-point variation.  In short, 
Clarify offers a statistical way to isolate the “high” and “low” media freedom media 
environments and demonstrate the point-to-point predicted probability of civil conflict onset as 
the level of media access varies.  Fifth, I use Stata 13.0 statistical package to estimate all models.  
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DEPENDENT AND PREDICTOR VARIABLES  
Civil Conflict Onset is the dependent variable as the research question considers the 
effect mass media has on the likelihood a country experiences civil conflict.  The dependent 
variable includes data on intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflicts where the state in 
question is classified as State A.  Civil Conflict Onset is coded as 1 for the year when a civil 
conflict initiates, for the subsequent years of the same conflict it is coded as missing, and 0 if 
conflict does not occur in that year, for each state.  For states that experience overlapping civil 
conflict episodes, I code the observation year when the new conflict begins as 1 during an 
existing civil conflict (Saleyhan and Gleditsch 2006).  If a civil conflict episode reinitiates within 
two calendar years after the termination date, I consider it an extension of the terminated episode 
(Cunningham, Gleditsch and Saleyhan 2009).  I code the inter-episode peace years as well as the 
reinitiated conflict episode years as ongoing conflict years.  Lastly, a left censored data problem 
exists as several civil conflicts that began pre-1993 continued into the 1993 to 2004 timeframe of 
analysis. I exclude all civil conflict episodes that began prior to January 1st, 1993 due to this 
dissertation's focus on civil conflict onset.  
MASS MEDIA PREDICTOR VARIABLES 
My primary independent variable is Mass Media System which is an interaction of a 
state’s level of media freedom and the level of media access.  This represents my theoretical 
addition to the civil conflict literature.  To create the Mass Media System variable, I begin with 
Media Freedom and Media Access and then interact the two variables.  I include Media Freedom 
and Media Access in the model for two reasons.  First, per Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), 
the variables that make up an interaction term must be included in the model as to avoid biased 
inferences.  And, second, Media Freedom represents the existing literature’s current mass media 
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explanation of civil conflict.  The next several paragraphs operationalize each of the three media 
predictor variables.  
The data on Media Freedom is taken from Freedom House's press freedom statistics.  
Here, Freedom House measures the level of freedom a state affords to the press.  The variable is 
an index of several factors such as level of media censorship and level of government control 
over media outlets.  It is scored on a 100 point scale for each state, by year.  A state with a 0 
score is the most free and a 100 is the least free.  Given the existing literature on mass media and 
civil conflict, as the Media Freedom score increases, a state is more likely to experience civil 
conflict (e.g. Vultee 2009).  The expectation for Media Freedom is positive signed and 
significant result.  
Media Access measures the ability of individuals to receive media messages in each state, 
by year.  The operationalization of "ability" is the important part of Media Access.  While an 
individual may desire to receive mass media messages, he or she must have access to mass 
media in order to actually receive the messages.  Logically, the more media devices in a state, the 
more accessible mass media is for a population.  Applying this logic to the prospective rebel and 
incomplete information, the greater the number of media devices in a state, the more likely Non-
Elite prospective rebels have access to mass media information, and thus the more likely they 
will receive aggregate regime capabilities information.  
Like Norris (2004), I gauge a state’s level of media access by the number of media 
devices present, divided by the population of the state.  However, unlike Norris (2004), Media 
Access is not based on a mass media index.  Rather, the mass media metrics that make up Media 
Access are determined by a timeframe of analysis and the nature of specific mass media 
mediums.  First, I exclude internet from Media Access.  Given the timeframe of analysis, internet 
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accessibility likely examines whether the state is developed or not.  According to the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a high correlation between gross domestic 
product (GDP) and internet accessibility exists.  If internet accessibility were included in Media 
Access, any relationship between it and civil conflict onset would not be examining media effect 
on prospective rebels but the level of development.  As a result, I exclude internet accessibility 
from my definition of Media Access.  
Second, unlike Norris (2004), I exclude the number of newspapers per 1,000 people for 
each state, by year from the Media Access variable.  While newspapers are a central feature in 
many media effect studies (e.g. Zaller 1992; Loveless 2009), most of these analyses occur in the 
United States, Canada, and European Union countries where the levels of social infrastructure 
are high and negligibly different.  The level of social infrastructure development, specifically the 
education system, influences a country’s literacy rate.  So, newspapers might be readily 
available, but an individual must possess a certain level of education in order to gather 
information from the newspaper article.  In fact, individuals must not only be able to read, but do 
so at a relatively high level as to comprehend the regime capabilities messages incorporated in 
the newspaper article.  Discussions on troop detachments, military technology, military and 
police spending and activities, etc. require a vocabulary that is beyond the elementary level.  In 
short, while newspapers are often included in developed states’ media effect studies, newspapers 
complicate global media access studies as message reception can be hindered despite 
availability.  As such, I exclude newspapers from the Media Access definition.  
Media Access is defined as the number of televisions per 1,000 people, by state, by year 
and gathered from World Bank’s World Development Indicators dataset.  As a mass media 
medium, television is theoretically attractive for two reasons which are global proliferation and 
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low education usage requirements.  First, new mass media technology has a global proliferation 
lag period; whereas developed countries typically purchase and use new technologies before 
developing countries are able to do so.  The internet’s global proliferation illustrates this point 
perfectly.  Television and television broadcasting, unlike the internet, is not a new mass media 
medium.  It has had 60 plus years to transition from a new technology that is largely present only 
in developed countries to becoming a global mass media mainstay.  So, while more televisions 
are present developed countries than developing countries, this television variance is not due to 
the lag of new technology proliferating to the developing world.  
Second, individuals do not need as high of an education level to consume information 
from television as compared to a newspaper.  Unlike newspapers, literacy is not as necessary for 
individuals to consume information from television as news anchors and pundits provide 
information to the viewers by describing some phenomenon.  While charts and graphs may be 
used in the explanation, the viewer is likely able to glean at least some of the content provided in 
the supporting materials by listening to the on-air speaker’s discussion of the phenomenon.  
Moreover, by using television as the Media Access metric, I argue that the social infrastructure 
proxy concerns central to the newspaper mass media medium are reduced.  
In sum, I use television sets per 1,000 people by state, by year to proxy a country's level 
of access to the media.  Television is an attractive metric as it avoids the theoretical concerns 
present in the internet and newspaper mass media mediums.  While no examinations exist on the 
relationship between Media Access and civil conflict onset, I expect civil conflict is less likely to 
occur as a state’s level of media access increases.  Overall, the expectation for Media Access is 
negatively signed and a significant result.  
105 
 
The final mass media variable is Media Interaction which is the interaction of Media 
Freedom and Media Access.  Recall Figure 3.8.  In order to make the theoretical explanation 
easier, I separated the interaction into “high” and “low” media freedom media environments and 
then considered how perception, behavior, and likelihood of civil conflict onset changes within 
each media environment as the level of media access changes.  As a result, I determined two 
lines, one for each media freedom environment, which were plotted in Figure 3.8.  Media 
Interaction is not categorized in this way; rather, it considers the overall interactive effect of 
Media Freedom and Media Access on the likelihood of civil conflict onset.  In practice, only one 
line would be represented on Figure 3.8 had I theorized and plotted the media freedom-media 
access interaction this way.  Translating Figure 3.8’s depictions and Hypothesis 1’s and 
Hypothesis 2’s conjectures to the empirical test of Media Interaction, I predict a graphical result 
that lies between Figure 3.8’s two lines as the slopes of the “high” and “low” media freedom 
media environments are tangential.  Overall, I expect civil conflict onset is less likely as Media 
Interaction increases; whereas Media Interaction is negatively signed and a significant result.  
 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
Chapter III argues a relationship exists between mass media and civil conflict onset.  
However, before drawing any conclusions, it is important to consider these factors in conjunction 
with other factors.  The civil conflict onset literature has produced a host of significant findings 
and it is essential to control for these dynamics when examining the proposed mass media-civil 
conflict relationship.  This section discusses the theoretical arguments for many of these factors, 
operationalizes these contentions into variables for testing, and offers expectations on the impact 
on civil conflict onset.  
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STATE CAPACITY 
The state capacity literature suggests that a prospective rebel's decision to rebel is 
affected by the regime's ability to both address for grievances and coercively deter rebellious 
behavior.  On one hand, states with open, redistributive political systems are better able to 
accommodate prospective rebel grievances which likely reduce their need to act extra-
institutionally for political change.  On the other hand, states with coercive institutions deter 
rebellion by presenting high costs of rebellion and a low likelihood of success to prospective 
rebels.  As a result, the more a state is able to deter prospective rebels from rebelling; civil 
conflict is less likely to occur.  
Hendrix (2010) divides state capacity into three theoretical definitions which are military 
capacity, bureaucratic effectiveness, and the quality and coherence of the political institution.  
The state capacity literature has argued that each conceptual dimension effects prospective 
rebels' rebellion decision calculus and shown to impact the likelihood of civil conflict onset.  As 
such, I incorporate at least one measure for each of these state capacity theoretical definitions.  
First, military capacity is commonly defined as a "state's ability to deter or repel challenges to its 
authority with force" (Hendrix 2010; 47).  The theoretical argument for military capacity 
suggests that prospective rebels take into account the strength of the regime's military when 
deciding whether or not to revolt.  A military represents the regime's capacity to protect its 
position of authority, the strength of the military is shown to be an important factor in a 
prospective rebel's calculus.  
The state capacity often uses Military Personnel Per Capita to represent military strength 
(e.g. Mason and Fett 1996; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; 
DeRouen and Sobek 2004).  Using Correlates of War (COW) National Capabilities data, I 
107 
 
employ Military Personnel Per Capita to measure the regime's capability to project strength and 
deter rebellion.  The literature has determined the larger the military, the lower the likelihood of 
civil conflict onset. I expect Military Personnel Per Capita to be negatively signed and 
significant.  
States are not chessboards; the terrain of a country matters.  The literature finds a state is 
more likely to experience a civil conflict as terrains become rougher.  Terrain, specifically 
mountainous terrain, confounds the power projection of a regime's military (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004).  Traversing the geography to engage the rebel group, combating an enemy protected from 
artillery fire and with high-ground positions, and the ultimate difficulty in rooting out rebels 
from caves makes mountainous terrain particularly challenging for a regime's military.  These 
advantages are not lost on rebel leaders.  Mountainous terrain presents a powerful persuasion 
point for rebel leaders to reduce a prospective rebel's concerns over regime discovery, capture, 
and death.  In short, the likelihood of civil conflict onset increases as the terrain of a state 
becomes rougher.  For Rough Terrain, I use the mountainous coding of A.J. Gerard (2000) for 
each state, by year.  
Bureaucratic effectiveness is often included in state capacity analyses.  In the most 
general sense, bureaucratic effectiveness examines the regime's ability to effectively collect and 
process information.  State capacity scholars argue that bureaucratic effectiveness measures how 
well a regime can determine who is a rebel and he or she are located in the state (DeRouen and 
Sobek 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003).  One of the primary ways to measure a state's bureaucratic 
effectiveness is the regime's ability to generate revenue.  
Fearon and Laitin (2003) contend that the greater the gross domestic product per capita, 
the more revenue a regime extracts, and thus the greater the likelihood it invests in and possesses 
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a strong bureaucracy.  The authors demonstrate this variable has a negative effect on the 
probability of civil conflict onset.  However, Ross (1999) argues that gross domestic product per 
capita is not necessarily a straight-forward measure of bureaucratic capacity.  He finds that 
regimes with economies dependent on primary commodity exports possess a different type of 
bureaucracy.  Termed rentier states, these regimes are less likely to develop a strong 
administrative institution due to the reduced need to generate tax revenue from society.  In 
rentier states, when gross domestic product may be high, the strength of the bureaucracy is often 
times low.  
I incorporate both of these state capacity measures of bureaucratic effectiveness.  The 
data for GDP Per Capita is derived from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 
dataset.  GDP Per Capita is included for each state, by year.  Ross (2006), Fearon (2004b), and 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue and find that oil-producing states are the most demonstrative 
of the rentier state effect on bureaucratic strength.  For example, Ross (2006) examines the 
relationship between diamond production and civil conflict onset and determines only mixed 
results.  As a result, I code Oil 1 if 33% or more of a state's GDP is based on oil-production and 
0 if otherwise.  This operationalization mirrors Fearon and Laitin's (2003) and Ross's (2006) oil 
variable coding.  The data comes from Fearon and Laitin's (2003), Ross (2006), and the CIA 
World Factbook.  The expectation for Oil is a positive signed and significant and GDP Per 
Capita is a negative signed and significant effect on the likelihood of civil conflict.  
While GDP Per Capita and Oil measure the level or strength of a regime's bureaucracy, 
these concepts have a difficult time capturing the effect political transitions have on bureaucratic 
effectiveness.  Sambanis (2001), Hegre et al (2001), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue and 
show that regimes with recent political transitions (be it either democratization or autocratic 
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backsliding) are particularly vulnerable to rebellion.  Regime Instability presents an intriguing 
causal mechanism that ties-in with the prospective rebel and perception.  When political change 
occurs, it "indicate[s] disorganization and weakness" in the regime (Fearon and Laitin 2003; 81).  
These changes often include new policies, agendas, and a general governmental restructuring 
which likely has a bureaucratic ripple-effect.  This political upheaval presents a specifically 
appealing time for prospective rebels to revolt as the bureaucracy is perceived to be functioning 
at less than peak performance.  Like Sambanis (2001), I code 1 if a state experienced a three-or-
more Polity2 score increase or decrease in the three year period prior to each year and 0 if 
otherwise.  I anticipate Regime Instability to be positive signed and highly significant.  
The third theoretical dimension is the quality and coherence of the political institution.  
The state capacity literature suggests that regime type impacts the likelihood of civil conflict.  
Applying principles from the democratic peace literature, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that 
"political democracy should be associated with less discrimination and repression...and thus 
lower grievances" (Fearon and Laitin 2003; 79).  Regan and Norton (2005) determine that 
regime type has a puzzlingly positive and significant effect on the likelihood of rebellion.  
Regime type has some effect on civil conflict onset however the direction and significance is in 
question.  Other research contends that regime type has a curvilinear, inverted-U relationship 
with regards to the probability of civil conflict onset.  Hegre et al (2001) and Muller and Weede 
(1990) conclude that both the inclusive policies of highly democratic regimes and the repressive 
institutions of highly autocratic regimes reduce the likelihood of civil conflict.  Anocracies, 
regimes which are neither inclusive enough to afford prospective rebels the ability to satisfy 
grievances through the regime or repressive enough to dissuade revolt, demonstrate the highest 
probability of civil war.  
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Both of these state capacity theoretical arguments are incorporated into the analysis.  I 
employ POLITY IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2001) to represent a regime's level of political 
inclusiveness.  For Regime Type, I begin with POLITY IV's Polity2 score but recode the data 
from a -10 to +10 range to a 0 to 20 range.  Here, 0 represents highly autocratic regimes and 20 
highly democratic regimes. Regime Type-Squared utilizes the same Polity2 scores as Regime 
Type, however, the score is squared to allow for a curvilinear estimation.  Both variables, Regime 
Type and Regime Type-Squared, are coded for each state, by year.  The expectation for Regime 
Type is a positive signed but an insignificant result.  For Regime Type-Squared, I anticipate a 
positive signed and significant outcome. 
OPPORTUNITY AND GRIEVANCE VARIABLES 
The civil conflict literature identifies several variables which provide for "atypical 
circumstances that generate profitable opportunities" to rebel (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 564).  I 
include four opportunity factors each of which argue to increase the likelihood of civil conflict 
onset.  These are Economic Growth, Population, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Religious 
Fractionalization.  
Prospective rebels are likely to have suffered a reduction in income when the state's 
economy has slowed.  Rebel groups offer payment for rebellion services rendered which 
becomes an attractive way for prospective rebels to replace foregone income (Alesina et al 1996; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  Economic Growth is used to proxy this foregone income theoretical 
argument.  Here, I utilize World Development Indicator's growth rate data. I code the increase or 
decrease in each state's GDP from the preceding year.  Similar to Alesina et al (1996), I 
anticipate the likelihood of civil conflict onset to increase when the preceding year's growth rate 
was negative.  
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Population is used in many civil conflict onset examinations.  However, population is 
incorporated for two different theoretical reasons.  First, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that 
population presents a pseudo-bureaucratic effectiveness measure.  A regime's bureaucracy faces 
an increasingly difficult task at monitoring and effectively deterring rebellion as the population 
of the state grows.  Therefore, a state is more likely to experience civil conflict, the larger the 
population of the state.  Second, Lichbach (1995) contends that the larger the population, the 
greater the prospective rebel pool for rebel leaders to coopt.  Once again, the likelihood of civil 
conflict onset increases as the population of a state grows.  My examination is unable to separate 
and determine which causal mechanism is driving Population's positive effect on civil conflict 
likelihood.  However, as both theoretical arguments articulate the same directional effect on civil 
conflict onset, I expect a similar result and leave the nuanced study for future research.  The data 
for Population is taken from World Development Indicator's dataset and is coded for each state, 
by year.  
When considering the effect population has in a cross-national study, not all populations 
are created equal.  A population's demographic differences matter for prospective rebel 
mobilization.  Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al (2003), Collier (2001), Reynal-Querol 
(2002), Eldabawi and Sambanis (2000), and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that a low level of 
social and/or religious diversity in a state aids a rebel group's ability to attract and mobilize the 
greatest number of prospective rebels possible.  As a state's diversity or fractionalization 
increases, ethnic and/or religious differences form additional barriers for prospective rebel 
mobilization.  These barriers complicate a rebel leader's ability to coopt prospective rebels.  I 
code Ethnic Fractionalization and Religious Fractionalization from Alesina et al's (2003) 
dataset.  This coding reflects the probability that two arbitrary selected individuals will not share 
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an ethnic or religious affiliation, respectively, for each country, by year.  I have no expectations 
for Ethnic Fractionalization and Religious Fractionalization given the mixed results in the civil 
conflict literature for these variables.  
GRIEVANCE 
The civil conflict literature's grievance explanations contend that noncombatants are not 
compelled to rebel by opportunistic situations.  Rather, rebellion is motivational; prospective 
rebels choose to rebel due to political exclusion and social or ethnic subjugation.  I include 
Ethnic Dominance from the grievance literature.  Horowitz (1985) and Huntington (1996) argue 
that the relationship between ethnicity and politics often serve as a foundation for rebellion.  
When an ethnic group is unable to address and satisfy its socio-economic grievances through the 
political institution, it is forced to seek status quo change through extra-institutional action.  The 
civil conflict literature identifies how political grievances can lead to an increased likelihood of 
civil conflict.  Ethnic political grievances can be a product of a state's demographic makeup.  
When a substantial ethnic majority exists in a state, minority ethnic groups' abilities to solve their 
problems through the political institution are hampered.  While it is easy to imagine situations of 
ethnic domination in autocracies, a vote along ethnic lines can also effectively block minority 
ethnicities from political institution solutions to grievances in democracies, too.  
Similar to Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) procedure, I code Ethnic Dominance as 1 when a 
single ethnicity represents 49% or more of a country’s population and 0 if otherwise.  The data 
for Ethnic Dominance is taken from three sources.  I began with CIA World Factbook data on a 
state's ethnic demography.  I cross-referenced Ellingsen (2000) if CIA World Factbook did not 
numerically describe a state's ethnic demographic makeup.  Timor-Leste's and Tonga's ethnicity 
information was absent from both Ellingsen (2000) and CIA World Factbook, so I employed 
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data from www.minorityrights.org.  I anticipate a positive relationship between Ethnic 
Dominance and the likelihood of civil conflict.  
 
DATA  
As with many empirical examinations, several variables have missing values in the 
dataset.  While the dependent variable is complete, the media predictor and many of the control 
variables have missing values which not only diminishes the usefulness of the information it can 
also lead to biased estimations (King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve 2001).  For logistic 
regression, missing values are troubling event models and particularly so when the event count is 
low.  Here, missing values increase the likelihood that event observations are dropped which 
likely biases the estimations. In order to avoid these problems, I employ multiple imputation to 
replace the missing values in the dataset.  
Developed by Rubin (1987), multiple imputation is a methodological way for researchers 
to use all the observation, including those with missing values, in a dataset.  Per Schaefer’s 
(1997; 2000) and Rubin’s (1987) assumptions on multivariate normal data distribution, 
parameters of the imputed data can be estimated using the observed data.  The conditional 
distributions from the observed data provide imputed values for the missing values by forming 
five imputed datasets.  Using “Rubin’s Rules”, estimates from the n datasets are created and then 
merged to generate a single imputed value for each missing value.  
I use Stata 13 to perform the multiple imputation procedure.  Due to missing values, the 
original dataset includes only 1555 of 1883 country-year observations.  The variables I register 
(variables not contemplated in the imputation process) are Civil Conflict Onset, Country Code, 
Year, Prior Conflict, Time, Time2, and Time3.  The variables I include in the imputation model 
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are Media Freedom, Media Access, Media Interaction, Military Personnel Per Capita, GDP Per 
Capita, Oil, Regime Type, Regime Type Squared, Regime Instability, Ethnic Fractionalization, 
Religious Fractionalization, Ethnic Dominance, Economic Growth, and Population.  In order to 
better fit with the multivariate normal data distribution assumptions, I use the natural log of 
Population before imputing the missing values.  As Ethnic Dominance, Oil, and Regime 
Instability are binary variables, I round the imputed values to zero or one, whichever is closer.  I 
generate five imputed datasets and convergence in distribution occurs after 19 iterations per the 
EM algorithm.  The multiple imputation dataset includes 1883 country-year observations.  
Overall, multiple imputation is an attractive statistical tool to replace missing values and 
strengthen estimations.  
The logistic regression results of the non-multiple imputation dataset.  As a check, the 
mass media predictor variables produce similar results when comparing the results of the non-
multiple imputation and the multiple imputation dataset results.  This suggests that the multiple 
imputation procedure did not holistically alter the likelihood of civil conflict onset estimations.  
Feel free to contact me for the non-multiple imputation estimations. 
In review, the focus of this chapter is to empirically examine the hypothesized 
relationship between mass media and the likelihood of civil conflict.  To this point, I have 
transformed the mass media concepts hypothesized in Chapter III into measurable variables for 
quantitative analysis, outlined a research design and dependent variable which appropriately test 
the research question, and presented two statistical methods to examine the empirical 
relationships.  The remainder of Chapter VI performs the logistic regression estimation, the 
Clarify predicted probabilities procedure, undertakes a predicted probabilities-oriented controlled 
experiment, and discusses the results.  
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
For ease of explanation, I separate the estimations into two analyses.  Table 4.1 illustrates 
a set of preliminary estimations which examine the mass media variables in isolation from the 
literature variables.  Model 1 and Model 2 within Table 4.1 test whether the mass media 
variables are significant predictors of the probability of civil conflict.  After determining 
preliminary significance and directionality in Table 4.1, the analysis section turns to Table 4.2 
which examines the mass media variables in conjunction with the literature variables.  Model 3 
represents the primary empirical analysis on the relationship between mass media and the 
likelihood of civil conflict.  
Before testing an all-encompassing model, it is first necessary to determine whether the 
mass media variables are significant predictors of civil conflict onset, alone.  In order to establish 
an estimation baseline, Model 1 assesses the mass media variables, Media Freedom and Media 
Access, without the interaction term.  As theorized, Media Freedom and Media Access are each 
signed as theoretically expected and are significant predictors of civil conflict onset.  Making 
sense of the Media Freedom result, it is important to recall Freedom House’s coding scale.  
Perhaps counterintuitively, Freedom House measures a state’s level of media freedom on 
a 0 to 100 scale with 0 being “most free” and 100 being “least free”.  The positive and significant 
result for Media Freedom indicates that as the media freedom score increases (decreases in 
media freedom), the likelihood a state experiences a civil conflict increases.  Given the negative 
sign, the Media Access result suggests as a state’s level of media access decreases, the 
probability it will experience a civil conflict increases.  
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Model 2 introduces my theoretical addition to the literature, Media Interaction.  While 
only a preliminary test, Model 2 exhibits encouraging results for the importance of including 
Media Interaction in likelihood of civil conflict examinations.  However, beyond indicating 
Media Interaction has a significant influence on the probability of civil conflict onset, the 
dynamic nature of this relationship cannot be demonstrated by a logistic regression output.  I will 
expand on this point when discussing the results illustrated in Table 4.2.  Model 2 determines 
two other interesting findings.  First, despite introducing Media Interaction, Media Freedom 
retains significance and expected sign.  It appears that a state’s level of media freedom is a more 
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robust indicator than I anticipated.  Second, Media Access loses significance when Media 
Interaction is included in the estimation.  This result is a logical result of the interaction term’s 
inclusion.  
Table 4.2 examines the three mass media variables in conjunction with the civil conflict 
literature variables.  Like Model 2, Model 3 determines the same respective sign and significance 
for Media Freedom and Media Interaction.  For the literature variables, Population and Prior 
Conflict are highly significant predictors of civil conflict onset probability and appropriately 
signed.  Interestingly, while significant, Ethnic Fractionalization is signed opposite to Alesina et 
al’s (2003) findings.  Model 3 demonstrates that, as the number of ethnicities increases in a state, 
the more likely that state is to experience a civil conflict.  Finally, two surprising non-findings 
are GDP Per Capita and Military Personnel Per Capita.  Representing two primary explanations 
on the probability of civil conflict in the state capacity literature, the insignificance of GDP Per 
Capita and Military Personnel Per Capita is an intriguing finding.  
 
DISCUSSION  
From Model 2’s preliminary mass media-only estimation to Model 5’s all-inclusive 
estimation, Media Interaction consistently demonstrates a statistically significant result on the 
likelihood of civil conflict onset.  Clearly, the significant results are an important first step in 
testing the three hypotheses; without significance, Media Interaction would be no better than 
zero as a civil conflict onset predictor.  While a logistic regression can indicate whether Media 
Interaction has a significant effect on the probability of civil conflict, the estimation does not 
show the dynamic nature of this effect.  Said in a different way, logistic regression estimation 
offers little on the inner-mechanics of the relationship beyond the probabilistic statement that the  
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likelihood a state experiences civil conflict increases as Media Interaction decreases.  That said, 
in order to appropriately test the three hypotheses, an additional estimation is necessary to tease 
out the nuances of the Media Interaction-Civil Conflict Onset relationship.  I use the Clarify 
program to generate predicted probabilities of civil conflict onset to better understand this 
relationship (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003).  
By assessing the change in probabilities of civil conflict onset for each outcome 
according to the varying values of Media Interaction, Clarify simulates quantities of interest 
from the logistic regression model by assessing the change in probabilities of civil conflict onset 
as each of the interacted values of Media Interaction vary.  In order to test the three hypotheses, I 
categorize media freedom into two types: “high” and “low” media freedom media environments. 
I define “high” and “low” media freedom by percentiles on the Freedom House media freedom 
scale.  The twenty-fifth percentile and seventy-fifth percentile represents “high” media freedom 
and “low” media freedom media environments, respectively.  The twenty-fifth percentile is a 28 
and the seventy-fifth percentile is a 69 on the Freedom House media freedom scale. After 
isolating “high” and “low” media freedom, I simulate the probability of civil conflict (y-axis) for 
these values of media freedom as the value of media access changes (x-axis).  Figure 4.3 
graphically illustrates this simulation.  
In order to simulate the terminology and contentions made in Chapter III, I separate the 
level of media access into terciles which are “limited”, “moderate”, and “widespread”.  As media 
access is ranked on a range from 1 (lowest) to 830 highest, I divide 830 into three equal sections 
of 277.  Consequently, 1 to 277 is “limited”, 278 to 554 is “moderate”, and 555 to 830 is 
“widespread” media access.  Admittedly, these media access divisions are arbitrary. 
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 Figure 4.3 Media Interaction and Predicted Probabilities of Civil Conflict 
 
 
 
“HIGH” MEDIA FREEDOM ANALYSIS  
The predicted probabilities result for “high” media freedom appears to fit Hypothesis 1’s 
theoretical contention.  However, in order to fail to reject Hypothesis 1’s null hypothesis, “high” 
media freedom’s predicted probabilities must demonstrate two jointly necessary and sufficient 
conditions in Figure 4.3.  This section assesses each condition, discusses the theoretical 
implications, and determines whether to reject or fail to reject Hypothesis 1’s null hypothesis.  
First, Hypothesis 1 argues that the probability of civil conflict must be at its highest when 
the level of media access is at its lowest level.  In Figure 4.3, “high” media freedom’s highest 
likelihood of civil conflict occurs when the level of media access is most “limited”.  From a 
theory standpoint, this result suggests that prospective rebels are more likely to calculate to rebel 
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when the level of media access is “limited” than otherwise in a “high” media freedom media 
environment.  Second, Hypothesis 1 contends that the probability of civil conflict decreases as 
the level of media access increases.  Figure 4.3 illustrates a consistently negative slope when 
moving left to right on the “high” media freedom predicted probabilities line.  With the lowest 
probability of civil conflict being the most “widespread” level of media access, Figure 4.3 lends 
support to Hypothesis 1’s contentions.  
It is important to note the lack of substantive effects demonstrated in the “high” media 
freedom predicted probabilities line.  Despite the fact that “high” media freedom technically fits 
with the Hypothesis 1’s conditions, the substantive effects are clearly absent.  So, while the 
highest probability of civil conflict is in the most “limited” level of media freedom, the predicted 
probability is roughly only 2%.  Furthermore, while “high” media freedom media environments 
experience a decrease in the likelihood of civil conflict as the level of media access increases, the 
substantive change is slightly greater than a 1% probability decrease.  Overall, it appears that the 
likelihood of civil conflict is simply low when media freedom is “high” regardless of the level of 
media access.  
Non-Elite prospective rebels may not always have accurate regime capabilities 
information when media freedom is “high”.  My theoretical expectation was that, due limited 
information, Non-Elite prospective rebels likely crystallize regime capabilities misperceptions 
and subsequently miscalculate when to rebel.  However, regardless of the level of media access, 
the likelihood of civil conflict ranges between 2% to 1% for the “high” media freedom media 
environment.  Making sense of this finding, I propose that media freedom is probably nested 
with other freedoms.  A high correlation between the level of media freedom and regime types 
exists. Running an alpha test on Media Freedom and Regime Type, the correlation is .79.  The 
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fact that Media Freedom in Model 1 and Media Interaction in the subsequent models are 
statistically significant in the logistic regression estimations is a testament to the civil conflict 
predictive robustness of these variables. 
So, when media freedom is “high”, prospective rebels do not rebel because they have an 
altered rebellion calculus regardless of the level of media access.  Prospective rebels choose to 
rebel in order to change the status quo to greater maximize their welfare and when the regime is 
perceived to be weak.  Rebellion, in this scenario, is a low cost mechanism to maximize a 
prospective rebel’s welfare.  But, if a prospective rebel is afforded an inclusive political system, 
a lower cost method exists for him or her to change the political environment and maximize 
welfare.  Here, remaining a noncombatant and acting intra-institutionally would be the preferred 
rebellion decision strategy.  Consequently, as long as the prospective rebel feels he or she can 
efficiently and effectively maximize welfare by acting within the existing political institution, the 
likelihood of civil conflict will be low.  In short, when media freedom is “high”, both Elite and 
Non-Elite prospective rebels likely prefer to remain noncombatants regardless of the level of 
media access.  
In conclusion, the “high” media freedom results in Figure 4.3 do not contradict the two 
jointly sufficient and necessary conditions to fail to reject Hypothesis 1.  However, the predicted 
probabilities result for “high” media freedom does not demonstrate a substantive change in the 
likelihood of civil conflict as the level of media access varies.  As such, I reject the null 
hypothesis for Hypothesis 1 but with reservations on the substantive importance of this finding.  
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“LOW” MEDIA FREEDOM ANALYSIS  
The predicted probabilities result for “low” media freedom predicted probabilities result 
in Figure 4.3 appears to match the theoretical arguments in Hypothesis 2.  Like Hypothesis 1, 
“low” media freedom must graphically demonstrate two jointly necessary and sufficient 
conditions in order to fail to reject Hypothesis 2’s null hypothesis.  This section assesses each 
condition in turn, discusses the theoretical implications, and determines whether to reject or fail 
to reject Hypothesis 2’s null hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2 contends that the highest likelihood of civil conflict occurs when the level 
of media access is most “limited” and Figure 4.3 offers graphical support for this condition.  
Here, the highest likelihood of civil conflict is (9%) when the level of media access is zero.  In 
short, Figure 4.3 graphically demonstrates support for the first condition of Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 2 contends that the probability of civil conflict decreases as the level of media 
access increases and Figure 4.1 demonstrates this condition as well.  Here, the “low” media 
freedom predicted probabilities shows a curvilinear and negative sloped result with the lowest 
likelihood of civil conflict (sub-1%) occurring at 830, the highest level of media access.  This 
graphical result supports the second of two conditions in Hypothesis 2.  
Several implications for Hypothesis 2’s theoretical explanations can be drawn from the 
“low” media freedom predicted probabilities graph.  First, as theorized, the likelihood of civil 
conflict is at its highest when the level of media access is most “limited”.  This result supports 
the contention that the more prospective rebels rely on the non-mass media sources of 
information for regime capabilities information, the more likely they will crystallize 
misperceptions and consequently miscalculate their rebellion decision calculi.  Ultimately, the 
predicted probabilities result lends support to my contention that civil conflict is most likely 
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when prospective rebels must significantly rely on limited information sources for regime 
capabilities information.  
Second, Figure 4.3 determines the likelihood of civil conflict is near-zero when the level 
of media access is at its most “widespread” level and is a similar result to the theoretical 
illustration in Figure 3.8.  The near-zero predicted probability when media access is 
“widespread” in Figure 4.3 lends support to the theoretical explanation that the likelihood of civil 
conflict should be low when a large sector of the population can receive pro-regime-oriented 
mass media messages.  Given its aggregate purview, both Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels 
are likely to utilize mass media to gather regime capabilities information when it is widely 
available.  However, the controlled nature of the media environment makes it likely that the 
prospective rebels receive pro-regime messages on the regime’s capacity to combat a rebellion.  I 
theorized that the regime is able to manufacture the perception of strong capabilities in the minds 
of the prospective rebels by controlling the definition newsworthiness and the content of the 
messages.  For my mass media pacification contention to be determined, the lowest likelihood of 
civil conflict must occur at the highest level of media access in Figure 4.3.  The consistent 
negative slope and the lowest likelihood of civil conflict manifesting in highest level of media 
access lends further support to my theoretical explanation widespread access to pro-regime 
messages creates a pacifying effect on rebellion decision calculus.  
Overall, the change in the predicted probabilities of civil conflict as the level of media 
access varies in a “low” media freedom media environment fit the theoretical expectations in 
Hypothesis 2.  Figure 4.3 shows that the highest likelihood of civil conflict occurs when the level 
of media access is at its most “limited” level.  Also, Figure 4.3 demonstrates that the probability 
of civil conflict decreases as the level of media access increases.  This results supports the 
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contention that the greater the level of media access, the greater the level of prospective rebel 
pacification in a state.  Considering these findings in tandem, I am able to reject the null 
hypothesis for Hypothesis 2.  
 
COMPARING “HIGH” AND “LOW” MEDIA FREEDOM MEDIA ENVIRONMENTS 
Hypothesis 3 considers the probability of civil conflict between the two media freedom 
types.  It contends that the “high” media freedom type is comparatively more likely to experience 
civil conflict that the “low” media freedom type.  Figure 4.3 shows mixed support for Hypothesis 
3. When media access is “limited”, Figure 4.3 illustrates that the “low” media freedom media 
environment is demonstratively more likely to experience a civil conflict than the “high” media 
freedom media environment.  As discussed in the Hypothesis 1 analysis, likely due to nested 
political freedoms and the effect on the rebellion decision calculus the risk of civil conflict is low 
for the “high” media freedom media environment when media access is “limited”.  Here, the 
highest likelihood of civil conflict in a “high” media freedom type is roughly 2%.  
Non-Elite prospective rebels in the “low” media freedom media environments are 
unlikely to face this nested freedom dynamic.  Rather, Figure 4.3 suggests that a “limited” media 
access level likely affects a Non-Elite prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perceptions and the 
subsequent rebellion decision calculus.  For Non-Elite prospective rebels, due to their likely 
significant reliance on limited information sources for regime capabilities Non-Elite prospective 
rebels are likely to crystallize regime capabilities misperceptions which rebel elevates the overall 
probability to civil conflict.  Comparing the 2% probability of civil conflict in a “high” media 
freedom and “limited” media access media system type, the likelihood of civil conflict is much 
higher, 9%, in the “low” media freedom and “limited” media access media system type.  In sum, 
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Figure 4.3 demonstrates a media freedom type outcome opposite to Hypothesis 3’s contention 
when the level of media access is “limited”.  
When media access is “widespread”, the difference in predicted probabilities of civil 
conflict between “high” and “low” media freedom media environments is slight.  While 
negligible, the “low” media freedom type does demonstrate a slightly lower likelihood of civil 
conflict than the “high” media freedom media environment.  Using the highest level of media 
access to compare the media types, the difference between “high” and “low” media freedom 
types is less than 1%.  True, the “high” media freedom media type demonstrates a greater 
likelihood of civil conflict when media access is 830, this is not a substantively distinct 
difference.  This is an intriguing result which, I find, underscores the impact that “widespread” 
pro-regime messages likely have on the regime capabilities perceptions that crystallize for both 
Elite and Non-Elite prospective rebels.  The implication of this result that a state which is able to 
heavily control the definition of newsworthiness and the content of news media can likely 
influence the regime capabilities perceptions of a population with significant access to mass 
media.  By manufacturing “strong” regime capabilities perceptions in a population, a state can 
pacify prospective rebels by increasing the cost to rebel factor in the rebellion decision calculus.  
In short, interestingly, a propaganda-type media produces a lower predicted probability of civil 
conflict than a watchdog free media when media access is “widespread”.  
Moreover, the predicted probabilities of civil conflict for “high” and “low” media 
freedom media environments do not support the contentions and supporting theoretical 
expectations in Hypothesis 3.  While Figure 4.3 shows that the “high” media freedom has 
slightly higher probability of civil conflict than the “low” type, the opposite occurs when media 
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access is “limited” which contradicts Hypothesis 3’s contention.  Considering this finding, I am 
able to confidently reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 3.  
In sum, the predicted probabilities estimation graphically sheds light on the nuanced 
effect that Media Interaction has upon the likelihood of civil conflict onset.  By separating the 
data into “high” and “low” media freedom media environments, Figure 4.3 illustrates the 
differences in the likelihood of civil conflict between the categories as the level of media access 
changes.  Using these graphical results, I was able to reject the null hypothesis for Hypotheses 1 
and 2; however, I failed to reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 3.  On Hypothesis 1, 
although the “high” media freedom type fits Hypothesis 1’s contentions, the lack of a substantive 
effect diminishes the importance of this finding.  On Hypothesis 2, the significant and 
substantive change in the likelihood of civil conflict for “low” media freedom as media access 
varies is the novel finding in the predicted probabilities estimation.  Here, I show support for the 
contentions that, when considered in tandem, media freedom and media access effect rebellion 
behavior but only when media freedom is “low”. 
  
“MOST SIMILAR” CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT: GUINEA AND TAJIKISTAN 
 The predicted probabilities estimation in Figure 4.3 nicely illustrates support for 
Hypothesis 2 where the likelihood of civil conflict decreases as media access increases in a 
“low” media freedom media environment.  However, this conclusion remains removed from the 
real world; a tangible, real world element is missing from the findings.  I contend that a “most 
similar” controlled experiment can bridge the predicted probabilities results and Media 
Interaction’s hypothesized effect on the likelihood of civil conflict.  By comparing two “low” 
media freedom states with similarly “weak” state capacity levels, I can control the objective 
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indicators of state strength and, at the same time, vary my media effect indicator, the level of 
media access.  If the countries demonstrate a difference in the predicted probability of civil 
conflict, the controlled experiment would suggest that a subjective, perceptual element of state 
capacity strength influences the likelihood of civil conflict.   
The controlled experiment set up is a straightforward four-step process.  First, I begin by 
selecting two countries, Country A and Country B.  As I am analyzing Media Interaction’s 
predictive capacity in “low” media freedom media environment, both states must have similar 
Freedom House “low” press freedom scores.  Second, in order to control for the state capacity 
literature’s proposed effects, Country A and Country B need to possess similarly weak levels of 
state capacity.  While acknowledging that no two states are exactly alike, I choose the states with 
similarly low per capita revenues, small militaries, and anocratic political institutions.  Third, just 
as Figure 4.3 suggests that the likelihood of civil conflict decreases as the level of media access 
increases in a “limited” media freedom media environment, the controlled experiment hinges on 
Country A and Country B possessing very different levels of media access.  In order to match the 
Hypothesis 2’s civil conflict likelihood directionality, Country A will have a “limited” level of 
media access and Country B will possess at least a “moderate” level of media access.  Finally, 
fourth, I generate a predicted probability of civil conflict for each country year observation in the 
dataset, using the Clarify program.  
The two countries I choose from the dataset for the controlled experiment are Guinea 
(1999) and Tajikistan (2002).  The matching process was constrained by the fact that matching 
states on multiple dimensions is inherently difficult to accomplish and the timeframe of analysis 
is only twelve years.  That said, these two states are fairly similar and both demonstrate weak 
state capacities across several of the state capacity indicators.  Table 4.4 illustrates these 
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similarities.  Guinea and Tajikistan both possess “low” levels of media freedom (Freedom House 
scores of 71 and 76, respectively), similarly small militaries (20
th
 percentile and 10
th
 percentile in 
the entire dataset, respectively), low per capita revenues (15
th
 percentile and 21
st
 percentile 
respectively), and are anocratic political institutions (each are coded as a nine on the one to 
twenty Polity2 scale).  Additionally, Guinea and Tajikistan have similar population sizes, neither 
has experienced a prior conflict, and neither possesses significant oil reserves.  While Guinea and 
Tajikistan are highly similar on media freedom, state capacity, and other factors, the two states 
differ significantly on two dimensions: the level of media access and the predicted probability of 
civil conflict. 
Guinea (1999) has only 16 televisions per 1,000 people.  By comparison, Tajikistan 
(2002) has 287 televisions per 1,000 people.  The astute reader will note that 287 is a “moderate” 
not a “widespread” level of media access.  I had to sacrifice some level of media access to 
maximize the weak state capacity similarities between the two countries.  This is not necessarily 
a problem as the 287 level of media access is largely right of the “low” media freedom’s near-
exponential decrease in Figure 4.3.  While not quite “widespread”, Tajikistan possesses a level of 
media access almost 18 times greater than Guinea.   
Comparing the predicted probabilities of civil conflict, Tajikistan is estimated at a 2.44% 
and Guinea at 9.07%.  If the state capacity literature’s objective contentions are correct, no 
meaningful difference in the predicted probabilities of civil conflict should be estimated between 
Tajikistan and Guinea.  Rather, if a state is weak on all three dimensions of state capacity, the 
predicted probability of civil conflict should be high in both Tajikistan and Guinea.  On the 
contrary, these results support my subjective, perceptual explanation that state capacity is not  
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directly observable through the objective state capacity indicators.  Despite the same level of 
state strength in Tajikistan and Guinea, Media Interaction acts as an indirect indicator of state 
capacity in “low” media freedom media environments.   
Overall, the low predicted probability of civil conflict in Tajikistan suggests that the state 
capacity indicators alone are not enough to determine the likelihood of civil conflict.  By 
constraining the level of media freedom and providing at least a “moderate” level of media 
access to its populace, these results strongly suggest that regimes, even when weak, can reduce 
the likelihood of civil conflict by manufacturing strength in prospective rebels’ regime 
capabilities perceptions.  In short, regimes are only weak if they are perceived to be weak by the 
prospective rebels, and, only through the Media Interaction subjective indicator, can this 
divergence in the predicted probability of civil conflict be determined.   
131 
 
CONCLUSION  
Chapter IV offered an empirical examination of the theoretical explanations hypothesized 
in Chapter III.  Using a series of logistic regression estimations, I demonstrated that media 
freedom and media access, together, is a significant predictor of the likelihood of civil conflict 
onset. I calculate the predicted probabilities in “high” and “low” media freedom media 
environments as the level of media access changes.  The graphical findings demonstrate mixed 
results for my three hypotheses.  When media freedom is “high” regardless of the level of media 
access, the likelihood of civil conflict is low.  Conversely, when media freedom is “low”, Figure 
4.3 shows that the likelihood of civil conflict changes significantly as the level of media access 
varies.  Here, as theorized in Chapter III, the likelihood of civil conflict is low when the level of 
media access is “widespread”.  I argue that, because the pro-regime message is likely both 
asymmetrically loud and widely available for reception in this media system type, both Elite and 
Non-Elite prospective rebels are likely to accept these messages as their regime capabilities 
perceptions.  Given that that likely message content espouses regime capabilities “strength”, 
prospective rebels like accept these cues as their regime capabilities perceptions.  Using these 
perceptions to calculate their rebellion decision calculi, the Elite and Non-Elite prospective 
rebels are likely to calculate that the regime is difficult to defeat and thereby remain 
noncombatants.  In the controlled experiment, the low predicted probability of civil conflict in 
Tajikistan (2002) appears to demonstrate that, through a controlled mass media and at least a 
“moderate” level of media access, a regime can manufacture strength and pacify prospective 
rebels. 
As the availability of mass media decreases, Non-Elite prospective rebels likely receive 
less pro-regime media messages.  In the place of pro-regime media messages, Non-Elite 
132 
 
prospective rebels gather information from other, limited information sources to form 
perceptions on the regime’s capabilities.  Here, Non-Elite prospective rebels likely replace 
misinformation for limited information which influences their regime capabilities perceptions.   
While “limited” media access likely insulates Non-Elite prospective rebels from pro-regime 
biased media messages, their increased reliance on limited information sources heightens the 
odds of crystallizing regime capabilities misperceptions.  The probability of civil conflict is 
shown to increase as the level of media access decreases in a state in Figure 4.3.  This result is 
mirrored in the controlled experiment as well; whereas Guinea is unable to effectively use 
controlled mass media influence prospective rebel regime capabilities perceptions due to 
“limited” media access.  Ultimately, when considering the empirical results from Tables 4.1 and 
4.2 along with Figure 4.3’s predicted probabilities and the controlled experiment, I conclude that 
Media Interaction can influence the likelihood of civil conflict but only when media freedom is 
“low”.  
In the next chapter, I first consider how my dissertation fits in and affects the civil 
conflict literature.  Next, I discuss a few of the obvious challenges my study was required to 
work around.  Finally, I propose two particular directions of future research given the challenges 
and data limitations. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
 Chapter V concludes the dissertation by discussing three topics.  First, I review my 
theoretical contentions, the empirical findings, and the conclusions drawn in the prior four 
chapters.  Next, I consider how a prospective rebel’s perception of regime capabilities and Media 
Interaction should be incorporated into the existing literature.  I offer both general and specific 
places for this relationship’s inclusion into the literature.  I close the chapter by discussing some 
of the data limitations and theoretical challenges in the dissertation.  As a result, I propose areas 
of future research that can buttress and expand my study. 
 
REVIEW 
My dissertation began with the question, “why do prospective rebels choose to 
rebel”?  Of course, nearly infinite reasons exist why an individual prospective rebel takes up 
arms against his or her incumbent regime.  One particular explanation of civil conflict onset is an 
analysis of a state’s capacity.  Using factors like military strength and bureaucratic capacity, state 
capacity research determines that the likelihood of civil conflict increases as the incumbent 
regime’s capacity to combat a rebellion weakens.  My dissertation begins by identifying a 
fundamental gap in the state capacity literature’s theoretical causal chain: the informational 
assumption.  Here, the state capacity literature assumes, albeit implicitly, a prospective rebel 
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knows a regime’s strength and thereby when to rebel base on these capabilities factors.  In short, 
prospective rebels are assumed to have complete information.   
I argue complete information is an unrealistic assumption and that prospective rebels 
probably possess incomplete information.  However, with this new assumption comes equally 
new questions: where does a prospective rebel likely get regime capabilities information from, 
do these sources likely influence a prospective rebel’s perception differently, do all prospective 
rebels possess the same informational access, and how do these regime capabilities perceptions 
affect a prospective rebel’s rebellion decision calculus?  First, by assuming that prospective 
rebels likely have only incomplete information, I fundamentally reconsider how prospective 
rebels calculate their rebellion decision.  Here, a prospective rebel’s rebellion calculus is not 
derived from the regime’s actual capabilities, rather, their perception of it. As such, I argue that 
the level and type of regime capabilities information that a prospective rebel possesses likely has 
some effect on the rebellion calculus.   
When considering the sources of information that are likely available for prospective 
rebels to gather regime capabilities information from, I argue that mass media is potentially the 
most informative as it can provide regime capabilities information at the national 
level.  However, mass media can be manipulated by regimes and is not necessarily equally 
accessible to all prospective rebels.  These structural effects present an informational variance 
not only between countries but also within domestic populations.  Moreover, I contend it is the 
combination of these mass media factors that shape a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities 
perception.   
Employing a variant of Zaller’s RAS model, the crossover effect model, I assert that a 
prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perceptions are likely influenced as these two structural 
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factors covary in scope.  Separating states into “high” and “low” media freedom media 
environments, I assess the probability that a state experiences civil conflict as the level of media 
access varies.  I propose that the likelihood of civil conflict increases, regardless of the media 
freedom level, as the level of media access decreases.  Furthermore, I also hypothesize that 
“high” media freedom media environments are comparatively more likely to experience civil 
conflict than “low” media freedom ones.  I test these hypotheses using a logistic regression to 
estimate the significance of the mass media interaction term.  I determine that Media Interaction 
significantly predicts the likelihood of civil conflict and is signed appropriately per my 
theoretical expectations.  However, the logistic regression results represent only the first 
statistical hurdle; it does not offer a dynamic description of the relationship between civil conflict 
onset and the interaction term.  In order to accomplish this, I employ the Clarify program to 
produce predicted probabilities of the likelihood of civil conflict as the level of media access 
varies.  As my predictor variable is an interaction term, I isolate the level of media freedom as 
my constant term.  But, as I expect a difference in the likelihood of civil conflict exists in the 
level of media freedom, I separate media freedom into two media environment categories, “high” 
and “low”, estimate the predicted probabilities for each, and compare the two results.   
Graphing the predicted probabilities, I determine mixed results for my three hypotheses.  
As I hypothesize, the probability of civil conflict increases as the level of media access decreases 
in both media freedom media environments.  However, a substantive change in the probability of 
civil conflict is only demonstrated in the “low” media freedom media environment.  Making 
sense of these results, I conclude that, while the likelihood of civil conflict increases as the level 
of media access decreases, the substantive effect only occurs when the level of media freedom is 
“low”.  I argue that the probability of civil conflict is low due to the nested political freedoms 
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that likely come with “high” media freedom environments.  Here, the regime may be weak and 
prospective rebels should choose to rebel, but the other political freedoms offered make rebellion 
more costly than intra-institutional political action which alters the rebellion decision calculus.  
In short, political freedoms like a transparent, inclusive political system likely spillover which 
reduces the probability of civil conflict, regardless of the level of media access.   
When the level of media freedom is “low”, a prospective rebel is not faced with the same 
political freedom spillover.  Rather, a prospective rebel likely contends with a different 
informational dilemma: misinformation.  While I cannot know exactly what content and cues are 
included in every mass media message in every country with a “low” media freedom level, it is 
not egregious to assume that content is pro-regime biased when a regime has significant control 
over the mass media institution.  Therefore, when media access is “widespread”, all prospective 
rebels are likely to use and receive pro-regime messages on the level of regime capabilities.  
Because of the controlled content environment, these pro-regime messages are likely 
asymmetrically loud.  Combining these two factors, I hypothesize that all prospective rebels are 
likely to form regime capabilities perceptions similar to pro-regime cues in the media messages.  
Using these perceptions as part of their rebellion decision calculus, I hypothesize that the “low” 
media freedom media environment should demonstrate a low likelihood of civil conflict when 
media access is “widespread”.  The predicted probabilities estimation lends support to this 
contention in that the likelihood of civil conflict is sub-1% in the “low” media freedom and 
“widespread” media access media system type.  I conclude this result directly stems from 
prospective rebels having significant access to pro-regime biased mass media.   
As the level of media access decreases, the less likely pro-regime media messages will 
influence the perception of the regime’s capabilities.  Consequently, prospective rebels likely 
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increasingly rely on the limited information sources for regime capabilities information.  Here, I 
hypothesize that Non-Elite prospective rebels are more likely to formulate misperceptions of the 
regime’s capabilities and chose to rebel due to the reliance on limited information.  In short, the 
switch from misinformation to limited information likely increases the likelihood of civil 
conflict.  The predicted probabilities estimation supports this theoretical contention; the 
likelihood of civil conflict increases dramatically as the level of media access decreases. 
 
EXPANDED HORIZONS: MASS MEDIA AND PROSPECTIVE REBEL PERCPTION 
IN THE CIVIL CONFLICT ONSET LITERATURE 
 
 Stepping back from the detail of the dissertation, it is important to consider the general 
impact my results have on the broader civil conflict onset literature.  My mass media-civil 
conflict conclusions challenge the state capacity scholars to look beyond the standard military 
size, revenue level, and political institution objective indicators and to consider the predictive 
power that subjective influences on prospective rebels have on the likelihood of civil conflict.  I 
show that even regimes with weak capabilities can demonstrate a low likelihood of civil conflict 
which is counter to the state capacity’s fundamental thesis.   The Tajikistan-Guinea controlled 
experiment highlights how the rebellion decision calculus is a subjective process for the 
prospective rebel, particularly in a “low” media freedom media environment.  By broadcasting 
controlled mass media messages to a public with even “moderate” media access, regimes can 
manufacture a regime capabilities perception of state strength in the minds of prospective rebels 
which pacifies their rebellion decision calculus and lowers the likelihood of civil conflict.  
Moreover, I conclude that a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception, not the actual 
strength, is the indicator for the likelihood of civil conflict, particularly in “low” media freedom 
media environments. 
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My findings suggest that the next wave of civil conflict onset research should continue to 
examine the factors that influence a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception of regime 
strength.  This dissertation focuses on the influential role mass media has on a prospective 
rebel’s regime capabilities perception and the rebellion decision calculus.  Given the newness of 
this research direction, countless areas of future research exist.  I propose a few ripe research 
ideas for the eager civil conflict scholar, a few of which particular address some of the 
challenges and assumptions particular to my dissertation. 
LIMITED INFORMATION SOURCES 
 In my dissertation, I operate under the assumption that information from non-mass media 
sources is limited and thereby less informative for a prospective rebel.  As such, personal 
experience does not offer a holistic picture of the regime’s actual aggregate capabilities due to 
the fact that prospective rebels likely only observe phenomenon near their residences.  While not 
an egregious assumption, research opportunities often arise from assumptions.   
 It is important to continue to refine what prospective rebels likely experience as I theorize 
it can influence their regime capabilities perceptions.  Here, I propose two ways to accomplish 
this objective.  First, a simple proxy for personal experience with regime capabilities would be 
distance from the capital.  In a sense, this proxy would replace one assumption with a more 
theoretically-derived one where a prospective rebel’s personal experience is more likely provide 
accurate information on the regime’s capabilities the closer he or she is to the epicenter of the 
regime’s power.   
 Second, given the technological advancements in geographic information systems (GIS) 
data, political science, and even more specifically civil conflict, scholars have begun to utilize it 
to test hypotheses with spatial elements.  A more advanced personal experience proxy could 
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include GIS data and a coding initiative.  Using geographic mapping and military research by 
country, a civil conflict research could replace “the capital” in the simple proxy with military 
bases.  While the capital likely has a significant military presence, other military installations 
outside of the capital can shape a prospective rebel’s regime capabilities perception just as well.  
For example, while the residents of South Hill, Virginia are closer to Washington DC than those 
of Fayetteville, North Carolina, the Fayetteville residents live less than 10 miles for Fort Bragg.  
I would expect the Fayetteville residents, by virtue of their proximity to one of the largest US 
military bases, possess a more accurate perception of the US’s military capabilities than the 
resident of South Hill despite being farther from Washington DC.  To be certain, a cross-national 
military base GIS coding would be a very rewarding project that could yield a better 
understanding of personal experience’s varying influence on a prospective rebel’s regime 
capabilities perception. 
MESSAGE MEDIUM AND MESSAGE CONTENT 
 In the dissertation, I argue that the level of media freedom and the level of media access 
structural effect the information prospective rebels likely receive.  However, I make at least two 
mass media assumptions which offer springboards for future research.  These assumptions are 
the mass media medium chosen and the relationship between media content and behavior.  First, 
the mass media medium I use to represent media access is television which is chosen because it 
avoids the theoretical problems of newspaper and internet.  However, another mass media 
medium avoids these problems as well, radio.   
 When choosing the mass media medium to proxy media access, radio, not television was 
my first preference.  As noted above, radio avoids the theoretical problems presented in 
newspaper and internet and it provides a tougher test; whereas radio has a lower purchase price 
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which closes the informational gap between Non-Elite and Elite prospective rebels, AM and 
shortwave radio greater distances in receptivity than antenna television which would provide 
prospective rebels in even larger area countries with aggregate, national information, and some 
African countries are shown to have gone from radio to internet skipping television as an 
important media information source.  So, why not radio in this study?  In 1995, the World 
Bank’s World Development Index stopped actively collecting Radios per 1,000 people data, and 
by 1997, this radio data was removed from the data set altogether.  Unlike radio, Televisions per 
1,000 people data was available for the entire 1993 to 2004 timeframe.  Television, while not the 
most preferred mass media medium, remains theoretically more viable than newspapers and 
internet. 
In order to include radio as the mass media medium to proxy media access and confirm 
or reject the television results, a researcher would need to search for individual country Radios 
per 1,000 people data by country from 1995 to 2004.  I have undertaken a cursory search for this 
data and it is haphazardly available.  Having said that, testing radio data would provide a crucial 
robustness check to my television conclusions; are these results bound strictly to television or are 
they representative of media effect across mass media mediums.  I cannot stress the importance 
of this proposed research project enough.   
Second, I assume that prospective rebels will consume mass media messages when 
available to them.  On the surface, this assumption seems logical; a prospective rebel is likely 
motivated to learn as much as possible about his or her potential opponent and so assuming high 
cognitive engagement on this issue is not unreasonable.  However, outside of this cognitive 
engagement assumption, I cannot confirm individual prospective rebels actually receive mass 
media and crystallize a regime capabilities perception that includes this information.  In short, it 
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is crucial to make the individual media message reception and individual behavior link in order 
to demonstrate media cue causality. 
Of course, survey data with specific mass media usage questions are rare but available.  
The real hurdle is finding a survey with both specific media usage and rebellion/protest questions 
that was conducted during the cusp of a civil conflict.  Intriguingly, Afrobarometer released a 
survey in late 2013 on social media usage and rebellion/protest participation during the Arab 
Spring.  Having reviewed the survey questions, researchers should be able to gauge whether or  
not a person had access to social media messages, consumed them, and participated in 
(which/how many) protests.  An individual level of analysis study such as this would determine 
the viability of the media access-media reception as well as media effect-rebellion/protest 
behavior assumptions made in my dissertation.  Additionally, it would provide an opportunity to 
theorize about internet’s effect on an individual’s perception and behavior which has become an 
en vogue topic in the political communication sub-field. 
Moreover, I propose that mass media is an important factor when considering the 
likelihood of civil conflict onset.  I offer a multi-faceted theoretical explanation that draws from 
several different civil conflict literatures, political science sub-fields, and social science fields.  
Empirically testing this contention, I determine that mass media is a significant predictor of civil 
conflict onset under certain conditions.  Overall, I present a new method to consider civil conflict 
onset and with it a new research agenda on incomplete information, the prospective rebel, and 
perception. 
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